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Injury compensation claims data are frequently used to measure injury trends; however 
other factors can influence claiming behaviour, such as the financial incentives within the 
insurance setting. Previous studies have looked at the determinants of claims within a 
workers’ compensation claims environment. I make a unique contribution by looking at 
the determinants of claims within the universal no-fault accident compensation 
environment in New Zealand. The determinants are expected to differ from previous 
studies due to the different claiming incentives in a universal environment. 
Chapter 2 provides some background on the legislative settings and chapter 3 reviews 
what is known in the literature about the determinants of injury claims. Chapter 4 
describes the economic theory used to consider incentives in a universal claims 
environment and contrasts it with a workers’ compensation environment. I describe the 
data used for this research in chapter 5. The source is the Statistics New Zealand 
Integrated Data Infrastructure, an anonymised longitudinal linked unit record dataset. 
In chapter 6 I use data on self-reported injury to look at how many injured people have 
an accepted compensation claim. I find that a third of people with a self-reported injury at 
work did not have an ACC claim. There is no significant difference in claiming rates 
between work and non-work injuries. Propensity to claim varies by age and ethnicity, 
most likely reflecting attitudes and access to healthcare treatment.  The findings indicate 
that access to healthcare may be a stronger determinant for claiming work-related injury 
under workers’ compensation than the requirement for proof that the injury is work-
related.  
In chapter 7, I investigate a policy intervention, experience rating, which aims to 
incentivise employers to improve safety but may inadvertently result in underreporting of 
injury claims. I find that experience rating is associated with a small, but not statistically 
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significant, decrease in work claims, with some possible spillover effects in reducing off-
the-job injury. This suggests that, on average, any decrease in work claims was not 
achieved through shifting claims from the work account to the earners’ account.  
Having studied underreporting of claims, chapter 8 looks at a section of the literature 
on overreporting of claims. Research in a workers’ compensation environment 
consistently finds a higher number of injuries on a Monday (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; 
Card & McCall, 1996). One theory is that workers claim off-the-job weekend injuries as 
occurring on the Monday at work to receive workers’ compensation. I test this within the 
New Zealand environment in which compensation is identical for both types of injuries. I 
find excess claims for work and off-the-job injury on Mondays. I also find excess claims 
on a Tuesday. This indicates that incentives in a workers’ compensation environment to 
fraudulently claim weekend injuries as happening at work on the Monday is likely to only 
be part of the explanation for excess claims at the start of the week. 
Claims data provide a powerful source of information about the injury environment. 
The findings in this thesis indicate that a universal claims environment generally 
promotes lodgement of injury claims and discourages misreporting to a greater extent 
than that found under workers’ compensation schemes.  
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Evaluations of injury prevention programmes commonly use workers’ compensation 
claims data as an indicator of injury; however, the occurrence of an injury is not the only 
determinant of whether a claim is lodged and accepted. Claims will underrepresent 
injuries in cases where no claim is made or if the injury is not eligible for compensation 
(underreporting). Alternatively claims will over-represent injury if fraudulent claims go 
undetected (overreporting). The use of claims data in research and evaluation will 
produce biased results if the trend in misreporting differs from the trend in injuries. It will 
also misrepresent the distribution of injury if propensity to claim varies by different 
person or firm characteristics or if there are incentives to misrepresent details of the 
injury such as the setting (e.g., whether the injury occurred at work or at home). 
For injury insurers, regulators, policymakers or employers, potential impacts of 
unwittingly depending on biased results include underinvestment in workplace injury 
prevention, incorrect conclusions as to the effectiveness of injury prevention programmes 
and inequitable funding of compensation for work injury. Depending on the form that 
claiming incentives take, it may also have a negative impact on the physical and mental 
wellbeing of injured workers. However, depending on who is monitoring injury trends, 
such bias may not be perceived to be a problem. For example, if an insurer is looking at 
means to reduce claims, they may logically favour reducing their costs rather than 
considering injury reduction per se.  
This thesis examines three aspects of the determinants of claiming within a universal 
scheme:  
  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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1. The proportion of people who do not receive injury compensation following an 
injury and their characteristics (chapter 6);  
2. The impact of a particular financial incentive scheme (Experience rating) in 
relation to whether it inadvertently increases misreporting (chapter 7); and  
3. A day-of-the-week effect in workers’ compensation claims in relation to whether 
it is caused by people claiming off-the-job injuries as occurring at work (chapter 
8). 
The research uses data sourced from the Statistics New Zealand Integrated Data 
Infrastructure (IDI). The IDI is a linked longitudinal dataset of administrative unit-record 
data for the full population of individuals and firms. The core population of the IDI (the 
‘spine’) is sourced from tax data, immigration visas and birth records. Other types of 
information have been linked to the IDI spine, such as accident compensation claims and 
Statistics New Zealand survey data.  
This thesis makes a unique contribution to the literature by utilising two important 
differences between the New Zealand accident compensation scheme and those found in 
other countries. Firstly, whenever a person seeks treatment for an injury in New Zealand 
(e.g., visits a doctor, dentist, physiotherapist); they are asked to complete a claim form. 
The treatment provider sends the form to the insurance provider on the patient’s behalf. 
This differs from some schemes where the employer submits the claim for workers’ 
compensation on the employee’s behalf. A requirement for workers to inform their 
employers of an injury can discourage some workers from claiming (Taylor Moore, 
Cigularov, Sampson, Rosecrance, & Chen, 2013). 
Second, New Zealand provides comprehensive injury cover for everyone in New 
Zealand – including workers in all industries, the self-employed, non-earners, and 
tourists. This feature allows me to test hypotheses on misreporting of work claims as non-
  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
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work claims (and vice versa) and I can test whether results found in other countries using 
workers’ compensation data also apply to non-work injury.  
By using data from the IDI this thesis includes information on both claimants and non-
claimants and has a broader suite of firm characteristics than that typically sourced from 
claims data alone.   
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 describes the legislative settings of the 
universal claims environment studied here. Chapter 3 sets the scene by outlining what is 
known from the literature about the determinants of injury claims. Chapter 4 describes the 
formal economic theory of incentives in a universal claims environment. The IDI data 
used for this research is described in chapter 5. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 each examine a 






2 Legislative Settings 
The universal injury claims environment in New Zealand, is central to this study of the 
determinants of claiming for workplace injury. This chapter outlines the legislative 
settings in New Zealand and describes how they differ from other countries. 
2.1 The Accident Compensation Act 
The New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) was established in 
1974 under the Accident Compensation Act 1972 and the 1973 Amendment to the Act. 
The no-fault personal injury scheme is based on recommendations in the Woodhouse 
Report (Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry 1967) which focuses on the five principles of community 
responsibility, comprehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, real compensation and 
administrative efficiency. 
Under the Act, everyone in New Zealand receives comprehensive injury cover 
(including tourists and self-employed workers). When a person seeks treatment for an 
injury (e.g., visits a doctor, dentist, physiotherapist) they are asked to complete an ACC 
form, irrespective of who they are, how the injury occurred, and level of awareness of 
entitlements. The treatment provider completes information on initial diagnosis and 
ability to work (if relevant) and sends the form to ACC on the patient’s behalf. Private 
health insurance coverage does not overlap accident insurance, rather it provides 
additional coverage to complement that which is provided by ACC. Therefore, claims 
made under the scheme provide reasonably complete coverage of injuries in New 
Zealand, for which treatment is sought from doctors, dentists and physiotherapists.  
                                                                   CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE SETTINGS 
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In New Zealand, there is a one-week stand-down period for loss of earnings 
compensation. If it is a work injury, this excess is paid for by the employer (Accident 
Compensation Act 2002 s97); if it is a worker injured off-the-job, it is paid through 
sick leave or annual leave employment entitlements (Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2017b). ACC pays weekly compensation of 80% of pre-injury earnings 
(Accident Compensation Act 2002, sch 1 s32). The current gross maximum rate of 
weekly compensation payable is NZ$1,940.75 per week (applies from 1 July 2017 to 
31 June 2018) (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2017a). 
2.2 Scheme funding 
Funding for the scheme is split into five accounts (Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2015c). Eligibility for injury cover does not vary by the account used.
1
 
 The Work Account, funded by a levy on employers and self-employed workers 
and shareholder-employees. It covers work injuries for people in paid 
employment. 
 The Earners’ Account, funded by a levy on earnings. It covers non-work injuries 
to people in paid employment. 
 The Motor Vehicle Account, funded by a levy included in the price of petrol and 
the motor vehicle licensing fee. It covers all injuries involving motor vehicles on 
public roads (including work-related, earner and non-earner injuries). 
 The Non-Earners’ Account, funded from general taxation.  It covers injuries for 
people not in paid employment. This includes students, beneficiaries, retired 
people, tourists and children. 
                                                 
1
 The focus of this thesis is injuries, for which eligibility does not vary by funding account; however, 
eligibility for cover for gradual process injury, disease and illness only apply if it is work-related (the work 
account). 
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 The Treatment Account, funded by the Earners’ and Non-Earners’ Account. It 
covers injuries that are caused by, or happen during, medical treatment. 
2.3 Legislative change 
There have been several major changes to the scheme since it was established. Some 
of the shifts in the scheme’s focus can be seen reflected in changes to the name of the Act 
as shown in Figure 2.1 (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2015b). 
In 1982 the scheme was reviewed in response to the rising costs. Among other 
changes, it went from being fully funded to pay-as-you-go; work-related motor-vehicle 
accidents were moved from the Work Account to the Motor Vehicle Account; and wage 
replacement compensation was reduced from 100 percent of wages to 80 percent. 
In 1992 the scheme was reviewed in terms of fairness. Among other changes, the 
earners’ account was introduced (previously funded from the work account), experience 
rating was introduced for the work account (individual employers receive penalties or 
discounts on their levies based on their own claims performance), lump sum 
compensation payments were replaced by periodic payments, and the accredited 
employers programme was introduced. The accredited employers programme is a 
programme whereby employers who have been verified by ACC as having good health 
and safety systems can choose to take on some of the risks and claims management for 
work-related injury for their employees, in exchange for a levy reduction. These 
accredited employers tend to be large businesses. 
In 1999 workers’ compensation was opened to the private market. ACC was no longer 
allowed to provide workers’ compensation, although self-employed workers could choose 
to stay with ACC; however, this only lasted for one year. Work Account claims data in 
1999 are not a reliable reflection of work injury claims paid because not all insurers 
reported claim numbers to ACC. The drop in the number of work account claims during 
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this period can be seen in Figure 2.2. From 1 July 2000 ACC was restored as the sole 
provider of workplace accident insurance, the scheme was shifted from pay-as-you-go to 
fully-funded and ACC re-established the Accredited Employers Programme.  
Later in the 2000s, changes were made to increase focus on injury prevention and 
rehabilitation and broaden the types of injury covered. In 2005 medical misadventure 
became covered as part of no-fault insurance and was renamed treatment injury. The 
definition of injury was also extended to include poisoning from mushrooms and injuries 
sustained from twisting. In 2008 coverage was extended to include mental health 
problems resulting from an injury and some of the barriers to claiming for occupational 
gradual-process were reduced. In 2010 a provision was introduced enabling a separate 
motorcycle levy. 
2.4 A model of the drivers of claims 
All injuries that result from an accident are eligible for accident compensation in New 
Zealand, irrespective of whether it was work-related. This should increase uptake of 
accident compensation in New Zealand, relative to other countries; however, some 
eligibility requirements remain. For example, ACC only covers injuries caused by 
accidents, it does not cover things such as illness (e.g., measles), conditions from ageing 
(e.g., arthritis) and emotional issues (e.g., stress). Although ACC covers work-related 
gradual process injury, disease and infection, there are specific requirements that need to 
be met under s30 of the Accident Compensation Act 2001 for such a claim to be 
compensable (e.g., the claimant performs an employment task that causes or substantially 
contributes to the harm and it is not found to any material extent in the non-employment 
activities or environment of the person).  
In an analysis of ACC appeals processes, Powell, Forster, Barraclough, and Mijatov 
(2015) find that there are systematic barriers to people who appeal ACC decisions. These 
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appeals relate to both the initial claim acceptance decision, and subsequent decisions 
regarding entitlements following acceptance of a claim. During the study period, it was 
estimated that of the 10-12 million claims lodged with ACC, 6 million were declined, and 
40,000 were appealed. The report identifies that the need for an injured person to provide 
proof is a major issue in the judgement. An injured person is required to prove exactly 
what their injury is, to prove that their injury is caused by an accident and to prove that 
their need for entitlements is caused by the injury.  
Figure 2.3 displays the ACC model of the drivers of claims. Important influencers on 
the number of claims filed as identified in the model include the seriousness of injury, the 
cost and accessibility of treatment, the impact on work, and the treatment provider’s 
beliefs about the value of claiming and the likelihood of a claim being accepted. Whether 
or not claims are accepted by ACC depends on the policy and operational settings that 
determine eligibility when the claim is made, including the standard of proof required (R. 
W. Hansen, MacAvoy, & Smith, 1989). Changes to any of these influencers may alter 
accepted claim numbers without changing injury incidence.  
2.5 Funding of health services  
Accident compensation in New Zealand, sits within a mixed private-public funding 
model for primary healthcare and a fully-funded publicly-provided secondary healthcare 
model. Primary health care services are funded through District Health Boards (DHBs). 
Funding is based on the number of people enrolled with a Primary Health Organisation 
(PHOs), and the demographic composition of their enrolled population, rather than the 
number of visits (Ministry of Health, 2014); although general practitioners (GP) retain the 
right to charge user-fees (Ministry of Health, 2017b). Primary health care subsidies have 
been found to be effective at targeting those most likely to have the greatest need for 
health services (Cumming, Stillman, & Poland, 2009).  
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Unlike primary health care, public hospitals are fully-funded and elective services are 
managed on a prioritisation basis. Hospital treatment is free, irrespective of whether the 
person has an injury or illness. The hospital receives funding from ACC to cover the 
injury treatment costs and from the DHB to cover treatment for other reasons (e.g., 
illnesses).  There are some private hospitals available for those willing to pay for non-
urgent treatment. Although New Zealand has a private health insurance market, it is 
relatively small (The Treasury, 2014). In 2015, 71% of healthcare expenditure was 
funded by the government, 9% through accident compensation insurance, 5% by 
voluntary private health insurance and 15% by user charges (OECD, 2017). Figure 2.4 
displays the structure of the New Zealand health and disability sector. 
2.6 How this differs from other countries 
In this section, I compare New Zealand to three other countries that use workers’ 
compensation data for injury prevention research – the United States (US), Canada and 
Australia. The commonality across each of these countries is that there is a compulsory 
no-fault workers’ compensation scheme. In some states in the US and Australia there are 
private insurers as well as state insurers (Institute for Work and Health, 2010; Safe Work 
Australia, 2016). In New Zealand and Canada, the insurance is provided solely by the 
state, although in Canada the provider varies across provinces while in New Zealand, it is 
a single insurer.  
New Zealand has a broader coverage across different types of workers than other 
countries. Everyone who works or owns a business in New Zealand, pays accident 
compensation levies and is entitled to workers’ compensation (Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2017d). In contrast, other countries typically exclude some categories of 
workers, such as self-employed, independent contractors, agriculture workers, domestic 
workers, or small businesses (e.g., fewer than three employees) (Association of Workers' 
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Compensation Boards of Canada, 2016; Safe Work Australia, 2016; Spieler & Burton, 
2012). It is estimated that about 24 percent of jobs in the US (McLaren & Baldwin, 2017) 
and 30 percent of the labour force in Ontario (Mustard, Chambers, McLeod, Bielecky, & 
Smith, 2012) are not covered by workers’ compensation .  
New Zealand, Australia and Canada have a public health care system whereby people 
have access to subsidised treatment whether the injury happened at work or not. The 
system in the US is more complex, with private health insurance generally required to 
cover treatment costs for injuries outside of work (see Figure 2.5). Consequently, in the 
US, a worker pays less for injury treatment if it happens at work than if it had happened 
off-the-job, potentially incentivising people to claim off-the-job injury as occurring at 
work. 
In New Zealand, people have access to loss of income compensation if they require 
more than a week off work to recover from their injury, whether the injury occurred at 
work or not. In Australia, Canada and the US, injured people are only entitled to loss of 
income compensation if the injury happened at work. Consequently, in Australia, Canada 
and the US, a worker receives higher benefits if the injury happens at work than if it had 
happened off-the-job, also potentially incentivising people to claim off-the-job injury as 
occurring at work. 
In this thesis I look at whether the determinants of claims within New Zealand’s 
universal claims environment differ from those found in Australia, Canada and the US. I 
expect to find some differences since the nature of the New Zealand scheme simplifies 
the claims process and reduces incentives for claiming off-the-job injury as occurring at 
work.  In the next chapter I provide further background on the topic and review the 
literature on the determinants of injury claims.  
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2.7 Figures and Tables 
Figure 2.1: Timeline of changes to the name of the Accident Compensation Act 
 
Source: Accident Compensation Corporation (2015b) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Number of claims per month per funding account 
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Figure 2.3: Modelling the drivers of ACC claim growth 
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Figure 2.4: The Structure of the New Zealand health and disability sector 
 
Source: Ministry of Health (2017a) 
  
                                                                   CHAPTER 2: LEGISLATIVE SETTINGS 
14 
 
Figure 2.5: Health and disability funding comparison across four countries 
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3 Literature Review and Background 
3.1 What is injury? 
The mechanism of injury is often defined in public health using the Haddon (1973) 
concept of bodily harm resulting from the transfer of energy; however this definition 
excludes some types of harm, such as psychological harm resulting from sexual abuse, 
that are often considered injury (Langley & Brenner, 2004). In practice, injury insurers 
decide whether to accept a claim as an injury and, where disputed, the courts determine it. 
The ambiguity associated with the definition of injury represents a challenge in 
quantifying misreporting of injury. This is generally addressed in the literature by 
assuming that the gap in reporting between two or more injury surveillance systems 
represents a lower bound on injury underreporting. An example is displayed in Figure 
3.1. If the first data source consists of A and B and the second data source consists of B 
and C (where B is the overlap between the two data sources), then the lower bound on 
injury underreporting for the first data source is assumed to be equal to C. I have applied 
this practice here. 
3.2 Injury surveillance systems 
Injury surveillance systems capture time series information about how many people 
are injured, the characteristics of injured people, how the injuries occurred and the risk 
factors associated with the injuries (Holder et al., 2001). This information can be used to 
assess the need for injury prevention efforts by quantifying the size and cost of the 
problem; target interventions through analysis of characteristics associated with injuries; 
and evaluate the effectiveness of injury prevention efforts. Surveillance systems are 
                                                                   CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
16 
 
usually based on administrative data, such as hospital records, as these are more 
affordable sources of time series data than primary data collection (although repeat 
surveys are sometimes used). A summary of some of the more commonly used data 
sources are displayed in Figure 3.2.  
3.3 Misreporting of injury within compensation claims 
data 
In this thesis I investigate the use of injury compensation claims within the context of 
an injury surveillance system.  One of the challenges with using administrative data to 
monitor injuries is that trends may be driven by factors other than injury risk, such as 
trends in health care utilisation (Cryer & Langley, 2008). If the data are used without 
consideration of these drivers it could lead to incorrect conclusions about the need for 
investment in injury prevention, inequitable distribution of injury prevention resources 
and inaccurate assessments regarding the effectiveness of injury prevention programmes.  
The extent to which a surveillance system over- or under- represents injury is referred 
to in this thesis as ‘misreporting’. I use the term ‘underreporting’ when claims data are 
missing some injuries and the term ‘overreporting’ where there are more claims than 
injuries (e.g., fraudulent claims).  This does not imply that there are inaccuracies in the 
collection of information by the accident insurer, but rather a misalignment between the 
information collected to administer injury compensation and the secondary use of this 
information for injury surveillance.   
3.4 Estimates of injury underreporting  
The extent of injury underreporting within workers’ compensation varies across 
studies and jurisdictions, with estimates ranging from about 30 percent (Shannon & 
Lowe, 2002) to 83 percent (Safe Work Australia, 2011); however, if one compares like 
with like, the results are remarkably consistent across countries. For example, a 2003 
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Canadian study finds that 35 percent of respondents with injury or illness do not make a 
claim (Mustard et al., 2003), while a more recent Australian survey of workers with an 
injury or illness produces the very similar result of 36 percent (Safe Work Australia, 
2011).  
Reporting of workers’ compensation claims tends to be higher for injuries and lower 
for occupational illnesses, possibly due to variation in latency and ease of attribution to 
work. Underreporting of workers’ compensation claims is estimated to be approximately: 
 30 percent for those with a work-related injury (excluding work-related illness) 
(Shannon & Lowe, 2002);  
 35 percent for those with a work-related injury or illness (Mustard et al., 2003; 
Safe Work Australia, 2011) 
 42 percent for those with a work-related musculoskeletal injury (gradual process) 
(Biddle & Roberts, 2003); and  
 69 percent for those with suspected occupational silicosis (occupational disease) 
(Stanbury, Joyce, & Kipen, 1995). 
The degree of reporting is also related to the seriousness of the injury or illness. The 
above estimates of non-claiming behaviour are based on injuries that resulted in a week 
or more away from work. If more minor injuries are included, the estimated degree of 
underreporting increases substantially (Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Rosenman et al., 2000; 
Safe Work Australia, 2011; Shannon & Lowe, 2002). This pattern is shown in Figure 3.3. 
3.5 Reasons for not claiming 
The main method used to identify the reasons why employees do not report work-
related injury is to survey employees and ask them (Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Tucker, 
                                                                   CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
18 
 
Diekrager, Turner, & Kelloway, 2014). This section structures the literature on the 
reported reasons for not making a claim under six common themes. 
3.5.1 They did not think they were eligible for compensation  
Eligibility for injury compensation varies across jurisdictions. Self-employed workers, 
unpaid (voluntary) workers, and bystanders (people not working at the time of injury but 
injured from someone else’s work activity) are commonly (but not always) excluded from 
workers’ compensation schemes. For example, about 30% of the labour force in Ontario 
is in employment situations not covered by workers’ compensation (Mustard et al., 2012). 
In such environments, a change in the labour market towards informal work practices will 
result in a decrease in the proportion of workers eligible for workers’ compensation. This 
decreases the proportion of the working population who make a claim following injury 
and may increase potential claimants’ uncertainty about their coverage because not 
everyone is covered. 
3.5.2 They were uncertain as to whether the injury was work-related. 
In countries where people are only eligible for compensation if the injury is work-
related, assumptions regarding work-relatedness are important in the decision on whether 
to lodge a claim. Interestingly, this has been found to apply even when a person has been 
advised by a health professional that their condition is work-related. Biddle and Roberts 
(2003) find that 21 percent of workers identified by physicians as having work-related 
pain did not make a workers’ compensation claim because they did not think the pain was 
work-related.  
The structure of the questions when researching this topic is likely to be of importance. 
In a similar study, Tucker et al. (2014) find that only three percent of workers gave this 
reason for not reporting lost time work-related injury. The lower estimate by Tucker et al. 
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(2014) may be because workers were asked whether they had a work-related injury that 
caused them to miss time from work before they were asked whether they had reported 
the injuries (and if not why not). If workers were not sure if it was work-related they may 
have responded in the negative to the first question and therefore were not captured in the 
follow-up question. In contrast, Biddle and Roberts (2003) collect data from people 
diagnosed by physicians as having work-related pain. By using an independent source of 
data on work-relatedness, they capture more people who did not think their pain was 
work-related.   
Changes over time to the standard of proof required from claimants will influence 
claim numbers. An increase in the standard of proof is likely to reduce the number of 
claims by ineligible claimants but also reduce claims from eligible claimants who are 
unable or unwilling to produce such proof (R. W. Hansen et al., 1989). Evidence of 
attribution of work is likely to be particularly difficult for gradual process injury and 
occupational disease. Scherzer, Rugulies, and Krause (2005) find that 35 percent of hotel 
workers who filed a claim for work-related pain and discomfort had the claim denied. 
The study did not discuss the reasons why the claims were denied, but one plausible 
reason would be insufficient evidence that the pain is attributable to work.  
The need for evidence impacts not just on the claim denial rate, but also on beliefs 
about whether the claim will be accepted, and therefore the likelihood that a worker will 
make a claim in the first case. Even when a physician has identified that musculoskeletal 
pain is likely to be work-related, a workers’ compensation claim is only made about 25 to 
30 percent of the time (Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Rosenman et al., 2000).
2
  
                                                 
2
 Scherzer et al. (2005) find that only 20 percent of unionised hotel cleaners with self-
reported work-related pain and discomfort file a workers’ compensation claim, and 
Rosenman et al. (2000) find that 25 percent of individuals diagnosed with work-related 
pain (mainly unionised autoworkers) file a workers’ compensation claim.  
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3.5.3 They did not think the injury was serious enough. 
Severity of injury is frequently identified as an important predictor of claiming 
behaviour in regression studies. In one such study, Shannon and Lowe (2002) find that 
workers were more likely to report having made a claim if the injury was serious enough 
to require two or more of: medical attention; time off work; modified duties. Similarly, 
Rosenman et al. (2000) find that severity is the strongest predictor as to whether 
individuals diagnosed with work-related pain filed a workers’ compensation claim. Qin, 
Kurowski, Gore, and Punnett (2014) also find severity to be a significant predictor of 
claiming among skilled nursing facility workers who experienced work-related back pain. 
This implies that workers’ compensation claims provide more complete surveillance for 
injuries that are more severe.  
Mustard et al. (2012) present further evidence in support of this. They compare work-
related injury and illness presenting to Ontario emergency departments to workers’ 
compensation claims. They find that the number of emergency visits is 60 percent higher 
than the number of claims, but when they restrict analysis to serious injury (those 
resulting in a fracture or concussion), the incidence is similar between the two datasets. 
Related to the idea that the injury was not serious enough to report is the perspective 
that pain is part of the job.  A survey of 135 union members working in the construction 
industry finds that the top three reasons for not reporting work-related injury are “My 
injury was small, so I don’t need to report it”; “I accept that pain is a natural part of the 
job”; and “home treatment, anti-inflammatories, pain medication, heat, etc., are sufficient 
to deal with my problems” (Taylor Moore et al., 2013). Variation in attitudes will lead to 
variation in injury reporting. 
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Another source of variation is attitudes to treatment of injuries; this frequently varies 
by culture. For example Sobrun-Maharaj, Tse, and Hoque (2010) find that some people in 
Asian communities prefer to self-diagnose or visit a traditional practitioner before they 
will visit a private general practitioner. If these types of treatments are not covered by 
workers’ compensation, people with these cultural preferences will be less likely to 
appear in the claims data. 
3.5.4 They thought the reporting process was too complicated 
Some of the reasons given for not filing a workers’ compensation claim include it 
being too much trouble (Scherzer et al., 2005); workers not knowing that they can claim 
(Fan, Bonauto, Foley, & Silverstein, 2006); and workers not knowing how to claim 
(Scherzer et al., 2005). These studies indicate that increased awareness about eligibility 
for claiming and how to make a claim could reduce underreporting by up to 18 percent.  
3.5.5 Fear of how others might react 
In a qualitative study of unionised construction workers, three of the top six reasons 
identified for why some workers do not report work-related injury to their employer are: 
“I am afraid I will not be hired again by the contractor if I file a workers’ compensation 
claim”; “I’m worried about being labelled as a complainer by my co-workers or 
supervisors”; and I’m concerned about being teased by co-workers for not being tough 
enough” (Taylor Moore et al., 2013).
3
 These fears are likely to disproportionately affect 
workers with tenuous job security such as immigrants, low-income workers and those in 
precarious employment (Azaroff, Levenstein, & Wegman, 2002). 
                                                 
3
 The other three reasons identified were: “I want the safety incentive for no lost work time”; “I accept that 
injury and pain are a part of the job”; and “the paperwork and process for filing workers’ compensation 
claims is complicated”. These reasons are covered under other headings in this section. 
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Few studies attempt to quantify the extent that the fear of how others might react 
impacts on claiming behaviour. Fan et al. (2006) estimate that eight percent of workers 
with a work-related injury or illness do not file a workers’ compensation claim for this 
reason. Similarly Safe Work Australia (2011) find that nine percent of employees did not 
claim out of concern for the possible impact on current or future employment. Qualitative 
research by Sobrun-Maharaj et al. (2010) finds that seeking help when in pain may be 
seen as a sign of weakness in Asian communities in New Zealand, and that not working is 
also seen as a sign of weakness for males. Further, they find that the main reason given 
for not seeking assistance is that ACC claims may affect their employment prospects. 
Although it is illegal in New Zealand, to discriminate against job applicants based on 
current or previous ACC claims (Human Rights Commission, 2016), this clearly remains 
a concern for some workers. 
In a study of unionised hotel cleaners, Scherzer et al. (2005) find that 26 percent of 
workers with work-related pain are afraid to claim. Hotel workers may experience less 
employment security than the general workforce and claims for work-related pain are 
more difficult to attribute to work than injury, which may generate high levels of 
uncertainty and fear; however unionised workers tend to be more likely to claim than 
non-unionised workers (Morse, Punnett, Warren, Dillon, & Warren, 2003), implying that 
fear of claiming might be even higher for non-unionised hotel cleaners. 
These estimates of the size of underreporting in response to fear of how others might 
react are likely to undercount the extent of the problem as some workers may be 
unwilling to give it as the reason for not reporting. If they are worried about others’ 
perceptions of them, they may instead give another reason, such as the injury was not 
serious enough or the injury is just part of the job.  
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Tied closely to fear of consequences is the organisational safety climate. Safety 
climate is the extent that an organisation promotes safety in what it says and does. A 
positive safety climate is likely to address information needs about how to report, as well 
as reduce fear of reporting. Probst, Brubaker, and Barsotti (2008) find that construction 
firms with poor safety climate have much higher underreporting of injuries (81%) than 
those with positive safety climate (47%). Qin et al. (2014) find that skilled nursing 
facility workers are more likely to claim for back pain if job strain is lower (related to 
decision-latitude) and social support at work is higher. Both low job strain and high social 
support are elements of a positive safety climate.  
3.5.6 Financial reasons for not claiming 
Research indicates that when compensation benefits increase, the number of claims 
and length of time off work also increases (Benkhalifa, Lanoie, & Ayadi, 2016; Biddle & 
Roberts, 2003; Bolduc, Fortin, Labrecque, & Lanoie, 2002; Chelius & Kavanaugh, 1988) 
and, vice versa (Chelius & Kavanaugh, 1988). The two main theories of the drivers when 
the benefits are lower are (1) workers take greater care to avoid injury and (2) people are 
less likely to make fraudulent claims. Since fraudulent claims are more likely to be for 
injuries that are hard to diagnose, Bolduc et al. (2002) test this by checking whether the 
distribution of easy-to-diagnose relative to hard-to-diagnose injuries changed following a 
change in benefits. They find that a one percent increase in benefits leads to an increase 
in the proportion of difficult-to-diagnose injuries of 0.1 to 0.4 percentage points (from a 
base of 44 percent).  
An alternative explanation is that when benefits increase, the advantages of making a 
claim increase relative to the disadvantages, making claiming more cost effective for 
injuries that are more difficult to claim for. For example, qualitative research shows that 
some people would choose to work rather than seeking treatment (and making a claim) if 
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the benefits are lower than the income required to support a family (Sobrun-Maharaj et 
al., 2010; Taylor Moore et al., 2013).  
Sobrun-Maharaj et al. (2010) find that some elderly people in Asian communities 
would rather pay for themselves because they do not want to be seen as ‘begging’, while 
Jansen, Bacal, and Crengle (2008) find that some Māori put off visiting the doctor 
because of the cost. If people do not seek treatment or refuse to complete a claim form, 
then they will not be represented in the claims data. 
3.5.7 Access to health services 
People who do not receive treatment for their injury will not appear in the claims data. 
Some of the reasons for not receiving injury treatment have been discussed above (e.g., 
the injury is not serious enough, they cannot afford the treatment, or they prefer 
alternative sources of treatment not covered by the insurance scheme). Additional barriers 
to treatment may include cost, time availability (e.g., caring for others), geographic 
distance, waiting times, availability of after-hours treatment, lack of culturally 
appropriate services, and language differences (J. R. Barnett & Coyle, 1998; R. Barnett, 
2000; Bierman & Clancy, 2000; Ellison-Loschmann & Pearce, 2006; Jatrana & 
Crampton, 2009).  
Studies on primary health care utilisation in New Zealand, typically find that gender, 
age, ethnicity, employment status, deprivation and health status are associated with health 
care utilisation (Cumming, Stillman, Liang, Poland, & Hannis, 2010; Jatrana & 
Crampton, 2009). Attitudes to health services and access to treatment will be an 
important driver of whether an injured person in New Zealand, makes a claim. 
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3.6 Relative importance of reasons for not claiming 
A survey run by the Australian Bureau of Statistics every four years, provides some 
insight into the relative importance of the above reasons for not claiming (Safe Work 
Australia, 2011). The top three reasons given in 2009/10 for not making a workers’ 
compensation claim following work-related injury or occupational disease were:  
1. They considered the injury to be too minor or required too much effort to claim 
(62 percent of injured workers who do not claim);  
2. They did not think they were covered or did not think they were eligible (14 
percent); and  
3. They were concerned it would have a negative impact on employment (eight 
percent). 
Even among those who had five or more days off work from injury, a third of those 
who did not claim stated it was because the injury was minor or claiming required too 
much effort.  
3.7 Characteristics associated with claiming  
Characteristics associated with a higher propensity to claim include injury severity 
(Alamgir, Koehoorn, Ostry, Tompa, & Demers, 2006; Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Qin et al., 
2014; Shannon & Lowe, 2002), having a physical job (Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Qin et 
al., 2014), lower levels of education (Qin et al., 2014), being married (Fan et al., 2006), 
living in an urban area (Koehoorn et al., 2015), being overweight (Fan et al., 2006), being 
in poorer health (Biddle & Roberts, 2003) and having comorbidities (J Wren & Mason, 
2010). A lot of these characteristics also appear to be related to the extent to which 
workers can modify their job to continue working following injury. 
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Findings regarding propensity to claim by different age groups are inconsistent; Biddle 
and Roberts (2003) find that older workers are more likely to claim while Alamgir et al. 
(2006) finds that they are less likely to claim. The difference in results may relate to the 
different populations studied: Biddle and Roberts (2003) sample people identified by 
physicians as having work-related back and arm pain, while Alamgir et al. (2006) look at 
a cohort of sawmill workers. It may be that the culture of older sawmill workers is such 
that they have a lower relative propensity to claim compared to the general population. 
3.8 Underreporting in a universal claims environment 
The determinants of underreporting in a universal claims environment may differ to 
that within a workers’ compensation scheme. For this reason, New Zealand-specific 
literature is described in this section.  
Urangia (2012) compares work-related serious harm reported to the occupational 
health and safety regulator to serious harm claims in the ACC work account for the Fruit 
and Vegetable Wholesale industry in the period 2004 to 2009. Employers are required to 
notify the regulator of serious harm events under the Health and Safety in Employment 
Act 1992.
4
 The results indicate that only 10 percent of serious harm notifications had an 
ACC claim, indicating that claims data underestimate serious harm by at least 90 percent. 
This is a much higher estimate of underreporting than is generally found in the literature 
(e.g., see section 3.4). 
The author suggests some reasons for why many serious harm events do not appear in 
the ACC claims data:  they might fall under an Accredited Employer Programme (where 
employers manage work claims instead of ACC) and therefore would not be captured in 
the data used for her study; the serious harm may be an aggravation of an existing health 
                                                 
4
 The Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 has since been replaced by the Health and Safety at Work 
Act (2015). 
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condition which would not be covered by ACC; and the notification may be for an injury 
too minor to make a claim (leading to lower levels of underreporting of serious harm in 
the claims data if serious harm were correctly specified). Another likely reason not 
mentioned by the author would be that some of the serious harm notifications may have 
been captured in a different claims account. For example, work-related serious harm to 
people not in paid employment at the time of injury (e.g., clients, volunteers, tourists and 
road traffic accidents) would have been captured in the serious harm notifications data 
but not in the ACC work account (these would have been in the non-earners’ account or 
the motor vehicle account).  
In a review of claiming behaviour, ACC find that Māori, Pacific and Asian peoples are 
particularly ‘low-claiming’ (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2008). For example, 
Asians represented seven percent of the New Zealand population in 2006 but only two 
percent in the claims data (Sobrun-Maharaj et al., 2010).  
The New Zealand Health Survey shows that people of Asian ethnicity living in New 
Zealand, are less likely than the full population to have visited a GP, a practice nurse, and 
after hours in the last 12 months; however, they are also less likely to report unmet need 
for primary health care and after-hours services and less likely to report unmet need for 
GP services due to cost. Those of Asian ethnicity have similar rates as the general 
population for being unable to get an appointment within 24 hours at their usual medical 
centre in the past 12 months. This implies that the lower claim rates may be related to 
lower perceived need for treatment rather than barriers to access. Although people of 
Māori ethnicity visited a GP, practice nurse and after hours at similar rates to the full 
population, they are more likely to report having unmet need for these services and more 
likely to have unmet need for GP services due to cost (Ministry of Health, 2012). 
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The design and implementation of workers’ compensation schemes plays a role in the 
extent to which claims data capture injuries. Insurance coverage, ease of claiming and 
awareness of entitlements can all impact on whether a person makes a claim. I would 
expect the complexity of the initial claiming process to be less of an issue in a universal 
claims environment, at least at the initial point of submitting a claim. Treatment providers 
are responsible for completing the form and sending it to ACC. This shifts a lot of the 
effort of claiming from the injured person to the treatment provider. 
 In 2014/15 ACC accepted 1.8 million new claims – “this equates to 30.5 percent of 
New Zealanders receiving compensation or rehabilitation services” (Accident 
Compensation Corporation, 2015a). Despite this, ACC find that 17 percent of the public 
feel ‘not at all informed’ about ACC and 80 percent of the public believe ‘everyone/all 
New Zealanders’ are entitled to help from ACC when they are injured (Accident 
Compensation Corporation, 2007). This implies that despite simplified eligibility in New 
Zealand, awareness of eligibility may still act as a barrier to claiming accident 
compensation for a minority of people. In some cases, language barriers and cultural 
differences may prevent some people from making an ACC claim. Sobrun-Maharaj et al. 
(2010) and DeSouza and Garrett (2005) identify that a lack of information and 
communication about how to make a claim to be a barrier for Asians in New Zealand, 
while Jansen et al. (2008) find that Māori have lower levels of trust and satisfaction with 
ACC relative to other healthcare providers. 
3.9 Workers’ compensation and misreporting of injury 
Scheme incentives designed to improve workplace health and safety by rewarding 
employers or employees for reductions in reported injury can have the unintended 
consequence of increasing underreporting.  Experience rating, zero harm targets in 
workplaces, and safety bonuses have all been criticised for their potential to result in 
                                                                   CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
29 
 
unintended consequences (Arthurs & Shepell, 2012; Lamm, McDonnell, & St John, 
2012; Wuellner & Bonauto, 2014). While much of the criticism is based on theory and 
anecdote, there are some quantitative studies that also support this view. For example, 
Wuellner and Bonauto (2014) use matched workers’ compensation claims and 
establishment survey data to assess underreporting of injury in establishment injury 
records. They find workplaces that use establishment injury records to measure job 
performance have higher levels of underreporting. Experience rating has been similarly 
criticised for incentivising claims management behaviour (Clayton, 2002; Mansfield et 
al., 2012). The next section reviews the literature on experience rating in more depth. 
3.10  Experience rating and claims management 
Economic theory predicts that in the absence of workers’ compensation schemes, 
employers will pay a wage differential to employees to compensate for the job’s injury 
risk. Employers are motivated to improve safety in return for paying lower wages. Market 
mechanisms will result in an efficient equilibrium that balances the costs of safety with 
the costs of wages (Ruser & Butler, 2010). 
In the presence of a workers’ compensation scheme that fully compensates workers for 
injuries, there will not be any compensating wage differentials for injury risk. Instead 
employers pay a flat workers’ compensation levy and employees receive full 
compensation if they have an injury; however, paying a flat levy reduces the potential 
benefits to individual employers from investment in injury prevention. To combat this, 
many compensation schemes add an experience rating component to levies. Experience 
rating adjusts levies based on a firm’s claims history, increasing financial incentives for 
injury prevention.  
Although studies into the effectiveness of experience rating generally find that it 
reduces the number of claims (Tompa, Cullen, & McLeod, 2012), it is also thought to 
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increase claims management. Claims management may take the form of discouraging 
employees from reporting accidents, appealing claims, pressuring workers to return to 
work early, or even falsifying or destroying accident records (Dabee, 2017; Tompa, 
Trevithick, & McLeod, 2007). In New Zealand’s case it could also take the form of 
claiming work-related claims as occurring outside of work. 
A variety of methods have been employed to look at claims management behaviour. 
Thomason and Pozzebon (2002) (Quebec) and Kralj (1994) (Ontario) survey firms about 
changes they made in response to the introduction of experience rating. Both studies find 
that firms use a combination of improvements to health and safety, speedier return-to-
work following serious injury, and increased claims management activity to reduce injury 
claims.  
Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) review the introduction of experience rating in British 
Columbia and find that while some claim types decreased (e.g., health care only and 
short-term disability claims), the more serious claim types did not; however, in this study 
they are unable to distinguish between improved health and safety and claims 
management activity. Tompa, Hogg-Johnson, et al. (2012) address this by looking at the 
relationship between experience rating and the incidence of claim types thought to be 
associated with claims management: no-lost-time permanent impairment claims, 
disputed/denied claims, claim types excluded from experience rating, and claims that 
reopen after the experience-rating window (when the costs no longer impact directly on 
the employers’ levy). They find that a higher degree of experience rating is positively 
related to these types of claims. In contrast, they find no evidence of improvements to the 
permanent injury claim rate - the most serious type of non-fatal claim.  
In an independent review of workers’ compensation funding in Ontario, Arthurs 
(2012) concludes that the experience rating scheme generates incentives for illegal claim 
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suppression and that it is inadequately policed.. He recommends that more be done to 
detect and punish illegal activity and that a controlled experiment be implemented to 
obtain a more reliable assessment of whether experience rating is effective in preventing 
injuries, improving return-to-work for injured workers and avoiding claims suppression. 
Not all studies find evidence of claims management. Neuhauser, Seabury, and 
Mendeloff (2013) hypothesise that claims management would be skewed towards more 
minor injuries and therefore average claim costs would be higher. They find no evidence 
of a change to average claim costs following the introduction of experience rating for 
small firms. Moore and Viscusi (1989) and Ruser (1993) find that an increase in workers’ 
compensation benefits, and therefore insurance premium costs for experience rated firms, 
is associated with fewer fatality claims. They argue that fatality claims are less 
susceptible to claims management and therefore reflect employer improvements to safety; 
however not all types of work have a fatality risk, so it is not clear whether these findings 
would apply to all job types. 
3.11  Incentives to over-claim 
While some incentives in workers’ compensation may work towards discouraging 
people from making eligible claims there are other incentives that may work in the 
opposite direction, encouraging people to make fraudulent claims.  
It has been observed in several countries that there are more workers’ compensation 
claims for injuries on a Monday than any other day of the week (Brogmus, 2007; Richard 
J. Butler, Durbin, & Helvacian, 1996; B. Hansen, 2016; Smith, 1990; Wigglesworth, 
2006). This is referred to as the “Monday Effect” (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & 
McCall, 1996; Martin-Roman & Moral, 2016). A common hypothesis is that excess 
Monday claims are the result of people injured off-the-job in the weekend fraudulently 
claiming that their injuries occurred on-the-job on the Monday to receive workers’ 
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compensation benefits that they would otherwise not receive. This is known in the 
literature as the ‘moral hazard hypothesis’. The worker knows where, when and how the 
injury occurred, but this is not observed by the insurer. 
One of the early studies into this hypothesis was by Smith (1990). He theorised that if 
people were fraudulently claiming weekend injuries as happening at work on a Monday 
then: (1) injuries that are easy to conceal and for which treatment can be easily delayed 
would be overrepresented on a Monday; (2) the injuries would be recorded as occurring 
earlier in the day on a Monday because people would seek to be treated as soon as they 
could reasonably do so without arousing suspicion; and (3) that the effect would be 
stronger on a Tuesday after a public holiday Monday because there had been a longer 
length of time possible for off-the-job injuries to occur. Using workers’ compensation 
data for several states in the United States of America (USA) he finds broad support for 
these theories, although the size of misreporting is quite small – 4% of strains and sprains 
and 1% of fractures equating to 2% of total compensation costs. These results have been 
replicated in other jurisdictions (Card & McCall, 1996; Choi, Levitsky, Lloyd, & Stones, 
1996). 
Card and McCall (1996) test this theory further by looking at whether employees 
likely to be uninsured are more likely to make claims on a Monday and whether 
employers are more likely to dispute Monday claims. They find no support for either of 
these propositions. Like Smith (1990), they find that back injuries and strains are more 
prevalent on Mondays than other weekdays. They conclude there may be physiological 
reasons for higher claims on a Monday. Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) also reach this 
conclusion after comparing the Monday effect in Canada to the US. Unlike the US, 
medical fees for injuries in Canada are fully funded irrespective of whether they are 
work-related, reducing incentives to fraudulently claim. They find that the Monday effect 
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persists and is of a similar magnitude to that found in the US.  Although these studies are 
not conclusive, they cast doubt on the suggestion that fraudulent claims of weekend 
injuries happening at work on a Monday explains the Monday Effect.  
Richard J Butler, Kleinman, and Gardner (2014) take a completely different approach. 
They use data from a single large multi-location national employer. One of the key 
differences between this study and earlier work is that they have data on all employees, 
not just those who make a claim. This allows them to look at the likelihood of having an 
injury on a Monday, relative to other days of the week; rather than relying on 
comparisons of the distribution of different types of injuries. While they find support for 
higher likelihood of claims for sprains and strains on a Monday, when they interact the 
Monday dummy variable with other characteristics thought to be associated with the 
incentive to make fraudulent claims for weekend injury on a Monday at work (such as 
whether they have health insurance with the employer, the wage replacement rate, and 
tenure), none of the interactions are statistically significant. To investigate this further, 
they obtain descriptive statistics for fatalities, medical insurance claims for sprains and 
strains (not just work injury) and sick leave data by day of the week. They find fewer 
fatalities on a Monday, but more strains and sprains and sick leave. This leads the authors 
to conclude that workers may have an aversion to working on Mondays.  
Since then, there have been other studies that claim to find support for the fraudulent 
claims explanation of the Monday Effect. One such study uses a policy change in the 
state of California that makes it harder to make fraudulent claims (B. Hansen, 2016). 
Using a difference-in-differences approach the author finds that sprains and strains on a 
Monday decreased by seven percentage points in California following the policy change, 
with no change in other states. The paper does not discuss whether the reforms might be 
expected to affect legitimate work claims. If the reform also increased the costs of 
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claiming for legitimate work claims (e.g., by increasing the costs associated with proving 
that the injury was work-related), then the decrease does not necessarily represent a 
decrease in fraudulent claims.  
In a similar study,  Martin-Roman and Moral (2016) exploit differences in loss of 
earnings compensation coverage for on-the-job versus off-the-job injury in Spain. In 
Spain, work injuries receive higher compensation than off-the-job injury for the first few 
weeks off work; however, once the person has had more than 20 days off work, both on-
the-job and off-the-job injuries receive the same compensation entitlements. They find 
the Monday effect decreases with time off work, but there is an effect that persists after 
the 20-day mark. The authors conclude that both fraudulent claiming and a physiological 
explanation are at play.  
Almost all the studies reviewed here assume the distribution of work hours is constant 
across weekdays. Only two of the studies tested this assumption. Card and McCall (1996) 
use the work sample from the United States Current Population Survey to look at patterns 
of work by medical coverage. They find that the probability of being at work on any 
given weekday is generally constant, apart from low-wage retail workers who have a high 
probability of being uninsured and a low probability of working on a Monday. 
Subsequently they exclude retail employees from the analysis but still find a Monday 
Effect. Other studies assume that the incidence of injury types less susceptible to 
incentives to fraudulently claim weekend injuries on a Monday at work, such as fractures, 
is a good control for hours of work. They look at the excess size of sprains and strains 
relative to fractures; however, injury hazards associated with fractures are different to the 
hazards associated with sprains and strains so the number of fractures on a Monday may 
not be a good control for the expected number of strains and sprains.  
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Brogmus (2007) calculates day of the week rates per number of work hours using 
Time Use Survey data. The author finds that the rate of Monday lost-time occupational 
injuries is statistically significantly higher than the injury rate on other weekdays. 
Although not directly investigating the Monday effect, Vegso et al. (2007) conduct a 
case-crossover study looking at the role of hours worked in cases where in an injury 
occurred, compared to the same day several weeks earlier where an injury did not occur. 
The data come from a single large multi-site company, and the injury data are sourced 
from its incident management system. The authors study the period one day, two days, 
three days and seven days before the injury. Using a conditional logit model, the authors 
find that the control group was more likely to have not worked in the previous day(s) than 
the injured group, although the difference was not statistically significant. This hints that 
a rest period is not associated with higher risk of injury on return to work. Those who 
worked over 64 hours in the seven days before the injury were statistically significantly 
more likely to have an injury relative to those who worked 0-40 hours in the week before 
(hazard ratio 1.88, 95% confidence interval (1.16-3.05)). This implies that working long 
hours is more likely to be associated with injuries than is a rest period, providing some 
evidence against the ergonomic theory.  
The countries in which these studies have been done either require private health 
insurance to receive cover for off-the-job injuries (e.g., the United States of America) or 
they have a public health care system that covers medical fees for off-the-job injury but 
do not provide benefits for loss of income (e.g., Canada, Australia). This creates 
incentives to claim off-the-job as occurring on-the-job to receive workers’ compensation 
entitlements. New Zealand has a universal accident compensation scheme in which 
injuries receive the same compensation cover (both medical costs and loss of income 
benefits) whether the injury occurs on-the-job or not. This reduces incentives to 
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fraudulently claim off-the-job injury from the weekend as happening at work on the 
Monday compared with other countries. This aspect will be studied in detail in chapter 8. 
3.12  Summary 
The literature suggests that there are seven primary reasons why people might not 
make an accident compensation claim following injury: they may be ineligible for 
compensation; they do not think the injury is serious enough; they are not sure if it is 
work-related; the reporting process is too complicated; fear of how others might react; 
financial reasons; and because they did not get the injury treated.  
This literature review has focused on misreporting within workers’ compensation 
claims data. There is a separate literature, not covered here, on underreporting in data 
captured by health and safety regulators (Wergeland, Gjertsen, & Lund, 2009; Wuellner 
& Bonauto, 2014) and within workplaces (Pransky, Snyder, Dembe, & Himmelstein, 
1999), and in healthcare data (Sears, Bowman, Hogg-Johnson, & Shorter, 2014). 
Spieler and Burton (2012) suggest that removing the need for proof that injury is 
work-related could improve access to compensation for schemes in other countries.  In 
chapter 6 I look at whether underreporting in the universal scheme in New Zealand, is 
lower than that found elsewhere and characteristics associated with having a claim
5
. I 
look at whether experience rating is associated with claims shifting from work injury to 
off-the-job injury in chapter 7 and in chapter 8 I look at whether the “Monday Effect” is 
present in New Zealand, given that on- and off-the-job injury is covered by the same 
entitlements. 
  
                                                 
5
 I am not able to directly measure whether any differences in underreporting are caused by differences in 
the work-relatedness requirement or other differences such as access to treatment; however, I believe the 
question of whether there is a difference remains an interesting one. 
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3.13  Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1: Using two data sources to estimate a lower bound for misreporting of injury 
 
Note: In this example, misreporting of injury is assumed to consist of the gap in reporting 
between data source 1 and data source 2 (A+C) 
 
Figure 3.2: Possible sources of data on injuries, according to severity of injury 
 No injury Mild Moderate Severe Fatal 
Household (community) surveys      
Health clinic records      
Family doctors’ records      
Emergency room records      
Ward admission records      
ICU* admission records      
Death Certificates      
* ICU=Intensive Care Unit 
Source: (Holder et al., 2001) 
 
  
A B C 
Data source 1 
(A+B) 
 
Data source 2 
(B+C) 
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of workers with a work-related injury or illness who do not make a 
workers’ compensation claim  
 
Note: Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
WI = Work-related Injury;  
HPDI = Health Professional Diagnosed Illness;  
WI&I=Work-related injury or illness;  

























































4 Economic Theory 
This chapter outlines a theoretical model of incentives in a universal claims 
environment. It starts with the workers’ compensation environment and then considers 
how incentives vary under universal accident compensation. 
4.1 Worker incentives  
Ruser and Butler (2010) economic theory of workers’ incentives under workers’ 
compensation. Consider a single period. At the start of the period the worker decides how 
much effort, 𝑒, to put into avoiding an injury, given wage W and workers’ 
compensation 𝐵. An injury occurs with probability 𝑝. If the injury occurs, then the worker 
is off work and receives a benefit 𝐵. If the injury does not occur (with probability 1 − 𝑝) 
then the worker receives wage 𝑊. 
The likelihood of an injury is: 






> 0,    (4.1) 
where the worker’s safety efforts are subject to diminishing returns.  
The cost of effort to prevent the injury is given as: 






> 0    (4.2) 
The payout at the end of the period depends on whether a work injury occurs and how 
the worker responds to the injury. I introduce a treatment decision option into the model 
from Ruser and Butler (2010). I consider three possible responses: 
1. The worker obtains treatment for the injury and makes a workers’ compensation 
claim. 
2. The worker does not have the injury treated and continues to work. 
3. The worker obtains treatment for the injury but does not make a workers’ 
compensation claim. 
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The worker obtains treatment and makes a workers’ compensation claim 
Obtaining treatment requires effort, ℎ. This effort includes costs not covered by 
compensation such as travelling to a medical practitioner and making alternative care 
arrangements for dependents. 






> 0   (4.3) 
For simplicity, I assume that there are no costs associated with submitting a workers’ 
compensation claim, other than the requirement that the injury is treated and that there is 
proof that the injury was work-related. Workers choose how much effort 𝑓, to put into 
proving that the injury was work-related. 






> 0   (4.4) 
I assume diminishing returns to effort. There are several different things workers can 
do to accomplish each, and they first do those that are most effective per unit of effort 
exerted. 
The expected utility of an injured worker who has an accepted claim is: 
u(claim|work injury) = 𝑢(𝐵) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ) − 𝑐𝑓(𝑓)    (4.5) 
where 𝑢(. ) is the utility of receiving compensation benefits, 𝐵. For simplicity, I 
assume all workers’ compensation injuries receive time off work, and 𝐵 captures loss of 
earnings compensation and medical treatment compensation.  
Under accident compensation, all injuries are covered by the scheme, irrespective of 
whether the injury occurred at work. I assume that under accident compensation 𝑓 = 0, 
while under workers’ compensation 𝑓 > 0. Holding everything else constant, the utility 
from making a claim will be higher under accident compensation than under workers’ 
compensation. 
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Hypothesis 1: There will be a lower proportion of injured workers who do not make a 
claim under accident compensation relative to workers’ compensation, because there is 
no requirement to prove that the injury occurred at work. 
 
The worker does not have the injury treated and continues to work 
If the worker decides not to get treatment, he or she will continue to work and receive 
wage 𝑊 and disutility from working 𝜉, but have disutility associated with living with an 
untreated injury 𝑛. The size of 𝑛 depends on the type of the injury, its seriousness, and the 
worker’s belief about the effectiveness of health care. I assume that, 𝑊 ≥ 𝐵.  
Although 𝑛 is a constant here, an extension would be to have it vary in size by the 
seriousness of the injury, as is done in Krueger 1990. For some injuries, it could take such 
a high value that continuing to work is not an option. 
u(no claim|work injury) = u(W) − 𝑛 − 𝜉     (4.6) 
An injured worker will choose to be treated and to make a claim over not being treated 
if: 
𝑢(𝐵) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ) − 𝑐𝑓(𝑓) > 𝑢(𝑊) − 𝑛 − 𝜉     (4.7) 
Hypothesis 2: This inequality is more likely to hold if: 
 Workers compensation benefits increase relative to wages. 
 The effort required to obtain treatment decreases. 
 The effort required to prove that an injury is work-related decreases. 
 Disutility from working increases. 
 The disutility from living with an untreated injury increases. 
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The worker obtains treatment for the injury but does not make a workers’ 
compensation claim. 
If a worker is injured during leisure time, for example at home or playing sport, he or 
she is not covered under workers’ compensation. However, some of the costs may be 
covered by state provided disability insurance, 𝐷. I assume that 𝑊 ≥ 𝐵 > 𝐷.  
u(treatment|leisure injury) = 𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ)    (4.8) 
Work injury versus leisure injury 
I assume that it is not observable to the treatment provider and employer whether the 
injury happened at work. The likelihood that a treatment provider believes that the injury 
is work-related, 𝛾, depends on effort, 𝑓.  
𝑢(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡|𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑦) = 𝛾(𝑓)𝑢(𝐵) + (1 − 𝛾(𝑓))𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ) − 𝑐𝑓(𝑓)   (4.9) 
The worker chooses 𝑒 and 𝑓 to maximise expected utility: 
𝐸U(e, f) =
{
(1 − 𝑝(𝑒))[𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉] + 𝑝(𝑒)[𝛾(𝑓)𝑢(𝐵) + (1 − 𝛾(𝑓))𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ) − 𝑐𝑓(𝑓)] − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)   if claims
𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉 − 𝑝(𝑒)𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)                                                                                                       if not treated
(1 − 𝑝(𝑒))[𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉] + 𝑝(𝑒)[𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ)] − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)                                      if treated but no claim
    
(4.10) 
Hypothesis 3: Injured workers who face high costs associated with treatment effort 
will be less likely to seek treatment and therefore less likely to claim than those with low 
costs associated with treatment effort. 
 
In the case of universal accident compensation, leisure injury is covered by the 
insurance scheme. If under accident compensation, 𝐵 = 𝐷, 𝑓 = 0 and 𝛾 = 0, there will 
be no incentives to pretend that a work injury occurred during leisure activity (or that a 
leisure injury occurred at work). 




(1 − 𝑝(𝑒))[𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉] + 𝑝(𝑒)[𝑢(𝐵) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ)] − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)    if claims
𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉 − 𝑝(𝑒)𝑛 − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)                                             if not treated
     (4.11) 
4.2 Non-earner incentives 
Non-earners are not eligible for compensation under a workers’ compensation system; 
however, they are eligible under accident compensation. Non-earners have some 
alternative source of income 𝑆, which is not affected by whether they are injured (e.g. 
unemployment insurance, wages from their spouse, savings). If a non-earner is injured, 
there is no wage compensation for time off work because the non-earner is not in paid 
employment; but the injured person will be covered for treatment costs.  
The non-earner chooses injury prevention effort, 𝑒, to maximise utility. The non-earner 
influences claim numbers based on whether the cost of effort to obtain treatment is 
greater than the cost of remaining untreated. 
𝐸𝑈(𝑒, ℎ) = {
𝑢(𝑆) − 𝑝(𝑒)[𝑢(𝐵) − 𝑐ℎ(ℎ)] − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)                  if treated
𝑢(𝑆) − 𝑝(𝑒)𝑐(𝑛) − 𝑐𝑒(𝑒)                             if not treated
  (4.12) 
Hypothesis 4: Injured non-earners who face high costs associated with treatment effort 
will be less likely to seek treatment and therefore less likely to claim than those with low 
costs associated with treatment effort. 
 
4.3 Employer incentives 
I use the model of employer incentives in workers’ compensation from Ruser and 
Butler (2010). 
Employers pay a levy for workers’ compensation insurance. The levy they pay is a 
weighted average of the company’s own payout costs (weighted by 𝛼) and the costs of 
companies in the same levy risk group (weighted by 1 − 𝛼). If a company is fully self-
insured, then 𝛼 = 1 and the levies paid will be equal to the company’s compensated 
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costs. If a company is covered under workers compensation, then 𝛼 = 0 and the levy 
costs will be a fraction of the total compensation costs. If the company is experience-
rated, then 0 < 𝛼 < 1. 
The firm faces compensation costs, 𝐵. However, a firm can influence the proportion of 
accepted claims Π through effort 𝑡, for example, by disputing claims or rewarding teams 
that have no injuries. Under accident compensation, this could also take the form of 
encouraging workers to state that the injury happened during leisure time rather than at 
work. 
The compensated costs for the firm are Π(𝑡)𝐵. The firm’s effort is subject to 
diminishing returns so that 
𝛿Π
𝛿𝑡




𝑃(𝑠) is the fraction of the workforce with an injury, this can be influenced by the firm 
through safety effort 𝑠, subject to diminishing returns  
𝛿P
𝛿𝑠




The model of workers’ compensation payments by the firm is: 
Levy = 𝛼𝑃(𝑠)𝑁[Π(𝑡)𝐵] + (1 − 𝛼)𝐹𝑁    (4.13) 
where N is the size of the workforce and F is the per worker levy rate for the firm’s 
levy risk group. When 𝛼 = 0 the levy is not influenced by 𝑠 or 𝑡. However, as 𝛼 → 1, an 
increase in 𝑠 and 𝑡 will decrease the levy amount.  
Hypothesis 5: Where experience rating is present, (𝛼 > 0), firms will increase safety 
effort and increase claims management. 
 
The firm maximises profits with respect to safety, 𝑠, and claims management, 𝑡 with 






> 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 𝑠, 𝑡. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠(𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑔 ((1 − 𝑃(𝑠))N) − 𝑊(1 − 𝑃(𝑠)) − 𝛼𝑃(𝑠)𝑁[Π(𝑡)𝐵] −
(1 − 𝛼)𝐹𝑁 − 𝑍(𝑠, 𝑡)                     (4.14) 
                                                        CHAPTER 4: ECONOMIC THEORY 
45 
 
Where 𝑔(. ) is a concave production function, assuming the only input influenced by 





5 Data  
The data used for this research comes from the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), a 
linked longitudinal dataset managed by Statistics New Zealand. The IDI is made up of a 
series of datasets from different source agencies that have been integrated using 
deterministic and probabilistic linking (see Figure 5.1). Most of the data sources are 
administrative and cover the full population, not just a sample. The IDI contains 
information about employees, employers, ACC claims and self-reported injury, making it 
a powerful dataset to study work-related injury. The main structure of the IDI - the spine - 
is based on three linked data sources: IRD numbers issued by Inland Revenue, births 
registered in New Zealand since 1920, and all visas granted to migrants from 1997 
(excluding visitor and transit visas). People present in at least one of these three data 
sources are included in the spine (Gibb, Bycroft, & Matheson-Dunning, 2016). The 
nature of the IDI means that the research is focused on New Zealand workers and 
residents. Tourists are not included in the spine and are therefore excluded from this 
research. 
5.1 How the IDI is used 
This research uses IDI data from ACC (injury claims), the Statistics New Zealand 
Survey of Family, Income and Employment (SoFIE) (self-reported injury), the Inland 
Revenue Department (linked employer-employee data) and the Ministry of Health 





. A summary of how these data sources are used in the research 
follows, with each of these data sources described in more detail below. 
The linked data on injury claims from ACC and self-reported injury information from 
SoFIE are used to assess the level of underreporting in claims data (when used for injury 
surveillance) in chapter 6. Information on the characteristics associated with having a 
claim primarily comes from the SoFIE data; however, I include linked hospitalisation 
data from the Ministry of Health as a proxy for the severity of injury. 
In chapter 7, I use the linked employer-employee data from IRD to create firm-level 
claims by linking claims to employees and employees to firms. I also use information 
from the IRD data to derive information relevant to experience ratings such as an estimate 
of liable earnings and ACC insurance premiums (levies). A range of information from the 
IDI, such as firm size, industry and employee characteristics is used as controls in this 
work. Unlike studies that rely purely on claims data, I use a richer set of controls for firm 
and worker characteristics through the information in the IDI (e.g., percent of young 
workers, worker turnover, and whether the firm is part of a larger enterprise). 
Chapter 8 primarily uses claims data, although this is supplemented with more 
complete information on age, gender and ethnicity from the IDI. This information is 
derived by Statistics New Zealand from the many data sources in the IDI where this 
information is captured.  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Access to the IDI is available to New Zealand-based researchers conducting research that is in the public 
interest. Research applications are managed by Statistics New Zealand and, where approved, data access is 
provided through a secure Data Lab. Researchers only receive access to the data needed for the specific 
research project. Access to the Business Register data is restricted to government researchers. The research 
output goes through a confidentiality checking process before being approved for public release to ensure 
that the rules contained in the Statistics New Zealand Microdata Output Guide have been correctly applied.   
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5.2 Accident Compensation Claims 
When a person has an injury, an ACC claim form is completed at their first visit to a 
treatment provider (see Appendix A.1). The form collects information from both the 
patient and the treatment provider about the accident, whether it occurred at work, 
employment details, personal details, diagnosis, and what effect the injury has on ability 
to work. These claim forms are sent to ACC by the treatment provider and entered into 
the ACC system. ACC gives a unique claim number to every claim recorded and assesses 
the eligibility of the claim.  
Firms in the Accredited Employer Programme are responsible for managing their own 
claims. They usually have a third-party claim manager that does this on their behalf. The 
claims are either sent directly to the claim manager by the treatment provider (if the 
employee is aware of the arrangement), or the treatment provider sends the claim to ACC 
and ACC passes it on to the claim manager.
7
 The AEP employers (or their claims 
manager on their behalf) provide ACC with regular information about the accepted 
claims that they manage. These claims are included in the IDI data with an indicator 
which identifies them as AEP claims.  
The data studied here include only those claims accepted for compensation by ACC. 
The claim is never closed, so the client may obtain further treatment for a single injury 
event under the same claim number at any stage (Statistics New Zealand, 2015).  
Sometimes there may be multiple claims for the same injury, each with a different 
claim ID. I am interested in the number of injury incidents, rather than the number of 
claims but there is no unique accident ID. I manage this by assuming that if an individual 
has multiple claims for an accident that occurred on the same day then it is the same 
                                                 
7
 Within the ACC system these claims are marked as declined. 
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incident. On advice from an ACC staff member, the claim with the highest amount of 
compensation paid-to-date is kept. This reduces the number of claims by 0.7 percent.  
The claims data used here are for the period April 2001 to March 2015. There are just 
over 23 million claims, an average of 1.5 million per year. Most of these are minor 
injuries, with only 62,000 per year involving loss of earnings compensation for more than 
a week off work. 
Gradual process claims are excluded (0.43% of all claims). Of the remaining claims, 
93 percent link to the IDI spine. Claims that do not link include those for visitors who are 
not in the IDI spine but are eligible for accident compensation if they have an injury 
while in New Zealand.  
5.3 Survey of Family, Income and Employment 
Chapter 6 uses self-reported injury data from SoFIE, a longitudinal survey run by 
Statistics New Zealand from October 2002 to September 2010. The target population is 
the usually resident population of New Zealand living in permanent dwellings. At wave 
one, 15,100 households were randomly selected to take part.  Survey responses were 
obtained through face-to-face interviews with 22,200 eligible adults and 7,500 children 
(under 15 years) living in 11,500 households (a response rate of 81 percent). The survey 
was repeated annually (Statistics New Zealand, 2011).  
Every two years (waves three, five and seven) adult respondents were asked a series of 
health questions. The data from these three waves are used in this research. The retention 
rate was reasonably high. Of all those surveyed during wave one, 85 percent responded 
for wave three, 80 percent for wave five and 74 percent for wave seven. 
There was a total of 52,281 eligible and responding adults for the health module across 
the three waves (an average of 17,432 per wave). Almost everyone links to the IDI spine 
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(98 percent). I exclude 102 responses because they did not respond to the injury question, 
leaving me with a total sample size of 51,147. 
The injury question used in this research is “In the last 12 months, have you had an 
injury that stopped you from doing your usual activities for more than a week? An injury 
includes burns, near drownings, and poisoning.” In this thesis I refer to this as ‘limiting 
injury’. 
‘Usual activities’ is likely to include paid and unpaid work and recreational activities. 
This is a broader question than those usually used in overseas surveys of work-related 
injury, which tend to ask about injuries that stopped the person from working (lost-time 
injury).  
There are two follow-up questions that ask about where the injury occurred (at home, 
at work, somewhere else) and what type of injury it was (sports injury, traffic injury, 
other injury). No other information is collected about the injury. 
5.4 Inland Revenue 
The IDI contains monthly Inland Revenue data from April 1999 onwards. This 
information is used to derive firm-level variables.  
5.4.1 Number of employees 
Information matching employees to enterprises is derived from the Linked Employer 
Employee Data (LEED). LEED links employee tax numbers to employer tax numbers 
through the Employer Monthly Schedule (EMS) and groups them up to the enterprise 
level through the Business Register (Fabling & Maré, 2015). I aggregate the monthly data 
to financial years ending March, averaging the number of employees from the Business 
Register.  
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5.4.2 Experience rating information 
Experience rating programme data are not included in the IDI, so I have derived some 
of the relevant variables for firms, such as liable earnings, levies and rating factors, from 
the Inland Revenue EMS. This is described in more detail in section 7.4. 
5.4.3 Linking ACC claims to firms 
The person ID (snz_uid) is used to link the claims data to the employee data, which is 
then aggregated to the geographic unit of the firm (permanent business number or PBN) 
and the enterprise level (based on enterprise number). Where a person works for more 
than one firm in a month the claim is evenly apportioned across the firms. 
5.5 Ministry of Health 
Chapter 6 includes a variable for whether a person has been admitted to hospital in the 
last 12 months. This is sourced from the Ministry of Health’s National Minimum Dataset 
for SoFIE respondents.  
5.6 IDI tables 
In chapter 6 I use self-reported age, gender and ethnicity from SoFIE because the 
study is based on the SoFIE sample population. I am unable to use these data in chapter 7 
and 8 because I am interested the full population of workers. Instead I use the IDI 
personal details table and the IDI source-ranked ethnicity table for these two chapters.  
The personal details table is Statistics New Zealand’s best estimate of demographic 
information using multiple sources within the IDI. I use this table for age and gender. The 
source-ranked ethnicity table is based on a Statistics New Zealand ranking of the 
reliability of each of the collections that contain ethnicity data. The information in these 
tables is thought to be more robust than that contained in the claims data alone because 
they are supplemented by other data sources (such as census data) where available.  
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A single and combined response approach is used where all ethnicities from the 
highest ranked source are included. For example, if the person reports in the 2013 Census 
(the highest ranked data source in the IDI) that they are New Zealand European and 
Māori then their ethnicity is coded as “New Zealand European and Māori”.   
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5.7 Tables and Figures 
Figure 5.1: Structure of the Integrated Data Infrastructure in May 2015 
 







6 Who claims for injury? Analysis of self-reported 
injury compared to accident compensation 
claims 
6.1 Introduction 
Workers’ compensation claims are often used to analyse the incidence of work-related 
injury and target resources for injury prevention; however, as discussed in the literature 
review, not everyone who has an injury receives injury compensation.  Claims data are 
known to underestimate the incidence of injury at work by about a third (Mustard et al., 
2003; Safe Work Australia, 2011; Shannon & Lowe, 2002).  
As described in the theory in chapter 4, workers can influence claim numbers through 
their decision as to whether to get treatment for their injury and, if they do obtain 
treatment, whether to make a claim. Under hypothesis 2, workers will be more likely to 
be treated and make a claim if workers compensation benefits increase relative to wages, 
the effort required to obtain treatment decreases, the effort required to prove than injury is 
work-related decrease, disutility from working increases, or if the disutility of living from 
an untreated injury increases (e.g. high injury severity).  
In the literature, propensity to claim for a work injury has been found to vary 
according to perceptions around eligibility for compensation (Biddle & Roberts, 2003; 
McLaren & Baldwin, 2017; Mustard et al., 2012; Safe Work Australia, 2011); the 
seriousness of the injury (Mustard et al., 2012; Qin et al., 2014; Rosenman et al., 2000; 
Safe Work Australia, 2011; Shannon & Lowe, 2002); ease of claiming (Fan et al., 2006; 
Scherzer et al., 2005); perception as to how others might react (Fan et al., 2006; Safe 
Work Australia, 2011; Taylor Moore et al., 2013); financial considerations (Chelius & 
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Kavanaugh, 1988; Sobrun-Maharaj et al., 2010; Taylor Moore et al., 2013); and access to 
health services (Bierman & Clancy, 2000; Jatrana & Crampton, 2009). 
Characteristics associated with higher propensity to claim include injury severity 
(Alamgir et al., 2006; Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Qin et al., 2014; Shannon & Lowe, 2002), 
having a physical job (Biddle & Roberts, 2003; Qin et al., 2014), lower levels of 
education (Qin et al., 2014), being married (Fan et al., 2006), being overweight (Fan et 
al., 2006), being in poorer health (Biddle & Roberts, 2003) and having comorbidities (J 
Wren & Mason, 2010). There are mixed results for the relationship between propensity to 
claim and age (Alamgir et al., 2006; Biddle & Roberts, 2003). 
The literature on propensity to claim is based on studies within a workers’ 
compensation claims environment. The claims process could be simpler in a universal 
claims environment where treatment providers submit the claims rather than the workers 
and the requirement for proof that an injury is work-related is alleviated. This reduces the 
cost of effort associated with making a claim. 
This chapter uses linked data on self-reported injury and ACC claims to test whether 
underreporting of work injury is lower in New Zealand, relative to other countries and to 
look at characteristics associated with claiming. Greater clarity of eligibility and lower 
burden of proof are expected to lead to lower levels of underreporting, making New 
Zealand claims data more reliable for measuring injury incidence. 
6.2 Empirical strategy 
I use self-reported injury data from SoFIE and linked ACC claims data to look at what 
proportion of people who report having had a limiting injury in the last 12 months also 
have an accepted ACC claim for an injury in the same period. While it would have been 
of interest to look at declined claims also, these data were not available at the time that 
this research was done. 
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A limiting injury is defined as an injury that prevented the person from doing their 
usual activities for more than a week. This is a different type of injury to that typically 
studied in the workers’ compensation literature, which tend to focus on injuries involving 
more than a week away from work. The advantage of this type of question is that it can 
be used to look at compensation outcomes for workers and non-workers alike. The 
disadvantage is that it is not be directly comparable to estimates from other jurisdictions. 
This thesis looks at whether people who report in SoFIE that they had a limiting injury 
in the last 12 months also have an accepted claim in the same 12-month period. 
Unfortunately, there is not enough information collected in SoFIE for me to identify 
whether a claim corresponds to the same injury that was reported in SoFIE. The absence 
of a claim in the data could indicate that (1) they did not lodge a claim for the injury; (2) 
they lodged a claim, but it was not accepted (e.g., if the injury was deemed to be a result 
of the ageing process rather than an accident event); or (3) they thought the injury 
occurred within the last 12 months, but it was actually more than 12 months ago (recall 
bias). I am not able to distinguish between the first two reasons, although I test how the 
results vary if the claims period is extended as a check for recall bias. 
I restrict the sample to people with a limiting injury and use linear regression to 
estimate the effects of demographic, socioeconomic and health variables (described 
below) on the likelihood of having an accepted claim for an injury that occurred in the 
last 12 months. 
The regression takes the form: 
𝑌 = 𝛽𝑋 +      (6.1) 
where 𝑌 is a binary variable that equals one if the person with a limiting injury 
(according to SoFIE) also has an accepted claim for an injury that occurred in the last 12 
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months and zero otherwise, 𝑋  is a vector of demographic, economic and health variables 
and  is a random term.  
I use a linear probability model to estimate this binary outcome model because the 
results lend themselves to easy interpretation and the use of this model is appropriate as 
most of the explanatory variables are binary variables. The regression is run on 
unweighted data. It controls for demographic variables often used in survey stratification, 
so it should provide unbiased estimates of the association between the explanatory 
variables and the outcome variable.  
The demographic variables are gender, age, ethnicity, an indicator for whether the 
person is born in New Zealand, and a four-category indicator which provides information 
on the degree of urbanisation in the area that the person lives. Under hypothesis 3, injured 
workers who face high costs associated with treatment effort will be less likely to seek 
treatment and therefore less likely to claim than those with low costs associated with 
treatment effort. Those living in more remote areas are expected to face higher costs 
associated with treatment effort and a lower likelihood of having a claim. 
Ethnicity is coded using the single and combined response method. For example, if 
someone reports being of both Māori and European ethnicity they are coded to ‘Māori 
and European’ as opposed to the prioritised ethnicity approach where they would be 
coded to ‘Māori’.  Where numbers are small they are grouped into an ‘other 
ethnicity/ethnicities’ category. All these variables are based on self-reported information 
from SoFIE. Some ethnic groups may face cultural barriers to treatment, increasing the 
costs of effort associated with treatment. 
The economic variables are highest qualification, employment status, occupation, 
annual household earnings, weekly hours worked and the size of the firm for which the 
person works. Firm size is derived from the tax data, the rest of these variables come 
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from SoFIE. I expect that the coefficient on earnings will be positive indicating better 
access to healthcare and injury compensation with higher levels of income (J. R. Barnett 
& Coyle, 1998), while the coefficient on those who work more than 60 hours per week is 
expected to be negative, owing to the cost of time associated with obtaining treatment.  
The health variables are whether the person put off visiting the doctor in the last 12 
months because of the cost, the likelihood that they would see their primary health care 
provider if they had a new health problem, whether they consider themselves to be as 
healthy as others, whether they have had more than one limiting injury in the past 12 
months, and whether they have been admitted to hospital in the last 12 months. The 
hospital information is derived from Ministry of Health data, the rest of these variables 
come from SoFIE. 
The first two health variables proxy for people’s propensity to seek treatment from an 
approved provider. I expect the coefficient on these to be negative because if people do 
not seek treatment for their injury then they will not be eligible for accident 
compensation. People in poorer health may be less able to obtain treatment for injury due 
to higher non-monetary costs; however, they may also be more likely to obtain treatment 
due to familiarity with the health system. Therefore, it is an empirical question as to what 
the direction of the coefficient is on this variable.  I expect that people who have had 
multiple limiting injuries would have an increased likelihood of having had at least one 
ACC claim, and similarly the coefficient for people who have been admitted to hospital 
in the last 12 months is expected to be positive. This is partly because it indicates 
receiving treatment and partly because it indicates that the person had an injury serious 
enough to require hospital admission. 
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6.3 Measurement error in claims data relative to self-
reported injury 
Pooling three waves of SoFIE sample data, there are 52,296 respondents. Of these, 
52,281 meet the eligible and responding criteria, of which 52,149 are linked to the IDI 
spine (98%). I further restrict the sample to those who responded to the question that asks 
whether they have had a limiting injury in the last 12 months. The final pooled sample 




About 12 percent of people reported in SoFIE that they had experienced a limiting 
injury in the last 12 months (an injury that stopped them from doing their usual activities 
for more than a week), while 28 percent of people had an accepted ACC claim for an 
injury that occurred over the same period. It makes sense that claim numbers are higher 
than limiting injury numbers because claims can be made for non-limiting injuries. 
Looking at more serious injury, only 3 percent of the sample had an entitlement claim in 
the last 12 months.
9
 Although Table 6.1 pools data for the three survey waves, the 
patterns are consistent across individual waves. 
Of workers who had a limiting injury at work in the last 12 months, 30 percent did not 
have an accepted ACC claim in the same period. This is surprisingly high, although 
consistent with estimates from other jurisdictions for work injuries with more than a week 
off work (Mustard et al., 2003; Safe Work Australia, 2011; Shannon & Lowe, 2002). Of 
all people with a limiting injury (work and non-work), a similar proportion (32 percent) 
did not have an ACC claim. This implies that the reasons for underreporting are not 
                                                 
8
 Estimated using the longitudinal weights. 
9
 Entitlement claims are those that have progressed beyond a medical fee only claim. They may involve 
weekly compensation payments for more than a week away from work, rehabilitation payments and lump 
sum payments. 
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limited to workplace injury. This provides some support for hypotheses 3 and 4 in chapter 
4; that both workers and non-earners will be less likely to claim if the costs of treatment 
effort are high. 
Recall bias in the response to the SoFIE question may generate misalignment in timing 
between the two datasets. When the claims period is extended from 12 to 24 months 
before the SoFIE interview, the proportion that does not have a claim reduces from 32 
percent to 18 percent. This is still a sizeable number of people who do not have a claim. 
I also look at whether people have ever made an ACC claim. I find that only seven 
percent of person-wave observations with a limiting injury had no ACC claim between 
the start of the claims data in the IDI (1994) and the interview date.
10
 This makes it likely 
that most of the reasons for not making a claim are time-varying.  
It is likely that different people interpret the SoFIE injury question differently. For 
some people, an injury that stops usual activities for more than a week may be a relatively 
minor injury that does not require treatment, such as a cut or sprain. Unfortunately, the 
survey does not ask any direct questions about the seriousness of the injury, whether it led 
to time off work or what treatment was received. It is possible that traffic accident 
injuries are more serious than other types of injuries and when I restrict the data to 
injuries on the road I find a slightly lower proportion of non-claiming; however, the 
differences are not statistically significant. Of those with limiting injury on the road in the 
last 12 months 26% did not receive compensation compared to 32% for all limiting injury 
(95% CIs [20.3%, 31.7%] and [30.9%, 33.1%] respectively). 
Another way to look at the seriousness of limiting injury is to look at the 
characteristics of the ACC claim, where one was made (see Table 6.1). Most people with 
                                                 
10
 This compares to 18 percent of person-wave observations who had not had a limiting injury in the last 12 
months. 
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a limiting injury who had an ACC claim received medical fees compensation only (rather 
than entitlement payments), implying that the injury that stopped them from doing usual 
activities for more than a week was not severe enough to stop them from working or from 
managing at home. Entitlement payments provide compensation for costs other than 
treatment, such as loss of earnings compensation (for more than a week off work) and 
help managing at home (e.g., housework, childcare, personal care). Eligibility for 
entitlement payments is assessed by ACC based on the recommendations of health 
professionals.  
6.4 Injury at work 
SoFIE respondents who had a limiting injury in the last 12 months are asked whether 
the most recent limiting injury occurred at work. Table 6.2 compares these injuries to 
claims made in the ACC Work Account. This is of interest because work account claims 
are often used as a proxy for injury at work. The information about ACC claims by 
funding account is imprecise because I do not know for certain which claims made in the 
last 12 months correspond with the limiting injury reported in the survey. For analysing 
the claims by funding account, I assign the claim to the work account if the person has 
had one or more work account claim in the last 12 months. If not, I display the funding 
account of the most recent claim. This allows me to test whether someone who had a 
work injury in the last 12 months was also able to access compensation for a work injury 
over the same period. 
For those with a limiting injury at work who had an ACC claim, about three quarters 
were funded from the work account (72 percent). Some of the reasons for a non-work-
account claim might include a mismatch between survey injury and claims injury (for 
people who did not make a claim for the work injury but had made claims for other non-
work injuries); it may be a work-related motor vehicle accident which would be funded 
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by the motor vehicle account; the injured person may be working in informal work 
arrangements, meaning their claim would come under the non-earners’ account; they may 
be at work but the injury was not work-related so it is funded from the earners’ account; 
and people may engage in claims shifting (stating on the ACC form that the injury 
happened at home when it actually happened at work). I am not able to distinguish 
between these here. Of all the workers who had made a work account claim in the 
previous 12 months, only 21 percent reported having had a limiting injury at work 
implying that most of the work injuries were not limiting. 
6.5 Characteristics of people with a limiting injury 
Table 6.3 describes the characteristics of people with a limiting injury and the 
proportion who had an ACC claim.  The characteristic with the greatest variability in 
reporting rates was ethnicity: 69 percent of New Zealand Europeans with a limiting injury 
made a claim compared to 47 percent of those with Chinese ethnicity. 
6.6 Regression results 
6.6.1 Characteristics associated with having an accepted injury claim in 
the same year as a limiting injury 
I limit the sample to those who reported in SoFIE that they had a limiting injury and 
use a linear probability regression to assess likelihood of making a claim. Robust standard 
errors are calculated to correct for correlated person-clusters. The results are presented in 
Table 6.4.  
Ethnicity is strongly related to the likelihood of making an ACC claim (given that a 
limiting injury was reported in SoFIE) although the size of the variation decreased once 
health variables were included. In the final specification, of those reporting a limiting 
injury, people of Chinese ethnicity are 29 percentage points less likely to have an 
accepted ACC claim relative to New Zealand European, Māori are 12 percentage points 
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less likely to have an accepted ACC claim and ‘other ethnicities’ are 10 percentage points 
less likely to have an accepted ACC claim.  
The coefficient on age is negative. A ten-year increase in age is associated with a 
decreased likelihood of having a claim by 2.5 percentage points. Robustness checks were 
undertaken – I excluded people over the age of 75 from the sample, included a quadratic 
term for age in the regression, and tested age categories rather than age as a continuous 
variable (see Appendix B). Although the likelihood of having a claim appears to increase 
for those over the age of 75, the sample size is small, and these alternative models have 
little impact on results. The preferred specification is with the full sample and no 
quadratic term for age because injuries generally decrease with age (apart from some 
small increase at ages over 75). 
The coefficients on household income, being employed, and working more than 60 
hours per week are small and not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Conditional on having had an injury, these variables appear not to influence the decision 
to be treated and make a claim.  
It might be expected that people who work in physical or dangerous occupations are 
more likely to have an ACC claim following injury because an injury would be more 
likely to impact on their ability to work (and therefore increase the disutility associated 
with living with an untreated injury). I find some support for this. Machinery workers and 
drivers (eight percentage points, significant at the 5% level) and market-oriented 
agriculture and fisheries workers (seven percentage points, significant at the 10% level) 
are more likely to make an ACC claim relative to managers. 
Health characteristics are only added in the final specification because they are likely 
to be correlated with socio-economic characteristics; however, including them does not 
alter the results from the prior specifications. People who have been admitted to hospital 
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in the last 12 months are seven percentage points more likely to have made a claim. 
Those who have a negative view of their health relative to others are six percentage 
points less likely to have made an ACC claim. Having a negative view of health may 
impact negatively on the perceived value of treatment. 
Migrants may be thought to be less likely to make a claim because they may be less 
familiar with the ACC system; however, the coefficient on ‘New Zealand born’ is small 
and not statistically significantly different from zero. Although permanent migrants will 
be captured in the IDI through the immigration data, the longitudinal nature of the survey 
means that new migrants are largely excluded from the sample.  
Deferring a visit to the doctor because of cost is associated with a three percentage 
points lower likelihood of making an ACC claim, although this is only significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. 
Restricting the sample to people who had a limiting injury at work, the sample size 
reduces to about 900 observations. In the final specification, the small sample size means 
none of the estimates are statistically significantly different to zero, but the size and 
direction of the coefficients are similar to the unrestricted sample. The results are not 
presented here. 
6.6.2 Characteristics associated with having a limiting injury in the same 
year as having an accepted injury claim 
Looking at the ACC claims data, some people said in SoFIE that they had not had a 
limiting injury in the last 12 months but according to the match to ACC data, they 
received loss of earnings compensation for more than a week away from work (see Table 
6.5). This is surprising because I would expect paid work to be considered a usual 
activity.  
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One explanation might be that there is a lag between when the injury occurred and 
when the time off work was taken. For example, a person may be able to keep working 
initially after an accident but some months later may require time off work following 
surgery for the injury. If the interview was taken in between these two points in time it 
would explain the difference in the results. I do not have data on this, so I test whether 
loss of earnings compensation claims that occurred close to the interview date are less 
likely to be reported as limiting.  I find that this is the case; if the accident is within a 
month of the interview date, people with loss of earnings claims are less likely to report 
that their injury was limiting, relative to people whose injury occurred more than a month 
before the interview date (see Table 6.6). 
Table 6.7 compares the types of injuries incurred by those who had any type of ACC 
claim in the last 12 months by whether they report having had a limiting injury. Those 
who were more likely to report having had a limiting injury include those who had a 
claim for a fracture or dislocation (46.8%) or an amputation (45.2%).  
Table 6.8 displays the results of a linear regression with a binary dependent variable 
indicating whether the person reported a limiting injury in the last 12 months. The sample 
is restricted to people who had an accepted ACC claim in the last 12 months. Injury type 
is the most important explanatory variable, along with indicators about the seriousness of 
the injury such as the size of the compensation payments and whether they involved 
entitlement payments. The coefficient on the variable ‘days since accident date’ is 
negative, consistent with the possibility of recall bias. Age, employment and living with a 
partner are all negatively associated with reporting an injury as limiting, possibly 
indicating that these variables are associated with an ability to continue doing usual 
activities despite time off work for injury. 
 




About a third of workers who report having an injury at work in the last 12 months 
that stops them doing their usual activities for more than a week do not appear to have 
received accident compensation for that injury.  This is consistent with international 
estimates of the proportion of workers who do not make a workers’ compensation claim 
for injury involving more than a week off work (Mustard et al., 2003; Safe Work 
Australia, 2011; Shannon & Lowe, 2002). It is surprising that the New Zealand estimate 
is not lower, because I expected that the claims process would be simpler in a universal 
claims environment where treatment providers submit the claims rather than the workers 
and the requirement for proof that an injury is work-related is alleviated.  
One explanation may be that the sort of injuries that stop usual activity for more than a 
week are less incapacitating than injury that stops work for more than a week. This is 
supported by analysis of claims data. Two-thirds of those who made an ACC claim 
received cover for medical treatment only, which indicates that the injured person was not 
away from work for more than a week.
11
 This would mean that responses to this type of 
survey question are not directly comparable to survey questions that ask about injury 
resulting in more than a week away from work. It seems likely that seriousness of the 
injury influences decisions on whether to seek treatment (Alamgir et al., 2006; Biddle & 
Roberts, 2003; Qin et al., 2014; Shannon & Lowe, 2002). SoFIE does not ask any 
questions about injury severity or treatment so I cannot assess whether those with a 
limiting injury who did not make a claim would have been entitled to ACC 
compensation. For example, the injury might not have been serious enough to require 
treatment in which case it would not be compensable.   
                                                 
11
 The employer covers the first week of absence and ACC pays entitlements for any subsequent time away 
from work. 
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The result is not specific to work. When considering all people who had an injury, 
whether at work or not, a similar proportion did not have a compensation claim (a third of 
injured people). This suggests that the causes of non-claiming go beyond work-specific 
factors. The decision on whether to obtain treatment for the injury is likely to be a 
significant factor in whether a claim is made. 
One of the strongest findings in the regression analysis was that people of Chinese 
ethnicity who reported a limiting injury were about 29 percentage points less likely to 
have an ACC claim relative to those of European ethnicity. The literature indicates that 
Chinese people in New Zealand, may face language and cultural differences that act as 
barriers to accessing primary healthcare and accident compensation services, increasing 
the costs of effort involved in obtaining treatment and making a claim (DeSouza & 
Garrett, 2005; Sobrun-Maharaj et al., 2010). Chinese people in New Zealand, have better 
average self-reported health relative to New Zealand Europeans (Ministry of Health, 
2012). This may also act as a barrier, as fewer people within the community will have had 
prior experience with treatment providers. Although this study is based on data from 
2002-2009, indications are that people of Asian ethnicity continue to be under-
represented among those that make ACC claims.
12
 
Propensity to claim for a limiting injury also decreases with age, possibly reflecting 
attitudes and access to healthcare treatment.  This result is consistent with the findings of 
(Alamgir et al., 2006) and (Krueger, 1990) who also found that younger workers were 
more likely to claim for work injuries. Younger workers may face lower costs of effort in 
obtaining treatment. 
I find that people who had an injury which involved more than a week off work are 
less likely to report the injury as limiting if the injury occurred within a month of the 
                                                 
12
 Based on analysis of 2014 ACC work-related claims. 
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interview date. This implies there may be a gap between when an injury occurs, and time 
being taken off work.  
This study was restricted to accepted claims because this was the only information 
available at the time; however, declined claims have since been added to the IDI. One 
possible area for future research is to look at whether some of those who had a limiting 
injury lodged a claim which was denied. A better understanding of declined claims would 
be required though, as it is possible these claims include some declined for administrative 
reasons (e.g., it is a claim for a firm that is in the AEP scheme, so it is declined by ACC 
and forwarded to the AEP provider). 
6.8 Recommendations 
Research that relies on claims data to assess changes in injury rates should be 
accompanied by a robustness check using injury types less affected by differential 
healthcare utilisation. 
Research using more than a week off work injury claim should apply a lag to the data 
to improve stability of the data since there is often a lag between the date of the injury 
and the date in which time off work is taken. 
Although the SoFIE survey data do not enable further analysis by injury type and 
severity, this research emphasises the important role of survey data within injury 
surveillance.  This is an important source of information for countries that rely on 
workers’ compensation data for monitoring of work-related injury trends, such as New 







6.9 Tables and Figures 
Table 6.1: Cross-tabulation of the SoFIE sample by whether they had an accepted ACC claim for an injury that occurred in the last 12 months  





No ACC claim ACC claim 
Entitlement claim Medical fees 




Full sample 51,147 8,517,800 72% 2% 1% 25% 
Sample of workers 33,597 5,776,300 70% 2% 1% 26% 
All people with a limiting injury 6,441 1,053,400 32% 12% 5% 50% 
All people with a traffic limiting injury 225 38,500 26% 19% 4% 50% 
Workers with a limiting injury 4,053 688,500 31% 17% 3% 49% 
Workers with a limiting injury at work 1,113 184,300 30% 23% 2% 44% 
Source: Statistics New Zealand IDI, confidentialised weighted pooled data, waves 3, 5 and 7.  Excludes non-response.  
 
Table 6.2: ACC claims in the last 12 months by funding account and injury setting 
Sample Location of limiting injury  Population with a claim in the last 12 
months 
At least one claim in the last 12 
months was in the work account
1
  
All respondents Full weighted sample 2,409,800 20% 
Limiting injury 713,400 19% 
Limiting injury at work 146,000 70% 
Limiting injury at work on the road 2,500 40% 
Workers Full weighted sample of workers 1,715,200 26% 
Limiting injury 473,800 26% 
Limiting injury at work 128,600 72% 
Limiting injury at work on the road 2,200 suppressed 
1 
A claim is allocated to the Work Account if the injury happened at work (excluding motor vehicle accidents on public roads) and the person is in paid employment and is 
15 years of age or older. Unweighted counts of less than six have been suppressed for confidentiality. 
Source: Statistics New Zealand IDI, confidentialised weighted pooled data, waves 3, 5 and 7.  
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Full sample 1,053,400 68% 
Ethnicity   
NZ European only 755,100 69% 
Other European only 50,900 70% 
Māori only 75,300 59% 
Samoan only 17,600 68% 
Chinese only 16,400 47% 
NZ European & Māori 56,200 69% 
Other ethnicity/ethnicities 81,800 63% 
Gender   
Female 493,700 66% 
Male 559,700 69% 
Age   
15-24 years 
230,200 75% 
25-64 years 659,100 66% 
65+ 164,100 65% 
Born in NZ   
No 183,400 64% 
Yes 870,100 68% 
Highest qualification   
None 
230,200 64% 
School 290,000 71% 
Vocational 
347,700 68% 
Degree 165,600 66% 
Other post school 19,600 74% 
Missing 
- - 
Occupation   
Managers 110,500 67% 
Professionals 106,500 66% 
Associate Professionals 72,500 64% 
Clerical Services 88,900 72% 
Community & Personal Serv. 133,600 69% 
Agriculture & Fishing 
56,800 
73% 
Craft & Trades Workers 66,600 69% 
Machinery Operators 63,500 73% 
Labourers & Related Work 
59,500 
67% 
Not working 294,800 65% 
Continuous variables (mean)   
Age 43.1  
Annual earnings $23,153   
Annual earnings (excl. none) $37,778   
Household earnings $77,578   
Weekly hours 24.6  
 





Partnered   
No 463,900 70% 
Yes 589,100 66% 







Urban   
Main urban 752,500 68% 
Secondary urban 68,600 64% 








20-249 employees 92,200 73% 
250+ employees 658,100 68% 
Other 250,300 65% 
Put off visiting a doctor in the last 12 months 
because of cost 
No 862,200 68% 
Yes 188,800 66% 
Missing 2400 88% 
Would visit primary healthcare provider with new 
problem 
Definitely 719,400 69% 
Probably 221,000 67% 





As healthy as others   
Definitely true 366,400 70% 
Mostly true 432,900 69% 







More than one limiting injury in last 12 months 
No – only one. 704,500 66% 
Yes 348,700 71% 





Note: Weighted sample 
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Table 6.4: OLS predicting whether a person had an ACC claim in the last 12 months, 
given they had a limiting injury in the last 12 months 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Female -0.0084 -0.0126 -0.00002 0.0017 0.0020 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0139) 
Age (10yrs) -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.021*** -0.025*** 
 (0.00314) (0.00343) (0.00376) (0.00396) (0.00413) 
Born in NZ  0.0145 0.0153 0.00348 0.00324 
  (0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0226) (0.0226) 
NZ European (reference) 
 
     
Other European  0.0334 0.0390 0.0263 0.0305 
  (0.0330) (0.0332) (0.0339) (0.0339) 
Māori  -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.115*** -0.119*** 
  (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0282) (0.0281) 
Samoan  -0.0497 -0.0631 -0.0556 -0.0627 
  (0.0534) (0.0540) (0.0565) (0.0565) 
Chinese  -0.249*** -0.245*** -0.291*** -0.289*** 
  (0.0669) (0.0671) (0.0694) (0.0694) 
European & Māori  -0.0570** -0.0578** -0.0410 -0.0421 
  (0.0288) (0.0287) (0.0299) (0.0297) 
Other ethnicity/ies  -0.090*** -0.092*** -0.104*** -0.103*** 
  (0.0272) (0.0275) (0.0285) (0.0284) 
Lives with a partner  -0.0238* -0.0329** -0.0324** -0.0263* 
  (0.0131) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
No qualifications (reference)      
      
School qualifications  0.0454*** 0.0479*** 0.0476*** 0.0468** 
  (0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0182) 
Vocational  0.0311* 0.0354** 0.0376** 0.0370** 
  (0.0167) (0.0174) (0.0178) (0.0177) 
Degree  0.00853 0.0233 0.0254 0.0248 
  (0.0214) (0.0239) (0.0246) (0.0246) 
Other post-school  0.105** 0.104** 0.102** 0.0991** 
  (0.0425) (0.0427) (0.0431) (0.0426) 
Main urban area (reference)      
      
Secondary urban area  -0.0309 -0.0363 -0.0420* -0.0425* 
  (0.0233) (0.0235) (0.0240) (0.0239) 
Minor urban area  -0.0198 -0.0216 -0.0260 -0.0256 
  (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0221) (0.0221) 
Rural area  -0.0136 -0.0287 -0.0426** -0.0406* 
  (0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
Log annual household income   0.00959 0.00724 0.00917 
   (0.00694) (0.00728) (0.00728) 
Employed at HED   -0.000576 -0.00160 -0.0153 
   (0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0247) 
Manager (reference)      
      
Professional   -0.0176 -0.0250 -0.0315 
   (0.0290) (0.0299) (0.0298) 
Associate Professional   -0.0222 -0.0134 -0.0201 
   (0.0306) (0.0316) (0.0316) 
Clerical Services   0.0376 0.0426 0.0338 
   (0.0292) (0.0301) (0.0301) 
Community & Personal Service    -0.00260 -0.00521 -0.0157 
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   (0.0271) (0.0280) (0.0281) 
Agricultural & Fisheries   0.0581 0.0579 0.0679* 
   (0.0354) (0.0366) (0.0365) 
Craft and Trades Workers   0.0416 0.0444 0.0422 
   (0.0322) (0.0334) (0.0333) 
Machine Operators & Drivers   0.0855*** 0.0866*** 0.0794** 
   (0.0317) (0.0325) (0.0323) 
Labourers   0.0134 0.00879 0.00284 
   (0.0328) (0.0340) (0.0340) 
No occupation (did not work)   0.00975 0.0123 0.00880 
   (0.0323) (0.0333) (0.0332) 
Works 60+ hours per week   0.0545 0.0374 0.0443 
   (0.0385) (0.0404) (0.0399) 
Put off visiting a doctor in last 12 months 
because of cost 




      
Definitely as healthy as others (reference)      
Mostly as healthy as others    -0.00521 -0.00523 
    (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Neither as healthy as others or not    -0.070*** -0.070*** 
    (0.0213) (0.0212) 
Mostly not as healthy as others    -0.0422* -0.0448* 
    (0.0236) (0.0235) 
Definitely not as healthy as others    -0.0589* -0.0600* 
    (0.0312) (0.0310) 
Would definitely visit primary healthcare 
provider with new problem (reference) 
     
      
Would probably visit    -0.0168 -0.0163 
    (0.0151) (0.0151) 
Would probably not visit    0.0122 0.0133 
    (0.0398) (0.0399) 
Would definitely not visit     -0.0513 -0.0502 
    (0.0719) (0.0713) 
Admitted to hospital in last 12 months    0.0722*** 0.0695*** 
    (0.0151) (0.0151) 
1-19 employees (reference)      
      
20-249 employees     -0.00113 
     (0.0357) 
250+ employees     0.00359 
     (0.0307) 
Other     -0.0626* 
     (0.0329) 
Constant 0.757*** 0.760*** 0.630*** 0.703*** 0.725*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0307) (0.0889) (0.0948) (0.0983) 
Observations 6,438 6,432 6,381 5,943 5,943 
R-squared 0.006 0.018 0.022 0.031 0.034 
Note: Unweighted linear regression predicting whether a person had an ACC claim in 
the last 12 months, given they had a limiting injury in the last 12 months. Sample 
restricted to people who had a limiting injury in the last 12 months. Dependent variable 
equals one if they had an accepted claim with an accident in the 12 months before the 
SoFIE interview. Columns 1-5 are separate regressions, each column from left to right 
has further explanatory variables added as displayed. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
                                                        CHAPTER 6: WHO CLAIMS FOR INJURY? 
73 
 
Table 6.5: Worker ACC claims in the last 12 months by whether the injury was limiting 
 Number of 
observations 
Limiting injury 
Loss of earnings compensation claim 930 83% 
Entitlement claim - no loss of earnings 606 59% 
Medical fees only claim 12,873 25% 
Source: Statistics New Zealand IDI, confidentialised weighted pooled data, waves 3, 5 
and 7.  
 
Table 6.6: Percent of weekly compensation claimants who stated that they did not have a 
limiting injury in the last 12 months by whether the claim accident date was within 30 
days of the SoFIE interview  
Claim injury was within 30 days of 
interview 
Number with a 
claim in the last 12 
months 
Percent that did not report having had a 
limiting injury in last 12 months 
Yes 14,400 25% 
No 116,400 18% 
Total 130,800 19% 
Note: People who received injury compensation for more than a week off work were less 
likely to report having had a limiting injury if the injury occurred within 30 days before 
the interview. 
 
Source: Statistics New Zealand IDI, confidentialised weighted pooled data, waves 3, 5 
and 7.  
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Table 6.7: The likelihood of reporting a limiting injury in the last 12 months, having had 












95% Confidence Interval 
Laceration, puncture or sting  668,181 0.163 0.0005 0.162 0.163 
      
Industries deafness 23,022 0.104 0.0020 0.102 0.106 
      
Soft tissue injury 2,358,105 0.239 0.0003 0.238 0.239 
      
Fracture or dislocation 243,720 0.468 0.0010 0.467 0.469 
      
Foreign body in orifice or eye 108,702 0.081 0.0008 0.080 0.082 
      
Burns 46,581 0.183 0.0018 0.181 0.185 
      
Amputation 4,005 0.452 0.0079 0.444 0.460 
      
Trauma induced hearing loss 4,971 0.016 0.0018 0.015 0.018 
      
Hernia 7,221 0.253 0.0051 0.248 0.259 
      
Dental injury 43,005 0.086 0.0014 0.085 0.088 
      
Inhalation or ingestion (occupational) 4,104 0.088 0.0044 0.083 0.092 
      
Occupational disease 3,696 0.149 0.0059 0.144 0.155 
      
Concussion 25,152 0.300 0.0029 0.297 0.303 
      
Gradual process – local inflammation 39,720 0.229 0.0021 0.226 0.231 
      
Gradual process – compression syndromes 2,949 0.224 0.0077 0.216 0.231 
      
Pain syndromes 60,738 0.214 0.0017 0.213 0.216 
      
Other/none 82,074 0.196 0.0014 0.194 0.197 
      
Total 3,725,940 0.231 0.0002 0.231 0.231 
Note: Data have been weighted using longitudinal survey weights. 
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Table 6.8: Linear regression predicting whether a person who had a claim in the last 12 
months also has a limiting injury 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Female 0.0156* 0.00665 0.00182 0.00691 -0.00650 
 (0.00799) (0.00806) (0.00885) (0.00858) (0.00853) 
Age (10 years) -0.0144*** -0.00993*** -0.0168*** -0.0242*** -0.0204*** 
 (0.00213) (0.00229) (0.00253) (0.00248) (0.00247) 
Born in New Zealand  0.0114 0.0145 0.00918 0.0108 
  (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0138) 
NZ European (reference) 
 
     
Other European  0.0484** 0.0467** 0.0377* 0.0369* 
  (0.0223) (0.0222) (0.0214) (0.0210) 
Māori  -0.00414 -0.00993 -0.00417 -0.00805 
  (0.0180) (0.0180) (0.0173) (0.0171) 
Samoan  -0.0150 -0.0285 -0.0322 -0.0297 
  (0.0356) (0.0360) (0.0330) (0.0324) 
Chinese  -0.0738** -0.0732* -0.0618 -0.0620 
  (0.0376) (0.0387) (0.0403) (0.0393) 
European & Māori  0.0450** 0.0407* 0.0309 0.0300 
  (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0208) (0.0205) 
Other ethnicity/ies  -0.0304* -0.0377** -0.0282 -0.0282* 
  (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0170) 
Lives with a partner  -0.0622*** -0.0416*** -0.0333*** -0.0344*** 
  (0.00855) (0.00919) (0.00882) (0.00874) 
No qualifications (reference)      
      
School qualifications  0.000801 0.0105 0.0133 0.0126 
  (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0111) 
Vocational  -0.0178* 0.000753 -0.000153 0.000907 
  (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0107) 
Degree  0.00412 0.0360** 0.0390*** 0.0350** 
  (0.0141) (0.0155) (0.0150) (0.0148) 
Other post-school  0.0245 0.0400 0.0404 0.0475 
  (0.0305) (0.0308) (0.0298) (0.0296) 
Main urban area (reference)      
      
Secondary urban area  -0.0130 -0.0135 0.00286 0.00203 
  (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0147) 
Minor urban area  -0.00322 -0.00783 -0.00538 -0.00166 
  (0.0134) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0130) 
Rural area  -0.0151 -0.0175 -0.0125 -0.0111 
  (0.0126) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0127) 
Log annual household income   -0.00299 -0.00291 -0.00371 
   (0.00488) (0.00472) (0.00469) 
Employed at HED   -0.0770*** -0.0464*** -0.0494*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0166) (0.0163) 
Manager (reference)      
      
Professional   0.00493 0.0230 0.0257 
   (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.0165) 
Associate Professional   0.0257 0.0262 0.0269 
   (0.0186) (0.0177) (0.0175) 
Clerical Services   0.0207 0.0243 0.0270 
   (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
Community & Personal Service    0.0147 0.0116 0.0164 
   (0.0165) (0.0157) (0.0156) 
Agricultural & Fisheries   0.0401* 0.0221 0.0308 
   (0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0208) 
Craft and Trades Workers   0.0108 -0.0235 -0.0156 
   (0.0194) (0.0179) (0.0177) 
Machine Operators & Drivers   0.0478** 0.0137 0.0246 
   (0.0197) (0.0184) (0.0182) 
Labourers   0.0182 0.0114 0.0147 
   (0.0206) (0.0192) (0.0191) 
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No occupation (did not work)   0.0194 0.0647*** 0.0616*** 
   (0.0222) (0.0212) (0.0209) 
Works 60+ hours per week   -0.000481 -0.00573 -0.00566 
   (0.0234) (0.0217) (0.0218) 
Log(ACC compensation paid)    0.0559*** 0.0532*** 
    (0.00315) (0.00320) 
Days between injury and interview (10)    -0.00335*** -0.00327*** 
    (0.000347) (0.000342) 
Entitlement claim (serious injury)    0.332*** 0.325*** 
    (0.0160) (0.0161) 
Laceration, puncture or sting (reference)      
      
Industrial deafness     -0.389*** 
     (0.0515) 
Soft tissue injury     0.0637*** 
     (0.00931) 
Fracture or dislocation     0.209*** 
     (0.0184) 
Foreign body in orifice or eye     -0.0540*** 
     (0.0184) 
Burns     0.0289 
     (0.0319) 
Amputation     0.315*** 
     (0.0949) 
Trauma induced hearing loss     -0.240*** 
     (0.0527) 
Hernia     -0.264*** 
     (0.0956) 
Dental injury     -0.140*** 
     (0.0293) 
Inhalation or ingestion (specific 
occupations) 
    -0.0619 
     (0.0812) 
Occupational disease     -0.132 
     (0.0956) 
Concussion     0.113** 
     (0.0498) 
Gradual process – local inflammation     -0.00159 
     (0.0370) 
Gradual process – compress syndrome     -0.289** 
     (0.124) 
Pain syndromes     0.0565* 
     (0.0294) 
Other/none     0.00899 
     (0.0280) 
Constant 0.357*** 0.376*** 0.451*** 0.189*** 0.150** 
 (0.0111) (0.0213) (0.0614) (0.0614) (0.0615) 
Observations 14,409 14,394 14,259 13,422 13,422 
R-squared 0.004 0.010 0.016 0.156 0.178 
Note: This is an unweighted linear probability regression. The sample is restricted to 
people who had an accepted ACC claim with an accident date in the 12 months before the 
SoFIE interview. The dependent variable is one if the person reported having 
experienced a limiting injury in the last 12 months in SoFIE, zero otherwise.  





7 Experience rating: Injury prevention or claims 
shifting? 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter finds that a substantial proportion of injured people do not 
receive accident compensation. Despite this, if underreporting is consistent over time then 
claims data can be reliably used to assess the impact of injury prevention interventions; 
however, if an intervention inadvertently increases underreporting of injury then it cannot 
be concluded that a reduction in claims corresponds to a reduction in injury.  
This chapter investigates one such policy intervention - experience rating. I use a 
continuous treatment variable – the degree to which a firm’s claims history affects its 
insurance levy under experience rating – and interact it with the period following the 
introduction of experience rating to test whether firms that received stronger treatment 
had larger decreases in work claims following the policy’s introduction. I then look for 
evidence of claims shifting behaviour by testing whether any decrease in work claims is 
associated with a corresponding increase in earner account claims, controlling for firm 
characteristics. 
7.2 Economic Theory 
As described in chapter 4, firms maximise profits by choosing a level of safety effort, 
s, and claims management activity t, with associated costs of effort 𝑍(𝑠, 𝑡). The degree of 
experience rating varies by 𝛼, with incentives to increase both safety effort and claims 
management increasing with 𝛼. 




𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠(𝑠, 𝑡) = 𝑧 ((1 − 𝑃(𝑠))N) − 𝑊(1 − 𝑃(𝑠)) − 𝛼𝑃(𝑠)𝑁[Π(𝑡)𝐵] − (1 −
𝛼)𝐹𝑁 − 𝑍(𝑠, 𝑡)      (7.1) 
where 𝑧(. ) is a concave production function and firm’s product price has been 
normalised to 1.  
I hypothesise that firms will respond to the introduction of experience rating with both 
a safety response and a claims management response, resulting in a decline in work 
claims and a small increase in off-the-job claims (hypothesis 5 in chapter 4). 
7.3 Literature 
Experience rating has been found to be effective at reducing workers’ compensation 
claims in other jurisdictions (De Groot & Koning, 2016; Lengagne, 2016; Tompa, Cullen, 
et al., 2012). Tompa, Cullen, et al. (2012) undertake a systematic literature review on the 
effectiveness of experience rating, updating an earlier article on this topic. The quality of 
studies is assessed and those of low quality are excluded from the review. An algorithm is 
used to determine the strength of evidence found. The authors conclude that there is 
moderate evidence that the introduction of experience rating is associated with a decrease 
in the frequency of reported injuries (based on six studies) and moderate evidence that the 
degree of experience rating is associated with a decrease in the frequency and severity of 
reported injuries (based on seven studies). The authors comment that most of the studies 
are based on claims data and none of them directly address the fact that claims may 
under-represent injuries. They reflect that several of the studies looked at different injury 
types which may indirectly provide information about claims shifting from lost-time 
claims to medical treatment only claims but none of the studies found any evidence in 
support of this.  
(De Groot & Koning, 2016) take a difference-in-difference approach using linked 
employer-employee administrative data to look at the impact of experience rating on 




disability insurance in the Netherlands. Experience rating was removed for small firms 
and the authors look at the impact on benefit inflows and outflows relative to large firms, 
which remained experience rated. They found that the removal of experience rating 
increased the disability inflow by seven percentage points and decreased outflow by 12 
percentage points.  However, the authors do not investigate whether this is a result of 
fewer injuries or fewer claims.  
Lengagne (2016) uses survey data on working conditions as reported by workers to 
look at whether experience rating is associated with firm safety behaviour and self-
reported injury in France. Firms with 10 or fewer workers are not subjected to experience 
rating, firms with 200 or more workers are fully experience rated, and firms with 11-199 
workers have a degree of experience rating that increases with firm size. The authors 
assume that if an industry’s insurance premium rate increases, it reflects an industry-wide 
shock. They also assume that industries with a higher proportion of firms that are 
experience rated will react more strongly to an increase in insurance premiums than 
industries with fewer experience rated firms. The paper aggregates the working 
conditions survey results to the industry level and combines it with industry levy rate 
information to look at variation in safety behaviour relative to industry levy increases. 
They find that industries with more experience rated firms respond to an increase in 
industry levies by reducing tiring postures and movements, reducing dust and smoke 
exposure and reducing injuries. The author suggests that more research should be done to 
look at other possible employer responses such as claims management. 
Some work has been done to look at claims management based on the type of injury or 
the type of benefit. Tompa, Hogg-Johnson, et al. (2012) look at claim types thought to be 
associated with claims management: no-lost-time permanent impairment claims, 
disputed/denied claims, claim types excluded from experience rating, and claims that 




reopen after the experience-rating window (when the costs no longer impact directly on 
the employers’ levy). They find that a higher degree of experience rating is positively 
related to these types of claims.  
Fortin and Lanoie (1992) look at whether the duration of injuries vary based on the 
size of benefits from workers’ compensation relative to unemployment insurance. They 
find evidence of a substitution effect between the two systems. The average duration of 
injuries increases with an increase in workers’ compensation benefits and decreases when 
unemployment benefits increase. 
7.4 Background 
The New Zealand ACC experience rating scheme was introduced in July 2011. It has 
two components: a no claims discount for small levy payers, low-risk levy payers13 and 
self-employed levy payers; and an experience rating loading or discount for large and 
high-risk employers.14 I focus here on the experience rating part of the scheme, although I 
briefly describe the no claims discount scheme below. The scheme is compulsory for all 
eligible firms. To be eligible for experience rating a firm must meet the minimum 
threshold for levy payments, have three years of claims history and must not be a member 
of the Accredited Employer Programme. 
Under the no claims discount scheme levy payers receive a 10 percent discount 
(decrease) if they had no weekly compensation claims and no fatality claims in the last 
three years. The levy payer receives a 10 percent loading (increase) on their levy if they 
paid out more than 71 days of weekly compensation to their employees over the last three 
years or had one or more fatality claims. If neither of these applies, then no adjustment is 
made to the levy.  
                                                 
13
 Levies less than $10,000 in at least one of the last three years. 
14
 Levies of $10,000 or more in each of the last three years. 




Under the experience rating programme, levy adjustments are based on the firm’s 
claims history for the last three years relative to that of similar sized firms in the same 
industry. Firms with a better relative claims history receive a levy discount and those with 
a relatively worse claims history receive a levy loading. The adjustment is primarily 
based on the number of weekly compensation days paid (days off work), but also 
incorporates the number of claims with over $500 paid out for costs of treatment and the 
number of fatal claims.
15
 There is a maximum adjustment that is used for the experience 
rating modification. When experience rating was first introduced the maximum 
experience rating loading (increase) was 35% and the maximum discount (decrease) was 
also 35%. From 1 April 2014 the maximum loading was increased to 60%.  
In the year ending March 2012, the highest levy rate was $9.01 per $100 of liable 
earnings, the lowest was $0.04 per $100 of liable earnings, and the mean was $1.41 per 
$100 of liable earnings. For a company employing one hundred people with an average 
wage of $40,000 at the average levy rate, this would equate to annual levies of $56,400 
and a 35% loading would equate to almost $20,000; however, a company of this size 
would receive a small rating factor (weighting) of around 9%. This would reduce the 
loading to about $5,000. 
It is not clear whether the experience rating incentives in New Zealand are strong 
enough to influence behaviour change. Feedback from employers suggests that the size of 
the discounts and loadings may not be large enough to achieve this in New Zealand 
(Ministry of Business‚ Innovation & Employment & Accident Compensation 
Corporation, 2015).  
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 An ‘off-balance adjustment’ is also applied to the experience rating modification to ensure that the 
aggregate value of discounts equals the aggregate value of loadings. The scheme also has an industry size 
modification. If large firms have lower history in terms of weekly compensation days relative to medium-
size firms in the same industry, then they receive a levy discount (and vice versa). 




The extent to which experience rating is applied varies by firm size. Firm size is 
measured using liable earnings. The claims history of larger firms is weighted more 
heavily when making levy adjustments compared to smaller firms because larger firms’ 
claims history is subject to less random variation. The weighting formula is designed to 
minimise discontinuities, thereby preventing the use of discontinuity analysis to estimate 
the effect of the scheme; however, if experience rating is successful, I would expect that 
firms with a higher weighting would have a stronger response to experience rating 
incentives than firms with a lower weighting. I use this feature to evaluate the impact of 
the introduction of experience rating on injury claims. 
The New Zealand experience rating programme has previously been evaluated by 
MBIE and ACC (Ministry of Business‚ Innovation & Employment & Accident 
Compensation Corporation, 2015). They review the claim rate trend lines for 1,800 
businesses and find a lot of variation at the individual level. They also look in depth into 
200 businesses. They find that those with particularly high or low claim rates saw a 
decline post-2011; those with high liable earnings had a step change decline post-2011; 
and those operating in high-risk industries also saw a decline in claim rates. They also 
look at firms with high discounts (low injury rates relative to their peers’) or loadings 
(high injury rates relative to their peers’) but are unable to distinguish between the impact 
of experience rating and mean reversion. Overall, they conclude that the financial 
incentives are not strong enough to create wide-spread behaviour change and that 
strengthening the incentives would not help because of the strong random component that 
sits behind claim rates.  
This work differs from the MBIE evaluation in two main ways. Firstly, I use 
differences in the weighting of experience rating to better identify the impact on work 
claims. Second, I look at the impact on earner account claims to better investigate claims 




shifting. Like the previous chapter, this research uses data from the IDI (see chapter 5 for 
a general description). Experience rating programme data are not included in the IDI, so I 
have derived some of the relevant variables for firms. This section describes these 
variables.  
7.4.1 Estimating ‘liable earnings’ 
ACC uses liable earnings to calculate the levies that firms are charged (insurance 
premiums). I calculate liable earnings using the Employer Monthly Schedule (EMS) data. 
The EMS includes monthly information on wages and salaries and a variable called 
‘earnings not liable for ACC levies’. Earnings that are not liable for ACC levies include 
an individual earnings cap and some types of earnings such as redundancy payments. I 
estimate liable earnings for enterprises by subtracting ‘earnings not liable for ACC levies’ 
from gross earnings and aggregating the information to the year ending March.  
7.4.2 Estimating ACC levies 
Enterprises are excluded from experience rating if their levies are less than $10,000 in 
any of the three years used to estimate their claims history. The levy rate is the insurance 
premium that ACC charges per $100 of liable earnings. The levy rate is based on the levy 
risk group of the firm (‘classification unit’), which is industry-based. ACC provided me 
with levy rate information by levy year (year ending March) and classification unit along 
with a mapping table for assigning classification units to ANZSIC06 industries (these are 
available on request). I use these data to estimate the firm’s levy by multiplying the levy 
rate by the firm’s liable earnings at the geographic unit for the firm (based on the 
permanent business number (PBN)). These are then summed to the enterprise level. I 
believe that this provides a good estimate of firms’ levies since most of the data are the 
same as that used by ACC to calculate levies. In some circumstances the levy risk group 




used by ACC will differ to the one I have obtained by mapping it to the detailed 
ANZSIC06 industry. I expect the differences will be small and unbiased because I think 
most levy risk groups match well to industry and where it does not it will contain both 
over- and under-estimates.  Enterprises with levies of less than $10,000 in any of the 
three years used to estimate their claims history are excluded from the analysis.  
7.4.3 The Accredited Employer Programme 
Firms in the Accredited Employer Programme (AEP) are not included in experience 
rating. There is no indicator in the data for whether a firm is in the AEP, but there is an 
indicator for whether a claim is an AEP claim. Some firms have a mixture of AEP and 
ACC claims. There are few possible reasons for this. The nature of the scheme means that 
some firms no longer in the AEP scheme still have AEP claims because they are still 
responsible for ongoing payments for historical claims.  There are also some firms in the 
AEP who have non-AEP claims (e.g., if the cost of the claim rises above an agreed 
amount the claim may revert to an ACC claim).  
Although most firm-year observations have no AEP claims (97%), those that have at 
least one AEP claim vary in the percent of claims that are AEP. Figure 7.1 displays the 
distribution for observations with at least one AEP claim. Most have either a low 
proportion of AEP claims (for 25% of observations, AEP claims make up 10% or fewer 
of their claims) or a high proportion of AEP claims (for 36% of observations, AEP claims 
make up 90% or more of their claims). 
To manage this, I apply a rule that if more than 80% of an enterprise’s claims in a 
given year are marked as AEP claims, the enterprise is excluded from the experience 
rating analysis. The results are not sensitive to how an AEP firm is defined. The 
robustness checks in Appendix D indicate that the results are robust to increasing the cut-
off to 95% AEP claims and reducing the cut-off to 5% AEP claims.  




7.4.4 Experience-rated firms 
To restrict my sample to firms eligible for experience rating I exclude enterprises 
where more than 80% of their claims are AEP claims, enterprises with estimated levies of 
less than or equal to $10,000 in any of the three years in the experience period and any 
firms present in the data for fewer than three years in a row. Nine percent of enterprise-
year observations remain after these exclusions are implemented.  
7.4.5 The unit of analysis 
ACC group together commonly owned businesses so that experience rating is based on 
common control of the workplace (Accident Compensation Corporation, 2011). Each 
levy payer in the grouping will receive the same discount or loading based on the group’s 
performance. Therefore, I estimate firm variables such as the rating factor at the 
enterprise level. Since inclusion in experience rating is based on enterprise information I 
exclude PBNs that change enterprise partway through the year.
16
 
The experience rating modification is based on comparison of a firms’ performance 
relative to its industry peer group.
17
 It seems likely that an enterprise might respond to 
experience rating by making industry-specific safety improvements rather than 
enterprise-wide changes. Although some health and safety improvements may be 
implemented at the enterprise level (e.g., health and safety audits) most interventions 
would probably be industry-specific (e.g., improved machine guarding for the 
manufacturing companies). To allow for this, the unit of the firms used here is a grouping 
                                                 
16
 31% of PBN-year observations changed enterprise during the year. Fabling (2011) states that some 
changes in the link between PBN and enterprise number may be a result of changes to the legal entity rather 
than changes to the firm. For example, if a sole proprietor becomes an incorporated entity the enterprise 
number may change. I do not think this would have a large impact here because most experience rated 
firms are large and therefore less likely to change entity in this way; however, future work could use the 
method proposed by Fabling (2011) to repair “broken” links, which could potentially increase the number 
of PBNs included in this study. 
17
 The industry peer group is defined in the Experience Rating Regulations 2016, s9. The definition is based 
on industry and firm size. 




of PBNs that belong to the same enterprise and operate within the same industry 
classification unit. The final study population consists of an average of 5,972 firms per 
year, with ten years of data from 2006 to 2015.  
7.4.6 The Rating Factor 
The Rating Factor (RF) is calculated using the formula stated in the experience rating 
regulations (see Appendix D). A Rating Factor of one implies that the firm is fully 
experience rated, whereby a low RF (e.g., 0.1) implies that the firms claims history only 
has a small impact on levy adjustments. The Rating Factor is derived from liable 
earnings, meaning that it is strongly correlated with the number of employees in the firm 
(correlation coefficient of 0.72). The Rating Factor used in the regressions has been 
standardised with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one.  
7.4.7 Other variables 
Outcome variable 
The outcome variable is claims with treatment costs greater than $500 as this is one of 
the variables used directly in the experience rating calculations. I also look at treatment-
only claims, total claims, weekly compensation claims (lost-time injury) and the average 
number of compensated days per weekly compensation claim. 
March years 
I include year fixed effects. The ACC levy year runs from 1 April to 31 March, so I use 
years ending March. Experience rating was introduced in April 2011- the start of the year 
ending March 2012.  
Number of employees 
Modelling the relationship between the number of employees and the number of 
claims for the firm presents a challenge. It seems likely that there are economies of scale 




in injury prevention. Large firms are found to have lower injury rates than small firms for 
fatalities (Fabiano, Currò, & Pastorino, 2004; Mendeloff, Nelson, Ko, & Haviland, 2006), 
major injury (Kines & Mikkelsen, 2003; Nichols, Dennis, & Guy, 1995), and lost-time 
injury (McVittie, Banikin, & Brocklebank, 1997). To address this, I control for the 
number of employees in the firm and its quadratic. Economies of scale may take place at 
either the firm level or the enterprise level. To address this, I include a categorical 
variable for the number of employees at the enterprise level interacted with a dummy 
variable for whether the firm is part of larger enterprise. 
I also estimate a version with the rate of claims per 1,000 employees as the dependent 
variable and control for just the number of employees on the right hand side (excluding 
the quadratic). 
Monthly earnings categories 
Information on the occupation mix of the firms is not available so I use monthly earnings 
as a proxy. The variable used captures the percent of employees whose monthly earnings 
are within five categories: [$0, $1,000]; ($1,000, $2,000]; ($2,000, $5,000]; ($5,000, 
$10,000]; and over $10,000. Earnings are in 2015 dollars, adjusted using the consumer 
price index. 
Employee turnover 
Employee turnover is the average monthly number of employees who leave the firm 
divided by the total number of employees. 
Multi-site firm 
This is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm consists of more than one PBN. 
Enterprise age 
This variable is intended to capture firm maturity. Data are only available from the year 
ending March 2000 onwards, so it measures the number of years the enterprise has been 




in existence since the year 2000. There are four categories: 5 years or less; (5 years, 10 
years]; (10 years, 15 years]; and over 15 years 
Firm Industry 
Firm industry is measured at the two-digit level using the Australia and New Zealand 
Standard Industry Classification 2006 (ANSIC06). 
Demographic characteristics 
I include a variable for the percent of employees that are male. This variable is likely to 
also capture some of the occupation mix information as many high-risk occupations, such 
as tree harvesting and construction, are male-dominated. I also include variables for the 
proportion of young workers aged 25 years or under and older workers aged over 60 
years. Younger workers have been found to have higher injury rates, while older workers 
tend to experience more serious injuries following an accident (Salminen, 2004). 
7.5 Empirical Strategy 
7.5.1 Identification Strategy 
Experience rating is compulsory for all firms that meet the eligibility requirements. 
Firms that do not meet the eligibility requirements - firms in the Accredited Employers 
Programme and new firms with less than three years of claims history - are not 
considered similar enough to provide a good control group. The reason is that firms 
choose whether to participate in the Accredited Employer Programme, which raises the 
issue of self-selection bias, while new firms are likely to differ in many unobservable 
ways from established firms (e.g., financing, management practices, staff tenure, growth 
rates). Mean reversion in injury rates mean that low injury firms are not able to be used as 
a control group. Low risk industries are not a suitable control group either because they 
have different trends in injury patterns to high risk industries.  I choose not to compare 
firms in the experience rating programme with those in the no claims discount 




programme because it is not clear a priori what the incentive effects are at the boundary 
between the two programmes.  
Instead I regard RF as a treatment intensity variable as it represents the degree to 
which a firm’s claims history impacts on its future levies. This is similar to the approach 
used by (Tompa et al., 2013). I fix RF at the average value for the firm prior to the 
introduction of experience rating (2006-2010) so that treatment intensity is not affected if 
the firm adjusts liable earnings in response to experience rating. I exclude the year before 
the introduction (2011) from the fixed RF value to avoid any anticipation effects. Firms 
not present in any year in the period 2006-2010 are excluded from the analysis. 
I look at whether treatment intensity is associated with a change in claims following 
the introduction of experience rating compared to the period before its introduction. I do 
this separately for work claims and off-the-job claims to look for any evidence of claims 
shifting. 
The linear version of this model is shown in equation 7.1.  𝑌 is the number of claims, 
𝑅𝐹 is the treatment intensity variable, POST2011 is a dummy variable that equals one for 
the years after the introduction of experience rating, 𝛼𝑡 represents year fixed effects and 
𝑋 is a matrix of firm characteristics (including the number of employees and its 
quadratic). 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇2011 + 𝛿𝑅𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡   (7.1) 
The main variable of interest is the interaction between RF and post_2011. If the 
introduction of experience rating incentivised firms to reduce claims, then the coefficient 
on this variable will be negative and statistically significant. 
This approach relies on the assumption that trends in claims by RF are parallel prior to 
the introduction of experience rating. To check this assumption, I restrict the data to the 




period prior to the introduction of experience rating and apply two tests.  Firstly, I replace 
the interaction variable with a time trend interacted with the RF. If the parallel trends 
assumption holds, I expect the coefficient to be not statistically significantly different 
from zero. Second, I run a placebo test in which I replace the post-2011 variable with that 
of a different year. Once again, this coefficient should not be statistically significantly 
different from zero if the parallel trends assumption holds. Rather than picking just one 
year, I run the placebo test for three years – post-2007, post-2008 and post-2009 to check 
that I have not picked an unusual year. I do not include the year before the introduction of 
experience rating as a placebo because it may be confounded by anticipation effects. I run 
these tests for both the number of claims and the rate of claims per 1,000 employees.  
7.5.2 Modelling injuries 
Count models are generally preferred to linear and log-linear models for modelling 
injury data because injuries have a lower bound of zero (OLS may predict negative 
values) and many firms have no injuries, which can make the use of a log-linear model 
problematic. Experience rated firms are generally large and therefore are more likely to 
have injury claims relative to all firms; however, despite this nine percent of firm-year 
observations have no work claims and five percent have no earner claims associated with 
their workers. A much higher proportion of firm-year observations have no claims with 
medical costs of over $500 (52 percent for work claims and 31 percent for earner claims).  
An alternative option is the Poisson model, which assumes that the mean is equal to 
the variance. Like other studies of firm injuries (Ruser, 1993; Tompa et al., 2013), I reject 
this assumption, observing over-dispersion in the data, which is likely to arise because 
most firms have either no claims or only a few. The Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood 
model and the negative binomial model both handle count data and zero inflation well; 




however, they do not necessarily converge, particularly with a large number of firm fixed 
effects.  
Unlike log transformations, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation can be applied to 
values of zero (MacKinnon & Magee, 1990; Pence, 2006).  
It can also be applied to negative values and has the feature of pulling extreme values 
toward the other transformed observations (Burbidge, Magee, & Robb, 1988). 
Applying the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to the dependent variable yields: 
?̃? = arcsinh(𝑌) = ln (𝑌 + √𝑌2 + 1)    (7.2) 
To recover Y from the left-hand side the inverse of the inverse hyperbolic sine is applied 
to both sides: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = sinh(?̂? + ?̂?𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡)     (7.3) 
Bellemare and Wichman (2018) shows that the elasticity is: 






   (7.4) 
For large values of 𝑌, 𝜉𝑦𝑥 ≈ ?̂?𝑋, because lim𝑌→∞
√𝑌2+1
𝑌
= 1 (Bellemare & Wichman, 
2018). Except for very small values of y, the inverse hyperbolic sine can be interpreted in 
the same way as a standard logarithmic dependent variable (Woolley, 2011) . 
I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation for the main results. A robustness check 
indicates that the results are not sensitive to the choice of model (see section 7.6.4 for 
more details).  
7.6 Results 
7.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 7.1 displays the descriptive statistics for all years pooled together and broken 
down by the period before and after experience rating. The average number of work 




claims per firm is 9.14 (95% CI [9.00, 9.28]), while the average number of work claims 
with treatment costs greater than $500 is 1.20 (95% CI [1.18, 1.22]).  The average 
number of compensated days per weekly compensation work claim per firm is 91.6 days 
(95% CI [89.2, 94.1]). The number of earners’ claims per firm tends to be higher, with an 
average of 22.83 total claims (95% CI [22.40, 23.26]) and an average of 3.63 claims with 
treatment costs greater than $500 (95% CI [3.56, 3.70]). The average number of days off 
work per weekly compensation earners’ claim is also slightly lower than that for work 
claims (74.3, 95% CI [72.6, 75.9]). 
The average rating factor is 0.11 and a quarter of the firms are part of a larger 
enterprise. The employee turnover rate is 0.13. Average monthly earnings are $3,650. On 
average, enterprises have been in existence for 10.8 years since 2000.  
Next, I group firms into RF quartiles for descriptive purposes. Figure 7.2 displays the 
average number of work claims per firm by RF quartile. Firms with a higher RF have 
higher average numbers of work claims. From 2006 to 2009, the number of claims with 
treatment costs over $500 was increasing across all RF groups. Numbers then decreased 
until 2011 when they levelled out. Although the patterns are similar across the groups, the 
rate of growth and decline appear larger for the higher RF groups than the lower RF 
groups.  
Figure 7.3 displays the average rate per 1,000 employees of work claims with 
treatment costs of more than $500 by RF quartile. Firms in the two lower RF quartiles 
have higher injury rates than those in the higher quartiles. Injury rates follow a similar 
pattern to the number of injuries although the pattern is less consistent across RF groups.  
Figure 7.4 displays the average number of earners’ claims per firm by RF quartile. 
Earners’ claims follow a similar pattern to work claims, with an increasing number of 




claims up until 2009 and then a decline, with higher RF groups having larger rates of 
growth and decline than the lower RF groups. 
Figure 7.5 displays the average rate per 1,000 employees of earners’ claims with 
treatment costs of more than $500 by RF quartile. There is little difference in injury rates 
by RF quartile. This implies that employees who work for firms that have a higher 
intensity of experience rating have similar rates of off-the-job injuries as employees who 
work for firms that have a lower intensity of experience rating.  
7.6.2 Parallel Trends 
The approach used here relies on the assumption that trends in claim rates by RF are 
parallel prior to the introduction of experience rating. To test for parallel trends, I restrict 
the data to the pre-treatment period and include a time trend variable interacted with RF. 
If trends are parallel prior to the introduction of experience rating the coefficient will be 
zero. Table 7.2 displays the results using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. 
Columns 1 and 2 contain the results for work claims while columns 3 and 4 contain the 
results for earners’ claims. The results are presented both with and without firm fixed 
effects. The top panel dependent variable is the number of claims with treatment costs 
greater than $500, while the bottom panel dependent variable is the rate of claims with 
treatment costs greater than $500 per 1,000 employees. 
The coefficient on the time trend variable interacted with RF without firm fixed effects 
is 0.00463 (statistically significant) for the number of work claims and 0.00751 
(statistically significant) for earners’ claims. Adding firm fixed effects reduces the size of 
the coefficients, and the work claims coefficient is no longer statistically significant. This 
provides some support for the parallel trends assumption. 




 For the rate of claims per 1,000 employees, the coefficient on the interaction term is 
small and not statistically different from zero for work claims or earners’ claims, and with 
and without firm fixed effects.  
As described in section 7.5.2, I run a placebo test for three years in which experience 
rating was not introduced: 2007, 2008 and 2009. Table 7.3 displays the results. In most 
cases, the coefficients on the interaction between the time trend and RF appear to be 
decreasing over time, with the post-2007 coefficient being the highest and the post-2009 
coefficient being the lowest. The pattern of the coefficients suggests that injuries and 
injury rates may have been decreasing more quickly among firms with higher RF prior to 
the introduction of experience rating. This implies that an assumption of parallel growth 
trends rather than parallel trends is more appropriate for these data.  
Overall, the time trend test suggests that the parallel assumption holds when the work 
claims are used as the dependent variable but does not hold when earners’ claims are used 
as the dependent variable. The placebo test indicates that there may have been some 
divergence in claims prior to the introduction of experience rating. I proceed with the 
analysis using a parallel growth trends assumption but acknowledge that the evidence for 
causation is weak and so the results should be interpreted with caution. Further comment 
is provided in the discussion (section 7.7).  
7.6.3 Regression results 
Injury claims with more than $500 of treatment costs 
Table 7.4 displays the results of the inverse hyperbolic sine regression predicting 
the number of injury claims with treatment costs over $500. Columns 1-4 display the 
results for work claims while columns 5-8 display the results for earners’ claims. The first 
columns (columns 1 and 5) control for the interaction term (RF*post2011), the rating 
factor (RF), the number of employees and its quadratic, and year fixed effects. Columns 2 




and 6 add in firm characteristics. Columns 3 and 7 add in firm fixed effects (with industry 
excluded). Columns 4 and 8 add in a variable that is the interaction between the time 
trend and RF.   
I focus here on the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of interest 
(RF*post2011) because I am interested in the relative impact of the introduction of 
experience rating, holding all else constant. The marginal effect for the interaction term is 
constant across the distribution of other covariates. 
The coefficients on RF*post2011 are mostly negative and statistically significant. 
Computing the elasticities at the mean using formula 7.3, the results in column 2 indicate 
that a one standard deviation increase in the rating factor (0.09) in the period following 
the introduction of experience rating, holding all other variables at their mean value,  is 
associated with a decrease in work claims of 2.4 percent. Adding firm fixed effects and 
the interaction between RF and the time trend (column 4) decreases the elasticity at the 
mean from 2.3 percent to 2.0 percent and it is no longer statistically significantly different 
from zero.  
The coefficients on the variable RF*post2011 for the earners’ claims regressions 
are all negative and the final specification (includes firm fixed effects and the time trend 
interacted with RF) is statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the 
rating factor is associated with a 3.3 percent decrease in earners’ claims relative to the 
period before the introduction of experience rating (column 8), holding all other 
variables, including RF, at their mean value. This implies that any decrease in work 
claims is not a result of claims shifting (misreporting that work injuries occurred off-the-








Alternative claim types 
I next look at whether the results are specific to claims with high treatment costs by 
running the same inverse hyperbolic sine model but using different types of claims as the 
dependent variable. I look at treatment-only claims (those not involving days off work or 
other entitlements), all claims, weekly compensation claims (more than a week off work) 
and the average number of compensated days off work per claim. Table 7.5 displays the 
results. The top panel displays the specification with the full set of controls including firm 
fixed effects and the time trend interacted with RF. The bottom panel displays the results 
excluding firm fixed effects.  
The coefficients are all negative in the work claims specification without firm fixed 
effects; however once firm fixed effects are added the coefficients on RF*post2011 
become small, positive and not statistically significantly different from zero. The same is 
true for the earners claims, apart from the average number of days off work which is 
positive and statistically different from zero at the 5% level both with and without firm 
fixed effects. It is possible that a focus on return-to-work for work injuries following the 
introduction of experience rating has been ineffective at reducing days off work for work 
injuries but had a displacement effect on return-to-work for people with an off-the-job 
injury.  
7.6.4 Robustness checks 
I check whether the results are robust to alternative models. The results for work 
claims are displayed in Table 7.6. The models displayed are the inverse hyperbolic sine 
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 I also run these regressions with injury rates as the dependent variable (see Appendix D). The R-squared 
values on these are low, indicating that the injury rate model is not a good fit. 






), a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood model (POISSON QML), 
a negative binomial model with the average marginal effects displayed (NBREG AME), a 
log-linear model in which firms with no claims are excluded from the sample (LOG-
LINEAR), a log-linear model in which firms with no claims are recoded to have one 
claim (LOG-LINEAR2) and an ordinary least squares model (OLS). The dependent 
variable is the number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 and includes the 
full set of controls. The coefficient on the interaction term (RF*post2011) is negative and 
statistically significant in most of the models. 
Neither the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood model with firm fixed effects nor 
the negative binomial model with firm fixed effects converged. The size of the coefficient 
on the interaction term (RF*post2011) using the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood 
model is -0.0279 and is statistically significant.  
Using the negative binomial model without fixed effects, the marginal effect of an 
additional unit of RF in the post-2011 period holding all other variables, including RF, at 
their mean value is -0.049. This implies that when all other variables are at the mean a 
one standard deviation increase in the rating factor is associated with a 0.049 decrease in 
the number of claims relative to the period before the introduction of experience rating. 
For a firm with the mean number of claims (1.20), this would imply a 4.1 percent 
decrease. 
The size of the coefficient is similar across the two log-linear models. A one 
standard deviation increase in the rating factor is associated with a decrease in work 
claims with treatment costs over $500 by 0.019 log points (1.9 percent) for both log-
linear models with firm fixed effects.  
Using OLS with firm fixed effects, a one standard deviation increase in RF is 
associated with a decrease in the number of claims by 0.116. Given that the average 




number of claims per firm is 1.20, this would correspond to 9.7 percent decrease at the 
mean.  
The robustness check indicates that the use of alternative models finds a larger and 
stronger effect of experience rating on work claims relative to the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation model. 
The results for earners’ claims are similar to that for work claims (see Table 7.7). 
All coefficients on the interaction term of interest are negative and statistically 
significant, apart from the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood coefficient without firm 
fixed effects, which is negative, small in magnitude and not statistically significant. There 
is no evidence across any of the models to suggest that earners’ claims increased 
following the introduction of experience rating. 
7.7 Discussion 
Despite the hypothesis that firms will respond to experience rating with both improved 
safety effort and increased claims management, I find no evidence that the introduction of 
experience rating in New Zealand led to workers claiming work injuries as occurring off-
the-job. Experience rating appears to have had little impact on work claims, but some 
possible spillover effects in reducing off-the-job injury.  
While there are several possible firm responses to experience rating that might result 
in a reduction in earners claims (e.g., the knowledge gained from training on the safe use 
of machinery is then applied to use of machinery at home), it is surprising that this would 
not also affect other types of claims, such as treatment-only claims. Further research 
could look at the types of injuries in more detail (e.g. strains and sprains compared to 
fractures and dislocations). 
This research has some important limitations. Firstly, I am not able to directly measure 
firms’ participation in the experience rating programme. Instead I create a proxy for 




participation in experience rating using available data. While these data are thought to be 
a reasonable proxy, future work could benefit from direct access to programme data.  
Second, there have been a lot of changes to the health and safety system in New 
Zealand, over this period. There was the Pike River Coal Mine Disaster in 2010 in which 
29 workers lost their lives, a Royal Commission inquiry into the disaster which reported 
back 2012, and a Taskforce review of the workplace health and safety system which 
made recommendations in 2013. An independent workplace health and safety regulator 
was established at the end of 2013 (WorkSafe New Zealand) and new health and safety 
legislation came into effect in 2016 (the Health and Safety at Work Act (2015)). If these 
events have had a stronger effect on reducing claims in firms that are more highly 
experience rated, then they will be contributing to the results found here. 
Third, this study has only looked at claims shifting; it is possible that the introduction 
of experience rating was associated with other claims management behaviour not studied 
here. 
Overall, I find no evidence that experience rating has led to claims shifting behaviour 
in the current policy settings. The trade-offs between pooling risk and incentivising injury 
reduction appears to be well balanced; however, the impact on reducing work claims was 
also very small (and not statistically significantly different from zero in the main 
specification). This does not preclude a change in behaviour if incentives were to be 
strengthened by increasing the rating factor.  
From 1 April 2014 the maximum experience rating loading was increased to 60%. 
With only one year of data after the introduction of this increase I was not able to look at 
the impact that this may have had on claims. This could be an area for future research, 
once additional years of claims data are added to the IDI. 
  




7.8 Tables and Figures 
Figure 7.1: Proportion of work claims that are AEP claims for firms with at least one 
AEP claim 
 
Note: 97% of firm-year observations have no AEP claims. This figure is restricted to 
firm-year observations for which at least one claim is labelled as an AEP claim. The 
proportion of claims that are AEP is calculated for each firm-year observation and the 
frequency is displayed for the percent of claims that are AEP in groupings of 10 
percentage points. The sample includes all experience rated firms, prior to restricting the 
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VARIABLE Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Work claims       
Total claims 9.14 15.79 9.33 16.40 8.81 14.65 
Treatment costs <$500 1.20 2.35 1.20 2.35 1.19 2.36 
Treatment only claims 7.94 13.79 8.07 14.32 7.71 12.79 
Lost-time claims 1.12 2.32 1.17 2.38 1.02 2.19 
Number of compensated days 
per lost-time claim 91.62 191.92 101.46 222.75 73.09 110.66 
Off the job claims       
Total claims 22.83 48.91 22.48 48.38 23.43 49.82 
Treatment costs <$500 3.63 8.30 3.53 8.07 3.80 8.69 
Treatment only claims 20.76 45.39 20.38 44.80 21.42 46.43 
Lost-time claims 1.68 3.31 1.70 3.34 1.65 3.27 
Number of compensated days 
per lost-time claim 74.28 142.98 80.33 168.27 63.39 78.23 
Experience rating        
Rating Factor 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 
Liable earnings ($m) $4.54 $10.90 $4.18 $10.10 $5.18 $12.10 
Levy $42,538 $77,840 $39,085 $71,754 $48,634 $87,237 
Firm characteristics       
Number of employees (00) 0.95 2.12 93.48 213.15 97.45 209.52 
% male 0.65 0.28 0.66 0.28 0.65 0.28 
% aged <25 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.13 
% aged 60+  0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.10 
Part of a multi-site enterprise 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.44 
Employee Turnover 0.13 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Monthly gross earnings 3650.28 1501.09 3296.61 1312.56 4274.64 1606.04 
% earning $10,000 or more <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
% earning $5-10,000 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.26 0.17 
% earning $2-$5,000 0.55 0.18 0.57 0.19 0.52 0.17 




% earning $1- $2,000 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.09 
% earning less than $1,000 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.12 
Enterprise age since 2000 10.81 2.93 9.17 1.80 13.70 2.21 
Observations       
All 49,722  31,755  17,970  
Work claims with days off 23,118  15,096  8,022  
Earners’ claims with days off 28,704  18,441  10,263  
 
Figure 7.2: Average number of work claims with treatment costs over $500 per firm by 
treatment intensity group 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Four treatment intensity groups 
have been created for descriptive purposes. Low RF groups together firms with the 
lowest quartile treatment intensity; high RF groups together firms with the highest 
quartile of treatment intensity. 
 
  




Figure 7.3: Average rate of work claims with treatment costs overs $500 per 1,000 
employees per firm by treatment intensity group 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Four treatment intensity groups 
have been created. Low RF groups together firms with the lowest quartile treatment 
intensity; high RF groups together firms with the highest quartile of treatment intensity. 
Figure 7.4: Average number of earners’ claims with treatment costs over $500 per firm 
by treatment intensity group 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Four treatment intensity groups 
have been created. Low RF groups together firms with the lowest quartile treatment 
intensity; high RF groups together firms with the highest quartile of treatment intensity. 




Figure 7.5: Average rate of earners’ claims with treatment costs overs $500 per 1,000 
employees per firm by treatment intensity group 
 
Note: Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Four treatment intensity groups 
have been created. Low RF groups together firms with the lowest quartile treatment 
intensity; high RF groups together firms with the highest quartile of treatment intensity. 
 
  




Table 7.2: Inverse hyperbolic sine regressions predicting claims with costs of treatment 
greater than $500 to test for parallel trends in the pre-treatment period (2006-2011) 
Sample:  Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: Number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 
RF*Time trend 0.00463** 0.00127 0.00751*** 0.00686*** 
 (0.00232) (0.00217) (0.00201) (0.00194) 
RF 0.316***  0.729***  
 (0.0193)  (0.0205)  
Constant -1.683*** 0.0759 -0.207 0.477*** 
 (0.266) (0.163) (0.160) (0.175) 
Controls     
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry level 2  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
     
R-squared 0.390 0.030 0.661 0.080 
Observations 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms  7,824  7,824 
Mean dependent variable 0.6834 0.6834 1.2564 1.2564 
Dependent variable: Rate of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 per 1,000 employees 
RF*Time trend 0.00653 -0.00009 -0.00490 -0.00357 
 (0.00495) (0.00490) (0.00502) (0.00488) 
RF 0.648***  0.979***  
 (0.0290)  (0.0325)  
Constant -2.278*** 1.359** 1.187*** 2.346*** 
 (0.557) (0.597) (0.404) (0.648) 
Controls     
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared     
Industry level 2  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
     
R-squared 0.121 0.003 0.175 0.017 
Observations 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms  7,824  7,824 
Mean dependent variable 1.9682 1.9682 3.1460 3.1460 
 
Note: These regressions include controls for firm characteristics and year fixed effects. 
Columns 1 and 3 include detailed industry fixed effects (level 2). Columns 2 and 4 include 
firm fixed effects but exclude industry. When the dependent variable is the number of 
claims it includes controls for number of employees and its quadratic. When the 
dependent variable is the rate of claims per 1,000 employees, it includes controls for the 
number of employees but not the quadratic. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  




Table 7.3: Placebo test: Inverse hyperbolic sine regression predicting number of claims 
with treatment costs greater than $500 in the pre-treatment period 
Sample: Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
Dependent variable: Number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 
RF*Post2007 0.052***   0.060***   
 (0.0113)   (0.0091)   
RF*Post2008  0.036***   0.039***  
  (0.0124)   (0.0101)  
RF*Post2009   -0.057***   -0.066*** 
   (0.0116)   (0.0092) 
Constant 0.0796 0.0731 0.0813 0.481*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 
 (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) (0.174) (0.175) (0.175) 
Controls       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R-squared 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.081 0.080 0.080 
Observations 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 
Mean dep var 0.6834 0.6834 0.6834 1.2564 1.2564 1.2564 
Dependent variable: Rate of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 per 1,000 employees 
RF*Post2007 0.065**   -0.070**   
 (0.0276)   (0.0278)   
RF*Post2008  0.026   -0.010  
  (0.0300)   (0.0294)  
RF*Post2009   -0.083***   0.084*** 
   (0.0284)   (0.0277) 
Constant 1.36** 1.36** 1.37** 2.34*** 2.35*** 2.34*** 
 (0.597) (0.597) (0.596) (0.649) (0.648) (0.649) 
Controls       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes    
       
R-squared 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Observations 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 
Mean dep variable 1.9682 1.9682 1.9682 3.1460 3.1460 3.1460 
Note: These regressions include controls for firm characteristics, year fixed effects and 
firm fixed effects. When the dependent variable is the number of claims it includes 
controls for number of employees and its quadratic. When the dependent variable is the 
rate of claims per 1,000 employees, it includes controls for the number of employees but 
not the quadratic. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1








Table 7.4: Inverse hyperbolic sine linear regression of firms predicting the number of injury claims with treatment costs over $500  
Sample: Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 (SINH-1)     
RF*Post2011 -0.0292*** -0.0182** -0.0208*** -0.0156 -0.0212*** -0.0182*** -0.00823 -0.0318*** 
 (0.00785) (0.00745) (0.00614) (0.00970) (0.00762) (0.00704) (0.00544) (0.00762) 
RF 0.172*** 0.270***   0.682*** 0.670***   
 (0.0187) (0.0188)   (0.0216) (0.0223)   
RF*Time trend    -0.00109    0.00501*** 
    (0.00182)    (0.00158) 
Employees (hundreds) 0.221*** 0.196*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 0.197*** 0.166*** 0.455*** 0.455*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0199) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0260) (0.0246) (0.0285) (0.0286) 
Employees squared -0.00004*** -0.00004*** -0.00006*** -0.00006*** -0.00005*** -0.00004*** -0.00009*** -0.00009*** 
 (0.000008) (0.000007) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.000009) (0.00001) (0.000001) 
Multi-site firm  0.0599*** 0.0986*** 0.0985***  0.145*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
  (0.0146) (0.0224) (0.0224)  (0.0148) (0.0248) (0.0248) 
Employee turnover  0.000551 -0.000464 -0.000466  -0.00169*** -0.000594 -0.000584 
  (0.000394) (0.000327) (0.000327)  (0.000419) (0.000362) (0.000362) 
Monthly earning >$10,000+         
         
% earning $5-$10,000  0.0129*** 0.00268*** 0.00262***  0.00360*** -0.000569 -0.000295 
  (0.00181) (0.000950) (0.000951)  (0.00123) (0.00103) (0.00102) 
% earning $2-$5,000  0.0151*** 0.00246*** 0.00239***  0.00293*** -0.00105 -0.000753 
  (0.00163) (0.000900) (0.000903)  (0.00113) (0.000970) (0.000970) 
% earning $1-$2,000  0.0185*** 0.00398*** 0.00393***  0.00437*** 0.000862 0.00108 
  (0.00174) (0.00103) (0.00103)  (0.00127) (0.00114) (0.00113) 
% earning <$1,000  0.0169*** 0.00304*** 0.00298***  0.00482*** -0.00197* -0.00168 
  (0.00165) (0.00104) (0.00105)  (0.00128) (0.00119) (0.00118) 
% Male  0.00588*** 0.00153*** 0.00153***  0.000506 0.00123*** 0.00123*** 
  (0.000336) (0.000299) (0.000299)  (0.000309) (0.000373) (0.000373) 
% Aged<=25  0.000261 0.00110*** 0.00110***  0.00446*** 0.00237*** 0.00237*** 
  (0.000532) (0.000397) (0.000397)  (0.000485) (0.000472) (0.000472) 
% Aged>60  -0.00144*** -0.000724* -0.000730*  -0.00316*** -0.00215*** -0.00213*** 
  (0.000412) (0.000430) (0.000430)  (0.000492) (0.000521) (0.000521) 
Enterprise Age <=5 years         
         
5-10 years   -0.000208 -0.000749 -0.000727  0.0159 0.0215 0.0214 
  (0.0262) (0.0269) (0.0269)  (0.0289) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
10-15 years   0.00908 0.0180 0.0183  0.0322 0.0246 0.0234 
  (0.0304) (0.0331)  (0.0331)  (0.0332) (0.0335) (0.0335) 








>15 years   -0.0119 -0.0134 -0.0128  -0.0168 -0.0116 -0.0141 
  (0.0395) (0.0416) (0.0416)  (0.0442) (0.0428) (0.0428) 
Enterprise size 
(firm=enterprise) 
        
         
Small  -0.104*** -0.0736*** -0.0736***  -0.171*** -0.143*** -0.143*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0256) (0.0256)  (0.0160) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
Medium low  0.0110 -0.0463* -0.0465*  -0.0758*** -0.0321 -0.0315 
  (0.0155) (0.0271) (0.0271)  (0.0163) (0.0276) (0.0276) 
Medium high  0.0898*** 0.0246 0.0243  -6.06e-05 0.0853** 0.0869** 
  (0.0201) (0.0337) (0.0338)  (0.0200) (0.0339) (0.0339) 
Large  0.0252 0.000774 0.000562  -0.0641*** 0.0339 0.0349 
  (0.0240) (0.0445) (0.0445)  (0.0230) (0.0494) (0.0495) 
Constant 0.467*** -1.390*** -0.0310 -0.0252 0.932*** 0.306** 0.658*** 0.631*** 
 (0.0174) (0.162) (0.101) (0.102) (0.0209) (0.121) (0.111) (0.111) 
Controls         
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Level 2  Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
         
R-squared 0.301 0.385 0.042 0.042 0.625 0.650 0.080 0.080 
Observations 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 
Number of firms   7,821 7,821   7,821 7,821 
Mean dependent variable 0.6838 0.6838 0.6838 0.6838 1.2791 1.2791 1.2791 1.2791 
Note: This table displays the results of an inverse hyperbolic sine linear regression looking at whether the degree of experience rating (RF) is 
associated with the number of injury claims following the introduction of experience rating (post2011). The coefficients for the interaction terms 
are displayed, along with that for RF. Additional controls are displayed at the end. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 








Table 7.5: Inverse hyperbolic sine linear regression predicting the number of claims for firms by type of claim 
 Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 







Average days  
off work  








Average days  
off work  
 WITH FIRM FIXED EFFECTS 
RF*Post2011 0.00429 0.00601 0.00971 0.00350 0.00517 0.00589 0.00438 0.0511*** 
 (0.00807) (0.00799) (0.00957) (0.0297) (0.00739) (0.00732) (0.00914) (0.0192) 
RF*Time trend -0.00747*** -0.0077*** -0.00948*** -0.0102* -0.00175 -0.00176 -0.00483*** -0.0176*** 
 (0.00174) (0.00174) (0.00177) (0.00533) (0.00164) (0.00163) (0.00167) (0.00348) 
Constant 0.927*** 1.033*** 0.299*** 3.882*** 2.351*** 2.417*** 0.204* 3.857*** 
 (0.142) (0.142) (0.0951) (0.678) (0.135) (0.134) (0.107) (0.396) 
R-squared 0.105 0.117 0.054 0.009 0.121 0.130 0.060 0.006 
 WITHOUT FIRM FIXED EFFECTS 
RF*Post2011 -0.0199** -0.0189* -0.00634 -0.00340 -0.00977 -0.00956 -0.00233 0.0616*** 
 (0.00995) (0.00997) (0.0105) (0.0274) (0.00882) (0.00881) (0.00976) (0.0186) 
RF*Time trend -0.00350 -0.00337 -0.00615*** -0.0102** -0.00346 -0.00336 -0.00371** -0.0183*** 
 (0.00235) (0.00238) (0.00216) (0.00479) (0.00215) (0.00216) (0.00188) (0.00327) 
RF 0.674*** 0.686*** 0.237*** 0.130*** 0.985*** 0.990*** 0.405*** 0.146*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0278) (0.0219) (0.0247) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0233) (0.0181) 
Constant -1.795*** -1.861*** -1.647*** 4.010*** 1.460*** 1.396*** -1.572*** 3.225*** 
 (0.235) (0.243) (0.175) (0.353) (0.163) (0.165) (0.143) (0.228) 
R-squared 0.585 0.597 0.329 0.025 0.718 0.719 0.493 0.023 
Controls         
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 49,722 49,722 49,722 23,118 49,722 49,722 49,722 28,704 
Number of firms 7,824 7,824 7,824 6,012 7,824 7,824 7,824 6,549 
Mean dependent variable  2.0856 2.2183 0.6315 4.3819 2.8418 2.9524 0.8548 4.4071 
Note: Each column represents a separate regression with a different dependent variable. The first group of columns is based on work claims 
while the second group of columns is based on off-the-job claims for workers.  The dependent variable for columns 4 and 8 are the average 
number of days off work per weekly compensation claim per firm. “Weekly comp.” (columns 3 and 7) stands for weekly compensation. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table 7.6: Model comparison of predictions of the impact of experience rating on work claims with treatment costs over $500  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MODEL: SINH-1 POISSON QML NBREG AME LOG-LINEAR LOG-LINEAR 2 OLS 
Dependent variable: Number of work claims with treatment costs over $500 
WITH FIRM FIXED EFFECTS 
RF*Post2011 -0.0156   -0.0194* -0.0190** -0.116*** 
 (0.00970) Too many Does not  (0.0117) (0.00777) (0.0389) 
RF*Time trend -0.00109 variables converge -0.000034 -0.000231 0.00739 
 (0.00182)   (0.00220) (0.00148) (0.00734) 
Constant -0.0252   -0.449* -0.165** -0.663** 
 (0.102)   (0.257) (0.0673) (0.268) 
R-squared 0.042   0.052 0.052 0.117 
WITHOUT FIRM FIXED EFFECTS 
RF*Post2011 -0.0267*** -0.0279*** -0.0490** -0.0278** -0.0262*** -0.180*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0229) (0.0121) (0.00817) (0.0434) 
RF*Time trend 0.00171 0.00394 0.00559 0.000954 0.00167 0.0194** 
 (0.00202) (0.00396) (0.00562) (0.00239) (0.00164) (0.00923) 
RF 0.264*** 0.534*** 0.867*** 0.185*** 0.109*** 0.0953 
 (0.0214) (0.0606) (0.0569) (0.0224) (0.0174) (0.0929) 
Constant -1.393*** -4.867***  -2.004*** -1.079*** -3.321*** 
 (0.163) (1.524)  (0.345) (0.127) (0.844) 
R-squared 0.385 0.421  0.378 0.391 0.481 
Controls       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 49,722  49,722 49,722  25,167   49,722  49,722 
Mean dependent variable 0.0684 1.2007 1.2007 0.5324 0.2695 1.2007 
Note: This table compares the results for work claims from the six different models. Two version of log-linear are used, in the first model firms 
with no claims are dropped from the sample, in the second they are assigned a claims value of one. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  








Table 7.7: Model comparison of predictions of the impact of experience rating on earners’ claims with treatment costs over $500  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MODEL: SINH-1 POISSON QML NBREG AME LOG-LINEAR LOG-LINEAR 2 OLS 
 WITH FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  
  Dependent variable: Number of earners’ claims with treatment costs over $500 





 (0.00762) variables  (0.00647) (0.100) 
RF*Time trend 0.00501***   0.00265 0.00705*** 0.196*** 
 (0.00158)   (0.00168) (0.00138) (0.0225) 
Constant 0.631***   0.277 0.152* -0.245 
 (0.111)   (0.189) (0.0871) (0.633) 
R-squared 0.080   0.099 0.099 0.489 
 WITHOUT FIRM FIXED EFFECTS  
  Dependent variable: Number of earners’ claims with treatment costs over $500 
RF*Post2011 -0.0418*** -0.000968 -0.175** -0.0372*** -0.0455*** -0.697*** 
 (0.00817) (0.00710) (0.0740) (0.00847) (0.00691) (0.110) 
RF*Time trend 0.00476** -0.00381 0.00675 0.476*** 0.00673*** 0.190*** 
 (0.00187) (0.00245) (0.0172) (0.0254) (0.00165) (0.0236) 
RF 0.653*** 0.584*** 4.084*** 0.00279 0.482*** -0.00570 
 (0.0247) (0.0538) (0.370) (0.00193) (0.0242) (0.231) 
Constant 0.297** -1.033***  -0.0648 0.00747 0.559 
 (0.121) (0.338)  (0.142) (0.0996) (0.769) 
R-squared 0.650 0.621  0.653 0.687 0.852 
Controls       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Observations 49,722 49,722  49,722  35,298  49,722  49,722 
Mean dependent variable 1.2791 3.6362 3.6362 1.0256 0.7380 3.6362 
Note: This table compares the results for earners’ claims from the six different models. Two version of log-linear are used, in the first model 
firms with no claims are dropped from the sample, in the second they are assigned a claims value of one. 






8 What’s up with Mondays? An investigation into 
the “Monday Effect” for on- and off-the-job injury 
claims 
8.1 Introduction 
The results from the previous chapter provide some reassurance that the New Zealand 
ACC system is robust to the threat of claims shifting following the introduction of 
experience rating. This chapter turns to a different topic of claiming behaviour – that of 
the “Monday Effect”.  
Research in other countries consistently finds a higher number of injuries on a Monday 
(Brogmus, 2007; Richard J. Butler et al., 1996; B. Hansen, 2016; Smith, 1990; 
Wigglesworth, 2006). A common hypothesis is that excess Monday claims are the result 
of people injured off-the-job in the weekend claiming that their injuries occurred on-the-
job on the Monday to receive workers’ compensation benefits (B. Hansen, 2016; Smith, 
1990). This is known in the literature as the ‘moral hazard hypothesis’. The worker 
knows where, when and how the injury occurred, but this is not observed by the insurer. I 
test this using data from New Zealand, where compensation is identical for both types of 
injuries, so in principle there should not be the same incentives to claim weekend off-the-
job injuries as happening at work on the Monday. 
As mentioned in section 3.11, one of the early proponents of this hypothesis for the 
Monday Effect, Smith (1990), theorises that if people fraudulently claim weekend 
injuries as happening at work on the Monday then: (1) injuries that are easy to conceal 
and for which treatment can be easily delayed will be overrepresented on a Monday; (2) 
the injuries will be recorded as occurring earlier in the day on a Monday because people 




would seek treatment as soon as they could reasonably do so without arousing suspicion; 
and (3) the effect will be stronger on a Tuesday after a Monday public holiday because 
there had been a longer length of time possible for off-the-job injuries to occur. 
8.2 Economic Theory 
8.2.1 Fraudulent claims and the Monday Effect 
This section outlines the economic theory behind the fraudulent claims theory for the 
Monday Effect. 
Stage 1: Injury risk 
The probability of an injury on a given day of the week depends on the risk profile of 
activities undertaken and the exposure to those risks. For example, when a public holiday 
falls on a Monday, the average worker will have a longer period of ‘weekend’ exposure 
to off-the-job injury risk. Tuesdays after a public holiday Monday can be thought to be 
similar to Mondays in this sense. 
P(injury) = Risk x Exposure     (8.1) 
Stage 2: Whether to falsely claim that an injury happened at work 
As described in chapter 4, workers who have an injury have three options:  
1. Obtain treatment and make a workers’ compensation claim. 
2. Do not have the injury treated and continue to work. 
3. Obtain treatment for the injury but do not make a workers’ compensation claim. 
These options have the following payouts: 
𝐸U(e, f) =
{
(1 − 𝑝(𝑒))(𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉) + 𝑝(𝑒)[𝛾(𝑓)𝑢(𝐵) + (1 − 𝛾(𝑓))𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐(ℎ, 𝑓)] − 𝑐(𝑒) work 
𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉 − 𝑝(𝑒)𝑛 − 𝑐(𝑒)                                                                                        not treated
(1 − 𝑝(𝑒))(𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜉) + 𝑝(𝑒)[𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐(ℎ)] − 𝑐(𝑒)                                               leisure 
     
(8.2)   




where 𝑒 is the level of safety effort, and 𝑓 is the effort required to prove that an injury is 
work-related. In the following discussion I assume that workers maximise expected 
utility. 
If an off-the-job injury has occurred in the weekend, claiming it as a work injury on the 
Monday would involve disutility associated with delaying treatment, 𝑟.  
EU(seek treatment, falsely claim) = 𝛾(𝑓)𝑢(𝐵) + (1 − 𝛾(𝑓))𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐(ℎ, 𝑓) − 𝑟  
 (8.3) 
If the worker chooses to be treated, he or she will choose to falsely claim that the injury 
happened at work if the following holds: 
𝛾(𝑓)𝑢(𝐵) − 𝑐(ℎ, 𝑓) − 𝑟 > 𝛾(𝑓)𝑢(𝐷) − 𝑐(ℎ)  (8.4) 
The likelihood that the injury is accepted as work-related (γ) and the cost of delaying 
treatment (r) will vary by injury type. For example, it would be difficult to delay 
treatment for an amputated arm and it would be difficult to conceal the injury from 
colleagues at the start of the work day on the Monday. Alternatively, it would be much 
easier to delay treatment for a sprain and colleagues are less likely to observe the injury. 
If there are fraudulent claims then we would expect to see a larger Monday Effect for 
injuries that are easier to conceal (higher γ) and less costly to delay treatment for (lower 
r), such as strains and sprains. 
Statement 8.4 is also more likely to hold when 𝐵 is much greater than 𝐷. Consider 
three scenarios. In the first scenario, the costs of off-the-job injury are private, such that 
D = 0. In the second, there is a fully funded public healthcare system but there is no 
coverage for lost wages (0 < D < B). In the third, there is a universal injury 
compensation environment where all costs are fully covered for off-the-job injury 
(0 < D = B). I assume that each scenario has a fully funded workers’ compensation 




scheme and for simplicity I assume that there is no private health insurance. Broadly 
speaking, the US is comparable to scenario one, Canada to scenario 2 and New Zealand 
to scenario three (see section 2.6). If fraudulent claims cause the Monday Effect, one 
would expect the size to be largest in scenario one and smallest in scenario three.
19
  
Proposition 1: If fraudulent claims cause the Monday Effect, there will be no Monday 
Effect in the New Zealand work claims or the off-the-job claims.   
Card and McCall (1996) produce an estimate of the Monday Effect for the US. They 
observe that those with private health insurance will face weaker incentives (scenario two 
or three relative to scenario one). They compare these scenarios by interacting the 
Monday Effect with a variable indicating whether the person is likely to have private 
health insurance. They fail to find any difference.  
Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) produce a comparison between scenario one and scenario 
two by estimating the Monday Effect in Canada and comparing it to the overall estimate 
produced by Card and McCall (1996) for the US. They find a Monday Effect that is of a 
similar magnitude to the US suggesting that if fraudulent claims are causing the Monday 
Effect it is through the wage replacement rather than the treatment costs. In this chapter, I 
use the same method as Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) to produce an estimate of scenario 
three using data from New Zealand. 
8.2.2 Alternative theories 
There are several alternative theories for the Monday Effect. I consider each of these 
through the lens of whether the theory is work-specific or whether it might be expected to 
apply to other types of injuries such as off-the-job and non-earner injury.  
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people are not always aware of their eligibility (see section 3.5.1) so a Monday Effect may remain. 




The first alternative theory is that the Monday Effect is caused by job dissatisfaction 
on a Monday. This may have a physiological explanation as job dissatisfaction has been 
linked to pain (Hoogendoorn, van Poppel, Bongers, Koes, & Bouter, 2000) or it may be 
caused by people fraudulently claiming that they have had an injury to avoid being at 
work (Richard J Butler et al., 2014). This explanation could also apply to off-the-job 
injury in a universal claims environment, with people claiming to have injured 
themselves before work to avoid going in on the Monday; however, the effect would not 
be as strong as it would be in a workers’ compensation environment because they could 
also say that they injured themselves on the Sunday. Since the injury is prompted by job 
dissatisfaction I would expect the injury to be of a type that is harder to diagnose, such as 
sprains and strains and back injuries (Richard J. Butler et al., 1996; Dionne & St-Michel, 
1991; Smith, 1990) and to involve fewer days off work because it seems it would be 
easier to fake a minor injury than a major injury. 
In this case the disutility from working, 𝜉, varies by day of the week, 𝜂𝑑, where 
0 < 𝜂 ≤ 1 and 𝜂 on a Monday is greater than 𝜂 on other days of the week. This decreases 
the utility associated not getting treatment on a Monday relative to other days of the 
week. 
𝑢(no treatment|injury) = 𝑢(𝑊) − 𝜂𝑑 ∗ 𝜉 − n    (8.5) 
Proposition 2: If the job dissatisfaction explanation applies, there will be a Monday 
Effect for injury in New Zealand, for work injury and off-the-job injury. Monday injuries 
will have a higher proportion of strains and sprains and back injuries and be less serious 
than injuries on other days of the week. 
The next alternative theory is that after a weekend off work people are more 
susceptible to strains and sprains and back injuries because they need time to warm up at 




work. In this case, the risk variable in equation 8.1 varies by day of the week, 𝑑, and the 
type of injury, 𝑗, where 𝜂 is larger for strains on a Monday. A higher number of strains on 
a Monday will lead to a higher number of injury claims for strains on a Monday, 
everything else held constant. The value of 𝜂 is constant for off-the-job injury. 
𝑝(𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑗) = 𝜂𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒   (8.6) 
Proposition 3: If the physiological explanation is correct then there will be a Monday 
Effect in New Zealand, for work injury and off-the-job injury, with more sprains and 
strains and back injuries. 
Another alternative theory is that people are exposed to higher levels of work injury 
risk on a Monday. For example, there may be less supervision owing to management 
team meetings on a Monday; a backload of work from the weekend contributing to higher 
stress; or a tendency to tackle more difficult tasks earlier in the week. In this case the 
value of 𝜂 varies by the day of the week but not the injury type for work injury and it 
takes a constant value for off-the-job injury. 
𝑝(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑗) = 𝜂𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒   (8.7) 
Proposition 4: If there is higher work injury risk on a Monday, there will be a Monday 
Effect in New Zealand, for work injury but not for off-the-job injury. There is not 
necessarily any pattern in the type of injury or in the seriousness of the injury. 
The final alternative theory discussed here is that people are generally exposed to 
higher levels of any injury risk on a Monday than other weekdays. For example, this may 
be caused by impairment owing to drugs, alcohol or fatigue following a weekend of 




parties or late nights. In this case 𝜂 is higher on a Monday for both work and off-the-job 
injury. 
𝑝(𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑗) = 𝜂𝑑𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒    (8.8) 
Proposition 5: If there is higher injury risk on a Monday, there will be a Monday Effect 
for work injury, off-the-job injury and non-earners’ injury. There is not necessarily any 
pattern to the type of injury or the seriousness of the injury. 
8.3 Data 
I use New Zealand injury claims data from the IDI to look at whether there is a 
Monday Effect in the work account (work injury), earners’ account (off-the-job injury for 
workers) and non-earners’ account (nonearners’ injury) to evaluate the five propositions 
described in the previous section. The data cover the calendar years 2002 to 2015. I 
exclude gradual process injury because, by definition, these types of injuries do not have 
an accident date. I exclude the two weeks of every year that include Christmas day and 
New Year’s Day because a lot of workplaces in New Zealand close for the summer 
holidays over this period. 
8.3.1 Variables 
Day of the week 
The day of the week is based on the accident date (as distinct from the treatment date 
or the claim acceptance date). This information is usually recorded by the doctor 
following a discussion with the patient about when the injury happened and how it 
happened (lost-time injury, which is the focus here, requires a doctor visit). To be eligible 




for compensation, an injury needs to be caused by a specific incident, so all accepted 




Injuries are grouped into seven injury type categories: sprains and strains; cuts and 
lacerations; contusions; fractures; burns; dislocations; and other. Claims are assigned to 
injury type based on the first two digits of the read code of the primary diagnosis (read 
codes are a standard injury classification system). See Table 8.1 for details. 
Back injuries 
The indicator for back injuries is derived from the body part of the primary injury. 
Unlike the rest of the data, information on the body part injured is available only for 
injuries from 2015 onwards. 
Age and ethnicity 
Age is estimated to the nearest year. Ethnicity is recorded using single and combined 
response as described in section 5.6. For example, if a person reports that he is Māori and 
NZ European he is coded to a ‘Māori and New Zealand European’ category. Where the 
number of observations with an ethnicity combination is fewer than 100, the individuals 
are coded to an ‘Other’ category.  
Number of compensated days off work 
This is the number of days for which ACC have paid weekly compensation for time 
off work. Here, as in Campolieti and Hyatt (2006), it is used as a proxy for the 
seriousness of the injury. 
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ACC and may be added to the IDI in future. 




Average weekly benefits 
Consistent with Campolieti and Hyatt (2006), I include a measure of average weekly 
benefits. This is derived by dividing the total loss of earnings compensation received by 
the number of compensation days and multiplying it by five for a five-day working week. 
Since loss of earnings compensation is 80% of wages, this acts as a rough proxy for 
weekly wages, although the amount will be much smaller for part-time workers than full-
time workers. 
Using this method, some people have weekly gross benefits that seem implausibly 
high. There is a maximum on the amount of weekly compensation earnings that can be 
received, and some people appear to have weekly gross benefits higher than the 
maximum. In some instances, this could be because they only receive compensation for a 
few days per week (partly returned-to-work) so the actual amount received per week is 
lower than this derived amount. Even allowing for this though, some of the amounts still 
appear to be unreasonably high. To address this, I assume that if the average daily gross 
benefit for a claim is higher than the weekly maximum then it is an error, so I code it to 
missing. If the daily gross benefit amount is lower than the weekly cap, but the weekly 
gross benefit amount is higher than the weekly cap, I cap weekly earnings at the 
$1,908.50.
21
 This resulted in 729 claims being capped and 31 coded to missing.  
8.3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Figure 8.1 displays the distribution of lost-time injuries by the day of the work week 
for workers for both work injury and off-the-job injury. As found elsewhere, the highest 
proportion of on-the-job injuries occur on a Monday (21.0%), with the lowest proportion 
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this maximum to all years. https://www.acc.co.nz/about-us/news-media/latest-news/client-payments-
changes/  




happening on a Friday (18.1%) (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & McCall, 1996). This 
is equivalent to an excess of 283 lost-time work claims per year. The difference in the 
proportion of claims on a Monday compared to the proportion on a Tuesday or 
Wednesday is not statistically significantly different; indicating that there are more 
injuries at the start of the week. 
For off-the-job injury, the highest proportion of injuries occurred on a Friday (21.8%), 
possibly alcohol-induced, with the second-highest number occurring on a Monday 
(20.5%).  
Figure 8.2 displays the same information but for all days of the week for comparison. 
As expected, most off-the-job injuries occur on the weekend. Figure 8.3 displays the 
weekday patterns for all injury claims (not just the lost-time injury subsample) while 
Figure 8.4 displays the full day of the week pattern for all injury claims. Including all 
claims does not change the pattern for work injury.  
Table 8.2 displays the mean lost-time injury claim characteristics by whether the 
injury occurred on-the-job or off-the-job for: the full sample of workers; Monday injuries; 
and Tuesday to Friday injuries.  
The average number of compensated days for work injury (99.5) is higher than that 
found in other countries because injuries with less than a week off work are excluded 
here.
22
 The average number of compensated days for a work injury is 98.8 on a Monday 
and 99.7 on other weekdays. The values are slightly lower for off-the-job injury – 81.4 on 
a Monday and 83.5 on other weekdays.  
Sprains and strains made up 38.7% of on-the-job injuries on a Monday compared to 
37.3% on other weekdays. There is a similar day-of-the-week difference for off-the-job 
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There is no information available in the claims data for time off work if the person requires less than a 
week off. 




injuries with 37.5% of these being strains and sprains on a Monday compared to 35.2% 
on other weekdays. Data on the body part injured was only available for injuries from 
2015 onwards so there are fewer observations for this injury type. The proportion of back 
injuries, both on- and off-the-job, were higher on Mondays than other weekdays (33.2% 
on a Monday compared to 29.3% on other weekdays for work injury; 16.4% on a 
Monday compared to 13.2% on other weekday for off-the-job injury).  
8.4 Empirical Strategy 
I start by estimating the proportion of injuries on a Monday and, in order to compare 
my results from a universal claims environment (scenario three) to results from a 
workers’ compensation claims environment with free public healthcare (Campolieti & 
Hyatt, 2006) and one without (Card & McCall, 1996). 
There is not good data on hours worked by day of the week in New Zealand, so I am 
unable to analyse injury rates by day of the week. New Zealand Time Use Survey data 
indicate that the highest number of hours worked on average, occurs on a Tuesday (7.9 
hours) and the lowest on a Friday (7.5 hours), with 19.1 percent of all paid weekday work 
time occurring on a Monday (Callister & Dixon, 2001). About 63 percent of workers in 
New Zealand, usually work all hours at standard times (between 7am and 7pm Monday to 
Friday) (Statistics New Zealand, 2008) and Retail Trade and Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing industries have a higher proportion of people working in the weekend (Callister 
& Dixon, 2001).  
Consistent with the previous studies (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & McCall, 
1996), I exclude claims for injuries that occur on the weekend, restricting analysis to the 
typical Monday to Friday working week. I use one-sided t-tests to assess whether there is 
a higher than expected proportion of work injuries on a Monday (greater than 20 percent) 
and whether this varies by type of injury (proposition one and two). This assumes that 




people work the same number of hours per day on average, Monday to Friday. Given that 
the Time Use Survey data indicate that people work slightly less than 20 percent of 
weekly hours on a Monday, any estimate of injury above 20 percent on a Monday will be 
a lower bound estimate of the Monday Effect. 
For the comparison with the US and Canada I restrict the claims data to lost-time 
injury for two reasons: (1) to improve comparison of results; and (2) because the claims 
information for lost-time injuries is more accurate. Where only medical fees are paid out, 
ACC verifies only the most relevant information (Statistics New Zealand, 2015).  
I then conduct a series of linear regressions to test whether particular types of injuries 
are overrepresented on a Monday after controlling for other characteristics. For this part 
of the analysis, Tuesdays after a public holiday Monday are included in the Monday 
variable because they are the first day back at work after several days off.  I run the 
regression separately for each injury type, and separately for work and off-the-job injury. 
I report the coefficient on the Monday variable for each injury type regression. 
𝐼𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑦𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡      (8.9) 
Injury_Type is a binary variable for the type of injury, Monday is a binary variable that 
equals one if the injury occurred on a Monday or the Tuesday after a Monday public 
holiday and zero otherwise, and X is a matrix of variables associated with the claim.  
8.5 Results 
8.5.1 t-tests for excess injuries on a Monday 
If lost-time injuries were evenly distributed across the working week (Monday to 
Friday) I would see 20 percent of injuries on each day of the week. The one-sided t-tests 
in Table 8.3 indicate that the proportion of lost-time injuries on a Monday, in New 




Zealand, is statistically significantly higher than 20 percent.  This is similarly the case for 
back injuries and sprains and strains.  
Although the Monday Effect is not zero in New Zealand (as suggested in proposition 
one), it is statistically significantly smaller than that found in other jurisdictions, with 
21.0% of injuries occurring on a Monday in New Zealand, 23.0% in Minnesota (Card & 
McCall, 1996) and 24.7% in Ontario (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006) (see Table 8.4). 
When I compare work injuries to off-the-job injuries in Table 8.5 I find that 20.5% of 
off-the-job injuries occur on a Monday. While this is statistically significantly higher than 
20% it is a small effect. Like work injury, there are also statistically significantly more 
sprains and strains and back injuries on a Monday for off-the-job injury. Table 8.6 
displays excess Monday claims tests for when the sample is extended to include all 
claims. The results are broadly consistent with that for the subsample of lost-time injury. 
Looking at overall claims for people who are not working (non-earners), there are no 
excess claims on a Monday (19.9 percent). 
I also conduct t-tests to see whether the Monday Effect is unique to Mondays. Table 
8.7 displays the results for work lost-time injuries and Table 8.8 displays the results for 
off-the-job lost-time injuries. Weeks with a public holiday are excluded from these two 
tables to improve comparability of the weekdays. The proportion of work injuries on a 
Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday are all statistically significantly different from 20 
percent. This implies that injuries are elevated early in the week rather than just on a 
Monday. Table 8.8 shows that there are no excess off-the-job claims overall, but sprains 
and strains are elevated slightly on a Monday and Wednesday.  
8.5.2 Regression results – Number of injuries 
Table 8.9 displays the results of the linear regressions for on-the-job lost-time injury. 
Each row represents a separate regression with a dummy variable for the type of injury as 




the dependent variable. Robust-cluster standard errors are displayed. Model 1 contains 
only a Monday dummy variable; model 2 adds controls for number of compensation 
days, weekly gross benefits, age and gender; model 3 adds industry dummies; model 4 
adds occupation dummies; model 5 adds year fixed effects; and model 6 adds ethnicity 
dummies. The number of observations is reported at the bottom of the table - the total 
number of observations refers to the injury diagnosis regressions while the total number 
of body part observations refers to the back injury regressions (information on body part 
injured is available only from 2015 onwards). 
The results are consistent with previous studies (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & 
McCall, 1996). Sprains and strains and back injuries make up a greater proportion of 
injuries on a Monday than on other weekdays after controlling for other characteristics. 
The magnitude of the estimate for back injuries is the same as that found by Campolieti 
and Hyatt (2006) with an excess of 2.7 percentage points. The magnitude of the estimate 
for sprains and strains is smaller at 1.6 percentage points compared to 2.6 percentage 
points in the Ontario study. 
Table 8.10 displays the regression results for off-the-job injuries. Most of the Monday 
coefficients are in the same direction as on-the-job injuries and are slightly larger. Back 
injuries are 3.2 percentage points higher on a Monday than other weekdays and strains 
and sprains are 2.2 percentage points higher. This indicates that there may be something 
about Mondays that increases the risk of sprains and strains and back injuries more 
generally (proposition 3 and 5) rather than being caused by something specific to work 
(proposition 4). 
8.5.3 Regression results – Duration of time off work 
I look at the duration of time off work to see whether Monday claims differ from 
claims on other days. I run a linear regression with the log of the number of days of loss 




of earnings compensation paid (CompDays) and report the results of the Monday 
coefficient. 
log(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐷𝑎𝑦𝑠) = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑦 + 𝛽𝑋 +      (8.10) 
Table 8.11 displays the results for work injury. All of the coefficients on the Monday 
variable are negative, implying that Monday lost-time injuries involve fewer days away 
from work on average, compared to injuries on other days of the week. The overall 
duration of time off work for Monday injuries was 3.8 percentage points shorter than 
other weekdays. The duration was 6.5 percentage points shorter for sprains and strains on 
a Monday. The coefficient for back injuries was not statistically significantly different 
from zero because of the small sample size, though the magnitude of the estimate was 
similar to strains and sprains. 
Table 8.12 displays the duration results for off-the-job injuries. The results are similar 
to work injuries with negative coefficients on the Monday variable in all the regressions. 
The duration of injuries overall are 5.8 percentage points shorter if they happened on a 
Monday, while the duration of sprains and strains are 8.3 percentage points shorter. The 
coefficient for back injuries is statistically significant for the off-the-job injuries; the 
duration of Monday back injuries is 10.4 percentage points shorter. 
Table 8.13 contains robustness checks. It shows the Monday Effect persists when 
weekends and weeks with a public holiday are excluded from the sample (column 1) and 
when all claims are considered, including weekends and public holidays (column 3). 
Column 2 contains the results from the main tables for comparison. See Table E.1 in the 
Appendix for the full regression results when weekends are added to the sample. 
 
 





I make a unique contribution to the literature by looking at whether the Monday Effect 
in workers’ compensation persists within a broader accident compensation scheme and 
whether off-the-job injuries also exhibit a Monday Effect. I find that not only is the 
Monday Effect present in the work claims data; it is also present for off-the-job injuries. 
Both sets of injuries exhibit a higher proportion of strains and sprains and back injuries, 
consistent with the workers’ compensation literature (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & 
McCall, 1996). I also find that Monday injuries involve fewer average days off work. 
Unlike the US and Canada, New Zealand is less likely to be susceptible to people 
claiming an off-the-job injury from the weekend as happening at work on the Monday. 
This means the Monday Effect found here is unlikely to be a result of workers 
fraudulently claiming weekend injuries as occurring on the Monday at work. The 
magnitude of the results for New Zealand are smaller than that found elsewhere 
(Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & McCall, 1996), lending support to the conclusion of 
Martin-Roman and Moral (2016) that in countries with an incentive to claim weekend 
injuries as Monday work injuries, fraudulent claims are part of the explanation but not the 
full story. 
One concern about the analysis approach might be that while injuries of one and two 
days duration are counted if they occur early in the week, if they happen on a Friday the 
person has the weekend to recover and therefore Friday claims are less likely to become 
lost-time injury claims than Monday claims (Wigglesworth, 2006). This is not a problem 
in the analysis here because I include only injuries that involve more than a week off 
work.  
The finding that there is a Monday Effect for off-the-job strains and sprains and back 
injuries indicates that the reason is unlikely to be due to work-specific hazards such as 




less supervision or more difficult tasks. Instead it is most consistent with the hypothesis 
that job dissatisfaction prompts people to claim an injury to avoid work. This is the same 
conclusion that Richard J Butler et al. (2014) arrived at after finding that sick leave and 
health insurance claims were also more likely to occur on a Monday. This would also be 
consistent with the observation of a lower number of claims on a Friday, as research finds 
that people interviewed on a Friday tend to report higher job satisfaction than people 
interviewed in the middle of the week (Taylor, 2006)(Taylor, 2006)(Taylor, 2006) 
Another explanation is that people who experience strains and sprains during the week 
wait to see if resting over the weekend will fix the problem. If it does not, then they see 
the doctor on the Monday and the date of the accident is recorded as the day of treatment; 
however, this seems unlikely because to be eligible for accident compensation requires a 
reasonably detailed description about how the injury occurred and when it occurred, 
particularly for injuries involving more than a week off work as used in this thesis. 
Although they may not receive treatment on the same day as the injury I think it is likely 
that the accident date will be correct.  
The main limitation of this thesis is that I do not have data on the hours that people 
work by the day of the week. It is possible (but unlikely) that workers exposed to sprain 
and strain hazards, such as office workers and manual labourers, work more hours on 
Mondays resulting in higher numbers of injuries (although this would not explain the 
higher number of off-the-job injuries observed on Mondays). It is also possible that 
people are more likely to undertake activities such as heavy lifting at the start of the 
week, leading to higher prevalence of these types of injuries. Time use survey data may 
be a promising avenue for future research. 
I find that there are an excess number of injuries, not just on a Monday, but also on a 
Tuesday and Wednesday. Although the literature focuses on excess Monday injuries, 




other studies also exhibit a lower proportion of injuries on a Friday (Campolieti & Hyatt, 
2006; Card & McCall, 1996; Mason, 1979; Wigglesworth, 2006). Perhaps the focus of 
this literature needs to shift. Is the Monday effect really a Friday effect? 
  




8.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 8.1: The read codes used to assign claims to injury type categories 
Injury type ACC Read code 
Strains and Sprains S5 
Cuts and lacerations;  S8, S9 & SA 
Contusions;  SE 
Fractures;  S0, S1, S2 & S3  
Burns;  SH 
Dislocations S4 (excluding S4A) 
Other All other including S4A 
 
Figure 8.1: Distribution of lost-time injuries by weekday for workers 
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Figure 8.3: Distribution of all injury claims (includes treatment only claims) by weekday 
for workers 
 
Figure 8.4: Distribution of all injury claims (includes treatment only claims) by day of the 















































All off-the-job injury claims




Table 8.2: Mean lost-time worker claim characteristics by weekday and whether the 
injury occurred at work  
 

















Day of the Week       
Monday 0.210 
(0.407) 




















  0.218 
(0.413) 
  



























       
Nature of Injury       

























































































































Number of Observations 335,493 70,611 264,882 272,658 55,761 216,897 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses 
  




Table 8.3: Fraction of Monday injuries across different jurisdictions along with tests of 
excess 
 New Zealand data 
Used in this paper 
Ontario Data 
Used in Campoleti & Hyatt 
Minnesota Data 
Used in Card & McCall 
Type of injury N Mean Test 
Statistic 
N Mean Test 
Statistic 




335,493 0.210 14.874 10,702 0.247 11.297 21,314 0.230 10.77 
Back 
 
5,793 0.214 2.695 3,564 0.262 8.391 - - - 
Sprains & Strains 
 
126,108 0.217 14.469 5,282 0.258 9.633 9,560 0.237 9.12 
Cuts & Lacerations 
 
35,967 0.202 0.943 1,008 0.219 1.473 2,375 0.212 1.44 
Dislocations 
 
12,015 0.201 0.419 49 0.286 1.314 602 0.248 2.91 
Burns 
 
3,504 0.176 -3.661 174 0.195 -0.153 443 0.192 0.43 
Contusions 
 
19,146 0.204 1.342 1,411 0.240 3.475 1,453 0.233 3.17 
Fractures 39,063 0.205 2.200 623 0.238 2.204 1,274 0.199 0.12 
Note: One-sided t-tests for whether the proportion of injuries on a Monday is statistically 
significantly different to 20%. 
 
Table 8.4: Comparison of the Monday Effect for work injury across different jurisdictions 
Jurisdiction 
 
Proportion of work 




95% confidence interval 
 
Minnesota 0.230 0.003 0.227 0.233 
Ontario  0.247 0.004 0.243 0.251 
New Zealand 0.210 0.001 0.209 0.211 
Note: Claims restricted to weekdays. The estimates for Minnesota come from Card and 
McCall (1996) and those for Ontario come from Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) 
 
  




Table 8.5: Fraction of Monday lost-time injuries across different injury categories with 
tests of excess 




Type of injury N Mean Test 
Statistic 




335,493 0.210 14.874 272,658 0.205 5.845 
Back 
 
5,793 0.214 2.695 4,224 0.252 7.754 
Sprains & Strains 
 
126,108 0.217 14.469 97,254 0.215 11.446 
Cuts & Lacerations 
 
35,967 0.202 0.943 18,195 0.206 2.132 
Dislocations 
 
12,015 0.201 0.419 17,898 0.190 -3.360 
Burns 
 
3,504 0.176 -3.661 2,649 0.197 -0.440 
Contusions 
 
19,146 0.204 1.342 14,817 0.209 2.687 
Fractures 
 
39,063 0.205 2.200 67,818 0.191 -5.621 
* Excludes motor vehicle injuries (these are funded from a different account) 
Note: Excludes weekend injuries 
 
Table 8.6: Fraction of Monday injury claims (all claims including treatment only claims) 
across different injury categories with tests of excess 







N Mean Test 
Statistic 
N Mean Test 
Statistic 

































91,200 0.200 -0.351 227,805 0.192 -9.232 654,300 0.187 -26.0 
* Excludes motor vehicle injuries (these are funded from a different account) 
Note: Excludes weekend injuries 
 





Table 8.7: Work lost-time injuries: Fraction across different days of the week and injury 





















0.217 21.54 0.224 18.17 0.210 4.30 0.210 3.02 
Tuesday 
 
0.205 6.67 0.204 3.09 0.205 2.13 0.211 3.44 
Wednesday 
 
0.201 1.92 0.200 0.34 0.204 1.70 0.208 2.44 
Thursday  
 
0.194 -7.40 0.191 -7.24 0.195 -2.43 0.196 -1.35 
Friday 
 
0.182 -24.40 0.181 -15.88 0.187 -5.99 0.175 -8.12 
* Excludes motor vehicle injuries (these are funded from a different account) 
Note: Standard working weeks - excludes weekend injuries, the two-week Christmas and 
New Year’s Day period and weeks with a public holiday. 
 
Table 8.8: Off-the-job lost-time injuries: Fraction across different days of the week and 
injury categories with tests of excess 
Type of 
injury 


















0.198 -1.84 0.209 6.11 0.184 -9.48 0.204 1.13 
Tuesday 
 
0.188 -14.00 0.196 -2.98 0.179 -12.66 0.185 -4.10 
Wednesday 
 
0.197 -3.70 0.203 2.04 0.191 -5.47 0.198 -0.58 
Thursday  
 
0.198 -1.84 0.197 -2.30 0.200 -0.29 0.193 -2.02 
Friday 
 
0.218 20.36 0.196 -3.04 0.247 25.03 0.220 5.21 
* Excludes motor vehicle injuries (these are funded from a different account) 
Note: Standard working weeks - excludes weekend injuries, the two-week Christmas and 
New Year’s Day period and weeks with a public holiday.








Table 8.9: Lost-Time Work Injuries OLS Estimates of the “Monday Effect” from Linear Probability Models by Type of Injuries  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of Injury Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 Model 6 
       
Sprains & Strains 0.0152*** 0.0158*** 0.0159*** 0.0158*** 0.0157*** 0.0156*** 
 (0.00201) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00200) (0.00199) (0.00200) 
Cuts and Lacerations  -0.00572*** -0.00653*** -0.00679*** -0.00691*** -0.00710*** -0.00723*** 
 (0.00126) (0.00125) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00124) (0.00125) 
Contusions -0.00225** -0.00208** -0.00211** -0.00217** -0.00219** -0.00234** 
 (0.000949) (0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000953) 
Fractures  -0.00405*** -0.00463*** -0.00437*** -0.00422*** -0.00437*** -0.00422*** 
 (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00131) (0.00132) 
Dislocations -0.00182** -0.00207*** -0.00193** -0.00187** -0.00197*** -0.00188** 
 (0.000757) (0.000757) (0.000756) (0.000756) (0.000756) (0.000762) 
Burns -0.00237*** -0.00239*** -0.00222*** -0.00220*** -0.00222*** -0.00220*** 
 (0.000393) (0.000393) (0.000392) (0.000392) (0.000392) (0.000396) 
Back Injury 0.0272*** 0.0277*** 0.0271*** 0.0269*** 0.0269*** 0.0266*** 
 (0.00650) (0.00650) (0.00646) (0.00646) (0.00646) (0.00646) 
Control for observable characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies    Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies     Yes Yes 
Ethnicity       Yes 
Number of Observations 335,493 335,451  335,451  335,451  335,451  332,343  
Number of Observations (body part) 25,062 25,062 25,062 25,062 25,062 25,059 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is a dummy variable for the type of injury. The table reports coefficient estimates for the 
Monday/first Tuesday back from a public holiday dummy variable from several different linear probability regressions that estimate the 
incidence of each type of injury. Robust-cluster standard errors are in parentheses. Controls for observable characteristics include gender 
(male=1), age at time of accident, and gross weekly benefits. Industry dummies are level 1 ANZSIC. Occupation dummies are level 1 ANZSCO. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  








Table 8.10: Off-the-Job Lost-Time Injuries to Workers OLS Estimates of the “Monday Effect” from Linear Probability Models by Type of 
Injury  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of Injury Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Sprains & Strains 0.0248*** 0.0228*** 0.0224*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 0.0223*** 
 (0.00224) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00223) (0.00223) 
Cuts and Lacerations 0.000182 0.000733 0.000794 0.000647 0.000575 0.000321 
 (0.00116) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00115) 
Contusions 0.00137 0.00121 0.00116 0.00105 0.000948 0.000875 
 (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00106) 
Fractures  -0.0204*** -0.0190*** -0.0187*** -0.0186*** -0.0185*** -0.0184*** 
 (0.00197) (0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00196) (0.00196) 
Dislocations -0.00569*** -0.00518*** -0.00497*** -0.00491*** -0.00490*** -0.00487*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) (0.00112) 
Burns -0.000585 -0.000462 -0.000447 -0.000470 -0.000487 -0.000533 
 (0.000446) (0.000446) (0.000447) (0.000447) (0.000447) (0.000446) 
Back injuries 0.0330*** 0.0319*** 0.0316*** 0.0316*** 0.0316*** 0.0319*** 
 (0.00488) (0.00488) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00487) (0.00488) 
Control for observable characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies    Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies     Yes Yes 
Ethnicity      Yes 
Number of Observations  272,658   272,643   272,643   272,643   272,643   272,562  
Number of Observations  
(body part) 
30,351 30,351 30,351 30,351 30,351 30,348 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is a dummy variable for the type of injury. The table reports coefficient estimates for the 
Monday/ first Tuesday back from a public holiday dummy variable from several different linear probability regressions that estimate the 
incidence of each type of injury. Robust-cluster standard errors are in parentheses. Controls for observable characteristics include gender 
(male=1), age at time of accident, and weekly benefits. Industry dummies are level 1 ANZSIC. Occupation dummies are level 1 ANZSCO.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  








Table 8.11: Log Duration of On-the-Job Injuries OLS Estimates of the “Monday Effect” by Type of Injury  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of Injury Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
All injuries -0.0407*** -0.0378*** -0.0386*** -0.0385*** -0.0379*** -0.0375*** 
Standard Error (0.00547) (0.00541) (0.00537) (0.00537) (0.00537) (0.00540) 
Number of observations 335,493 335451 335451 335451 335451 332343 
Sprains & Strains -0.0693*** -0.0667*** -0.0670*** -0.0665*** -0.0652*** -0.0645*** 
Standard Error (0.00901) (0.00891) (0.00886) (0.00886) (0.00883) (0.00885) 
Number of observations 126,108  126,090  126,090  126,090  126,090  125,556  
Cuts and Lacerations -0.0568*** -0.0445*** -0.0461*** -0.0455*** -0.0445*** -0.0429*** 
Standard Error (0.0150) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Number of observations  35,973   35,967   35,967   35,967   35,967   35,865  
Contusions -0.0531** -0.0372* -0.0352 -0.0342 -0.0342 -0.0332 
Standard Error (0.0223) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0217) (0.0219) 
Number of observations 19,146   19,146  19,146  19,146  19,146  19,035  
Fractures  -0.0517*** -0.0480*** -0.0523*** -0.0525*** -0.0519*** -0.0521*** 
Standard Error (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140) 
Number of observations 39,063  39,063  39,063  39,063  39,063  38,994  
Dislocations -0.0155 -0.0179 -0.0154 -0.0198 -0.0208 -0.0238 
Standard Error (0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0267) (0.0268) 
Number of observations 12,012  12,012  12,012  12,012  12,012   11,985  
Burns -0.0437 -0.0129 -0.000393 0.00155 0.00160 -0.00107 
Standard Error (0.0484) (0.0467) (0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0460) (0.0463) 
Number of observations 3,504      3,504   3,504     3,504   3,504   3,492  
Back injuries -0.0712* -0.0706* -0.0663 -0.0583 -0.0556 -0.0500 
Standard Error (0.0415) (0.0414) (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0408) (0.0408) 
Number of observations 5,796   5,796  5,796  5,796  5,796  5,790  
Control for observable characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies    Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies     Yes Yes 
Ethnicity      Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the log of the total number of compensated days for each type of injury. The table reports 
coefficient estimates for the Monday/ first Tuesday back from a public holiday dummy variable from several different log duration regressions. 
Robust-cluster standard errors are in parentheses. Controls for observable characteristics include gender (male=1), age at time of accident, and 
weekly benefits. Industry dummies are level 1 ANZSIC. Occupation dummies are level 1 ANZSCO.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table 8.12: Log Duration of Off-the-Job injuries OLS Estimates of the “Monday Effect” by Type of Injury (t-statistics in parentheses). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of Injury Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
All injuries -0.0551*** -0.0594*** -0.0598*** -0.0600*** -0.0591*** -0.0580*** 
Standard Error (0.00592) (0.00586) (0.00586) (0.00584) (0.00584) (0.00583) 
Number of observations 272,658  272,643  272,643  272,643  272,643  272,562 
Sprains & Strains -0.0794*** -0.0823*** -0.0823*** -0.0838*** -0.0842*** -0.0828*** 
Standard Error (0.00995) (0.00985) (0.00984) (0.00981) (0.00977) (0.00976) 
Number of observations 97,257  97,257  97,257  97,257  97,257  97,227 
Cuts and Lacerations -0.0631*** -0.0600*** -0.0615*** -0.0623*** -0.0613*** -0.0628*** 
Standard Error (0.0213) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0211) 
Number of observations 18,198  18,198  18,198  18,198  18,198  18,192 
Contusions -0.0208 -0.0242 -0.0261 -0.0257 -0.0217 -0.0193 
Standard Error (0.0251) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0248) 
Number of observations 14,820  14,820  14,820  14,820  14,820  14,814 
Fractures  -0.0178* -0.0263*** -0.0282*** -0.0270*** -0.0258** -0.0256** 
Standard Error (0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0100) 
Number of observations 67,815  67,812  67,812  67,812  67,812  67,785 
Dislocations -0.0341 -0.0312 -0.0303 -0.0251 -0.0244 -0.0230 
Standard Error (0.0222) (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0219) 
Number of observations 17,904  17,904  17,904  17,904  17,904  17,892 
Burns -0.0302 -0.0129 -0.00382 0.00386 -0.00121 0.00679 
Standard Error (0.0525) (0.0518) (0.0521) (0.0518) (0.0517) (0.0520) 
Number of observations 2,643  2,643  2,643  2,643  2,643  2,643 
Back injuries -0.114*** -0.110** -0.117*** -0.115*** -0.110** -0.104** 
Standard Error (0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0437) (0.0438) (0.0437) (0.0437) 
Number of observations 4,227  4,227  4,227  4,227  4,227  4,227 
Control for observable characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummies   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Occupation Dummies    Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies     Yes Yes 
Ethnicity      Yes 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is the log of the total number of days of compensation paid for each type of injury. The table 
reports coefficient estimates for the Monday/first Tuesday back from a public holiday dummy variable from several different log duration 
regressions. Robust-cluster standard errors are in parentheses.  Controls for observable characteristics include gender (male=1), age at time of 
accident, and weekly benefits. Industry dummies are level 1 ANZSIC. Occupation dummies are level 1 ANZSCO.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  








Table 8.13: Robustness check of lost-time injuries OLS estimates of the “Monday Effect” from linear probability models by type of injuries  
    
Type of Injury (1) (2) (3) 
Work Sprains & Strains 0.0154*** 0.0156*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.00226) (0.00200) (0.00261) 
Off-the-Job Sprains & Strains 0.0218*** 0.0223*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.00261) (0.00223) (0.00290) 
Work Contusions -0.00247** -0.00234** -0.00259** 
 (0.00108) (0.000953) (0.00126) 
Off-the-Job Contusions 0.00157 0.000875 0.00217 
 (0.00124) (0.00106) (0.00137) 
Work Fractures  -0.00521*** -0.00422*** -0.00467*** 
 (0.00149) (0.00132) (0.00173) 
Off-the-Job Fractures  -0.0210*** -0.0184*** -0.0137*** 
 (0.00229) (0.00196) (0.00257) 
Sample restrictions    
Includes weeks with public holidays  Yes Yes 
Includes public holidays  Yes Yes 
Includes weekends   Yes 
Independent variables    
Includes dummy variables for other days of the week   Yes 
Number of Observations     
Work claims 267,936 332,346 376,242 
Off-the-Job claims 214,035 272,562 534,381 
Notes: Each model has a different sample restriction applied. Column 1 excludes weekends and weeks with a public holiday, column 2 excludes 
weekends (the approach used in the main results), and column 3 includes all claims including weekends and public holidays. It shows the 
Monday Effect is robust to these different specifications. The dependent variable in each regression is a dummy variable for the type of injury. 
The table reports coefficient estimates for the Monday/ first Tuesday back from a public holiday dummy variable from several different linear 
probability regressions that estimate the incidence of each type of injury. Robust-cluster standard errors are in parentheses. Controls for 
observable characteristics include gender (male=1), age at time of accident, and weekly benefits. Industry dummies are level 1 ANZSIC. 
Occupation dummies are level 1 ANZSCO. Models 1-3 include a dummy variable for whether the injury occurred on a Monday or not. Model 4 
includes dummy variables for each day of the week with Thursday as the reference.  






With its universal claim environment and availability of linked unit record data, New 
Zealand is an ideal setting for quantitative injury research. In this thesis I have exploited 
these advantages to test three elements of misreporting within claims data: the gap 
between self-reported injury and accepted claims; claims shifting following the 
introduction of experience rating (underreporting of work injury); and overreporting of 
work injury on a Monday.   
9.1 Variation in access to healthcare services is an 
important factor in propensity to claim 
Claims data are a convenient but imperfect source of information for injury 
surveillance.  As reviewed in section 3.5, misreporting of injury within claims data can 
arise from different perceptions about eligibility for compensation, the seriousness of the 
injury, ease of claiming, concern over how others might react, financial incentives and 
access to health services. If the claims data are used without consideration of the variation 
in propensity to claim it could lead to incorrect conclusions about the need for investment 
in injury prevention, inequitable distribution of injury prevention resources, and 
inaccurate assessments regarding the effectiveness of injury prevention programmes.  
The universal claims environment presents fewer barriers to making an injury claim 
compared to workers’ compensation (for example there is no requirement for proof that 
an injury is work-related). Despite this, I find that about a third of people with a limiting 
injury do not receive injury compensation (chapter 6); similar in magnitude to that found 
in other countries. This did not vary by whether the person was a worker or whether the 
injury occurred at work. This indicates that access to healthcare services may be a larger 




driver of underreporting than barriers such as proof that an injury is work-related. Access 
to healthcare services varies by income, ethnicity and regional area, introducing bias into 
the claims data. These findings highlight the limitations of relying on healthcare 
utilisation data for injury surveillance and the importance of supplementing it with other 
sources of injury information (such as survey data) to address the consequent bias.  
Future research could look at opportunities to reduce barriers to claiming, particularly for 
more vulnerable populations. 
The limiting injury survey question used here differs from the lost-time injury question 
more commonly used in other countries (e.g., Safe Work Australia (2011)). This means 
that non-earners were able to be included in this research, but it also means the results are 
not directly comparable to studies that use a lost-time injury question. The New Zealand 
General Social Survey has recently been added to the IDI and it includes self-reported 
information on any kind of physical health problem or injury while working in the last 12 
months and asks whether it caused any additional costs, loss of money or income. 
Information from this survey could be used in future to check that these results are robust 
to the wording of the injury question. 
While the Integrated Data Infrastructure presents a powerful tool for injury research, 
some populations are not well captured within the data, such as temporary visitors to New 
Zealand and illegal workers. These individuals are likely to be less aware of their 
entitlements and less able to access them, placing downward bias on the estimates of 
misreporting produced here.  
9.2 Claiming incentives are well-aligned in a universal 
claims environment 
The quantitative evidence presented here suggests that  claiming incentives are well-
aligned within the New Zealand’s claims system, with no evidence found for claims 




shifting following the introduction of experience rating (chapter 7); and a much smaller 
Monday effect than that found elsewhere (Campolieti & Hyatt, 2006; Card & McCall, 
1996) (chapter 8). These results imply that accident claims data are not seriously biased 
from misreporting of injury between the work and earners accounts and can be used in 
research and evaluation with greater confidence. Maintenance of checks and balances to 
identify and investigate potential cases of claims shifting remains important. 
Although this research found that the introduction of experience rating was not 
associated with claims shifting, it presents only weak evidence that the intervention was 
associated with a decrease in work claims. The data indicate that the firms targeted by the 
programme were already reducing their work injury numbers in the years prior to the 
policy introduction. It seems likely that there are other more important drivers of injury 
prevention for firms than that represented by experience rating. 
Claims data provide a powerful source of information about the injury environment. 
These findings indicate that a universal claims environment generally promotes 
lodgement of injury claims and discourages misreporting to a greater extent than that 
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A Glossary  
Accredited Employer Programme: This is a voluntary ACC programme in which 
participating employers are responsible for managing their own claims in return for an 
insurance levy reduction. They may choose to do this in-house or through a third-party 
provider. See Accident Compensation Corporation (2017c) for more information. 
Entitlement claim: An entitlement claim is a claim that involves more than just 
compensation for treatment costs. Additional entitlements include things such as weekly 
compensation, compensation for rehabilitation costs, and lump sum payments (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2015).  
Limiting injury: If a person reports in the Survey of Family, Income and Employment 
that they have had an injury in the last 12 months that stopped them from doing their 
usual activity for more than a week it is referred to here as a limiting injury. 
Usual activities: The term 'usual activities' is used in the limiting injury question in the 
Survey of Family, Income and Employment but the term is not defined. I assume that it 
would be interpreted to include paid and unpaid work and recreational activities. 
Weekly compensation claim: This is a claim in which workers receive compensation 
loss of earnings when they are unable to work because of their injury. In New Zealand, 
there is a one-week stand-down period for weekly compensation. Therefore, it captures 
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Figure B.1: ACC45 form 
 
Source: Getting help and what to know if you’ve been injured at work, September 2009. 
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Table C.1: OLS comparison of alternative ways of treating the age variable 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 










 No age squared Age squared No age squared Age squared categories 
Female 0.0020 0.00794 0.000275 0.00426 0.00738 
 (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0139) 
Age (10 years) -0.025*** -0.119*** -0.0333*** -0.108***  
 (0.00413) (0.0193) (0.00485) (0.0264)  
Age squared  0.00999***  0.00868***  
  (0.00202)  (0.00305)  
Age 45-55 (reference)      
      
Age <25     0.157*** 
     (0.0235) 
Age 25-35     0.0115 
     (0.0241) 
Age 35-45     0.0213 
     (0.0203) 
Age 55-65     -0.0151 
     (0.0226) 
Age 65-75     -0.0450 
     (0.0281) 
Age 75-85     -0.0117 
     (0.0331) 
Age 85-95     0.125*** 
     (0.0480) 
Age 95+     -0.273 
     (0.212) 
Born in NZ 0.00324 0.00522 -0.00308 -0.000757 0.00631 
 (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0241) (0.0240) (0.0226) 
NZ European (reference) 
 
     
Other European 0.0305 0.0276 0.0153 0.0139 0.0320 
 (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0339) 
Māori -0.119*** -0.109*** -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.111*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0284) 
Samoan -0.0627 -0.0610 -0.0647 -0.0644 -0.0628 
 (0.0565) (0.0568) (0.0567) (0.0570) (0.0563) 
Chinese -0.289*** -0.279*** -0.289*** -0.282*** -0.273*** 
 (0.0694) (0.0693) (0.0736) (0.0734) (0.0696) 
European & Māori -0.0421 -0.0384 -0.0423 -0.0391 -0.0358 
 (0.0297) (0.0296) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0295) 
Other ethnicity/ies -0.103*** -0.0998*** -0.101*** -0.0987*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0290) (0.0290) (0.0283) 
Lives with a partner -0.0263* -0.00136 -0.0163 -0.00336 0.00164 
 (0.0144) (0.0154) (0.0156) (0.0163) (0.0154) 
Highest qualification: None       
(reference)      
School qualifications 0.0468** 0.0421** 0.0426** 0.0432** 0.0392** 
 (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0182) 
Vocational 0.0370** 0.0472*** 0.0383** 0.0468** 0.0459** 
 (0.0177) (0.0179) (0.0188) (0.0190) (0.0179) 
Degree 0.0248 0.0352 0.0227 0.0312 0.0361 
 (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0246) 
Other post-school 0.0991** 0.102** 0.0900* 0.0946** 0.101** 
 (0.0426) (0.0426) (0.0468) (0.0470) (0.0428) 
Location: Main urban area       
(reference)      
Secondary urban area -0.0425* -0.0429* -0.0529** -0.0524** -0.0406* 
 (0.0239) (0.0237) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0238) 
Minor urban area -0.0256 -0.0257 -0.0287 -0.0294 -0.0226 
 (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0234) (0.0233) (0.0220) 
Rural area -0.0406* -0.0377* -0.0401* -0.0393* -0.0361* 
 (0.0212) (0.0213) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0212) 
Log annual household income 0.00917 0.00863 0.00780 0.00721 0.00749 




 (0.00728) (0.00726) (0.00748) (0.00746) (0.00721) 
Employed at HED -0.0153 -0.00476 -0.0147 -0.00595 -0.0111 
 (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0249) 
Occupation: Manager (reference)      
      
Professional -0.0315 -0.0377 -0.0319 -0.0359 -0.0343 
 (0.0298) (0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0299) 
Associate Professional -0.0201 -0.0278 -0.0210 -0.0259 -0.0241 
 (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0316) 
Clerical Services 0.0338 0.0276 0.0312 0.0272 0.0311 
 (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0302) 
Community & Personal 
Service  
-0.0157 -0.0327 -0.0215 -0.0319 -0.0321 
 (0.0281) (0.0283) (0.0283) (0.0286) (0.0284) 
Agricultural & Fisheries 0.0679* 0.0591 0.0646* 0.0594 0.0625* 
 (0.0365) (0.0364) (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0367) 
Craft and Trades Workers 0.0422 0.0340 0.0376 0.0330 0.0356 
 (0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0333) 
Machine Operators & 
Drivers 
0.0794** 0.0758** 0.0750** 0.0740** 0.0759** 
 (0.0323) (0.0323) (0.0326) (0.0325) (0.0323) 
Labourers 0.00284 -0.0102 -0.00538 -0.0130 -0.0112 
 (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0339) 
No occupation (did not 
work) 
0.00880 -0.0257 -0.00556 -0.0239 -0.0187 
 (0.0332) (0.0340) (0.0340) (0.0347) (0.0339) 
Works 60+ hours per week 0.0443 0.0477 0.0453 0.0475 0.0435 
 (0.0399) (0.0396) (0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0398) 
Put off visiting a doctor in last 
12  
-0.0302* -0.0163 -0.0285* -0.0193 -0.0143 
     months because of cost (0.0170) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0172) 
As Healthy As Others: 
Definitely  
     
(reference)      
Mostly as healthy as others -0.00523 -0.00461 -0.00704 -0.00692 -0.00504 
 (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0141) 
Neither as healthy as others  -0.070*** -0.0677*** -0.0756*** -0.0736*** -0.0707*** 
     or not (0.0212) (0.0212) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0212) 
Mostly not as healthy as  -0.0448* -0.0405* -0.0367 -0.0333 -0.0465** 
     others (0.0235) (0.0234) (0.0247) (0.0247) (0.0234) 
Definitely not as healthy as  -0.0600* -0.0448 -0.0558* -0.0457 -0.0541* 
     others (0.0310) (0.0309) (0.0334) (0.0334) (0.0310) 
Would visit primary healthcare 
provider with a new health) 
     
problem: Definitely (reference      
Probably  -0.0163 -0.0179 -0.0185 -0.0196 -0.0175 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0150) 
Probably not  0.0133 0.0168 0.0178 0.0199 0.0136 
 (0.0399) (0.0400) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0402) 
Definitely not  -0.0502 -0.0417 -0.0469 -0.0431 -0.0470 
 (0.0713) (0.0709) (0.0715) (0.0710) (0.0712) 
Admitted to hospital in last 12  0.0695*** 0.0668*** 0.0617*** 0.0621*** 0.0692*** 
months (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0151) 
Firm size: 1-19 employees       
(reference)      
20-249 employees -0.00113 -0.00327 0.000848 -0.000702 -0.000947 
 (0.0357) (0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0356) (0.0357) 
250+ employees 0.00359 0.00265 0.00642 0.00533 0.00725 
 (0.0307) (0.0306) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0309) 
Other -0.0626* -0.0582* -0.0568* -0.0560* -0.0592* 
 (0.0329) (0.0328) (0.0331) (0.0330) (0.0331) 
Constant 0.725*** 0.896*** 0.777*** 0.902*** 0.578*** 
 (0.0983) (0.104) (0.101) (0.110) (0.0953) 
Observations 5,943 5,943 5427 5427 5,940 
R-squared 0.034 0.038 0.037 0.039 0.040 
      




Note: Unweighted linear regression predicting whether a person had an ACC claim in 
the last 12 months, given they had a limiting injury in the last 12 months. Sample 
restricted to people who had a limiting injury in the last 12 months. Each column treats 
the age variable differently. The dependent variable equals one if they had an accepted 
claim with an accident in the 12 months before the SoFIE interview. Full set of controls 
included.  
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Table D.1: Robustness check on exclusion of firms thought to be in the Accredited 
Employer Programme 
 Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLES AEP1 AEP2 AEP3 AEP1 AEP2 AEP3 
 80% AEP 95% AEP 5% AEP 80% AEP 95% AEP 5% AEP 
Dependent variable: Number of claims with treatment costs over $500    
RF*post2011 -0.0156 -0.0222** -0.0146 -0.0318*** -0.0296*** -0.0330** 
 (0.00970) (0.00924) (0.00993) (0.00762) (0.00751) (0.00788) 
RF*Time trend -0.00109 -0.00106 -0.00139 0.00501**
* 
0.0042*** 0.00415*** 
 (0.00182) (0.00168) (0.00188) (0.00158) (0.00141) (0.00160) 
Constant -0.0252 0.00335 -0.0729 0.631*** 0.807*** 0.595*** 
 (0.102) (0.0989) (0.107) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113) 
Controls       
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
R-squared 0.042 0.040 0.041 0.080 0.072 0.079 
Observations 49,722  52,428 47,385 49,722  52,428 47,385 
Number of firms 7,821 8,229  7,578 7,821 8,229  7,578 
Mean log claims 0.0684 0.7095 0.6795 1.2791 1.3275 1.2641 
Note: In the main analysis, firms are assumed to be in the Accredited Employers 
Programme (AEP) and therefore excluded from the experience rating sample if more 
than 80% of their claims are flagged as AEP claims. This table tests different thresholds. 
It indicates that the results are not sensitive to how this is defined. This inverse 
hyperbolic sine regression contains the full set of controls (firm characteristics, year 
fixed effects and firm fixed effects). The dependent variable is claims with treatment costs 
greater than $500.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Table D.2: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation regression of firms predicting the rate of injury claims with treatment costs over $500 per 
1,000 employees 
Sample: Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Rate  of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 per 1,000 employees     
RF*Post2011 -0.0358** -0.0113 -0.0247* -0.0108 -0.0364** -0.0298** -0.00710 -0.00328 
 (0.0148) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0235) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0134) (0.0229) 
RF 0.410*** 0.595***   0.982*** 0.901***   
 (0.0233) (0.0217)   (0.0214) (0.0254)   
RF*Time trend    -0.00295    -0.000813 
    (0.00418)    (0.00410) 
Employees (hundreds) -0.0460*** -0.0602*** 0.102*** 0.102*** -0.162*** -0.151*** 0.0682*** 0.0682*** 
 (0.00914) (0.00784) (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0101) (0.0111) (0.0177) (0.0177) 
Multi-site firm  0.120*** 0.274*** 0.273***  0.257*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 
  (0.0310) (0.0646) (0.0646)  (0.0302) (0.0674) (0.0674) 
Employee turnover  0.000888 -0.00151 -0.00151  -
0.00393*** 
-0.00149 -0.00149 
  (0.00102) (0.00117) (0.00117)  (0.00106) (0.00131) (0.00131) 
Monthly earning 
>$10,000+ 
        
         
% earning $5-$10,000  0.0287*** 0.00774** 0.00758**  0.00553* -0.00171 -0.00175 
  (0.00351) (0.00333) (0.00334)  (0.00318) (0.00363) (0.00365) 
% earning $2-$5,000  0.0343*** 0.00801*** 0.00783**  0.00348 -0.00279 -0.00284 
  (0.00307) (0.00305) (0.00306)  (0.00277) (0.00337) (0.00339) 
% earning $1-$2,000  0.0408*** 0.0137*** 0.0136***  0.00470 0.00340 0.00337 
  (0.00337) (0.00355) (0.00355)  (0.00312) (0.00411) (0.00412) 
% earning <$1,000  0.0394*** 0.0119*** 0.0118***  0.00385 -0.00576 -0.00581 
  (0.00320) (0.00356) (0.00356)  (0.00303) (0.00409) (0.00411) 
% Male  0.0142*** 0.00442*** 0.00443***  0.00132* 0.00280* 0.00280* 
  (0.000763) (0.00121) (0.00121)  (0.000796) (0.00156) (0.00156) 
% Aged<=25  0.00121 0.00332** 0.00333**  0.00921*** 0.00653*** 0.00653*** 
  (0.00121) (0.00153) (0.00153)  (0.00131) (0.00184) (0.00184) 
% Aged>60  -0.00305** -0.00145 -0.00146  -
0.00788*** 
-0.00584*** -0.00585*** 
  (0.00130) (0.00189) (0.00189)  (0.00161) (0.00216) (0.00216) 
Enterprise Age <=5 years         
         
5-10 years   -0.00917 0.0618 0.0618  0.0883 0.169** 0.169** 









10-15 years   -0.0110 0.190* 0.190*  0.0764 0.203** 0.203** 
  (0.0860) (0.104) (0.104)  (0.0834) (0.100) (0.100) 
>15 years   -0.0795 0.170 0.172  -0.101 0.0832 0.0836 
  (0.108) (0.128) (0.128)  (0.106) (0.126) (0.126) 
Enterprise size 
(firm=enterprise) 
        
         
Small  -0.456*** -0.232*** -0.232***  -0.475*** -0.367*** -0.367*** 
  (0.0423) (0.0849) (0.0849)  (0.0482) (0.0845) (0.0845) 
Medium low  -0.269*** -0.191*** -0.191***  -0.295*** -0.145** -0.145** 
  (0.0384) (0.0700) (0.0700)  (0.0400) (0.0668) (0.0668) 
Medium high  -0.128*** -0.0323 -0.0332  -0.204*** 0.0190 0.0188 
  (0.0442) (0.0760) (0.0760)  (0.0458) (0.0748) (0.0748) 
Large  -0.200*** -0.0573 -0.0579  -0.174*** -0.0627 -0.0628 
  (0.0469) (0.0892) (0.0892)  (0.0506) (0.0931) (0.0931) 
Constant 1.933*** -2.141*** 0.485 0.501 2.961*** 1.885*** 2.578*** 2.582*** 
 (0.0300) (0.327) (0.337) (0.337) (0.0288) (0.301) (0.389) (0.390) 
Controls         
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Level 2  Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
         
R-squared 0.027 0.117 0.004 0.004 0.134 0.169 0.012 0.012 
Observations 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 
Number of firms   7821 7821   7821 7821 
Mean dependent variable 1.9529 1.9529 1.9529 1.9529 3.1757 3.1757 3.1757 3.1757 
Note: This table displays the results of a log linear regression looking at whether the degree of experience rating (RF) is associated with the 
rate of work injury claims per 1,000 employees following the introduction of experience rating (post2011). Additional controls are at the 
end. The regressions in this table include controls for the number of employees but exclude the quadratic term. The R squared values for the 
firm fixed effects model are low. 










Table D.3: Model comparison of predictions of the impact of experience rating on the rate of claims with treatment costs over $500 per 
1,000 employees 
                    SAMPLE: WORK CLAIMS EARNERS’ CLAIMS 
VARIABLES (4) (1) (2) (3) (8) (5) (6) (7) 
MODEL: SINH-1 LOG-LINEAR LOG-LINEAR 2 OLS SINH-1 LOG-LINEAR LOG-LINEAR 2 OLS 
  WITH FIRM FIXED EFFECTS   
Dependent variable: Rate of claims with treatment costs over $500 per 1,000 employees 
RF*post2011 -0.0108 -0.0147 -0.000490 -0.230 -0.00328 -0.0262*** 0.0298 -1.939 
 (0.0235) (0.0118) (0.0464) (0.852) (0.0229) (0.00789) (0.0394) (1.956) 
RF*Time trend -0.00295 0.00479** -0.00854 0.0187 -0.000813 0.00827*** -0.0122* 0.362* 
 (0.00418) (0.00226) (0.00825) (0.119) (0.00410) (0.00153) (0.00705) (0.198) 
Constant 0.501 2.702*** -3.417*** -8.529 2.582*** 3.885*** 0.337 2.374 
 (0.337) (0.257) (0.633) (8.084) (0.390) (0.187) (0.665) (24.65) 
         
R-Squared 0.004 0.015 0.005 0.002 0.012 0.032 0.010 0.005 
  WITHOUT FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
  
Dependent variable: Rate of claims with treatment costs over $500 per 1,000 employees 
RF*post2011 -0.0366 -0.000180 -0.0501 -0.0186 -0.0211 -0.0198** -0.00665 -1.017 
 (0.0237) (0.0131) (0.0467) (0.685) (0.0233) (0.00911) (0.0405) (1.139) 
RF*Time trend 0.00511 0.00606** 0.00823 -0.0256 -0.00176 0.00944*** -0.0129* -0.144 
 (0.00426) (0.00254) (0.00842) (0.108) (0.00428) (0.00185) (0.00758) (0.362) 
RF 0.577*** -0.615*** 1.442*** -1.135 0.907*** -0.334*** 1.896*** 3.915 
 (0.0266) (0.0186) (0.0529) (1.422) (0.0283) (0.0135) (0.0522) (5.831) 
Constant -2.150*** 2.357*** -8.846*** -6.397 1.888*** 4.498*** -1.379*** 38.22*** 
 (0.328) (0.361) (0.630) (10.75) (0.302) (0.148) (0.535) (8.972) 
         
R-Squared 0.117 0.558 0.149 0.039 0.169 0.245 0.198 0.014 
CONTROLS         
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 49,722 25,167  49,722 49,722   49,722  35,298 49,722  49,722  
Mean dependent variable 1.9529 3.1629  -0.6717  18.8005 3.1757 3.7821  1.3495  41.1709  
Note: This table compares the results from the log-linear, ols and inverse hyperbolic sine models. The negative binomial and Poisson quasi-
maximum likelihood models are not included here because rates are not a count variable. Two version of log-linear are used, in the first 
model firms with no claims are dropped from the sample, in the second they are assigned a claims rate of 0.01. 











Table D.4: Inverse hyperbolic sine transformation regression predicting claim rates per 1,000 employees for firms by type of claim 
SAMPLE: WORK CLAIMS EARNERS’ CLAIMS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 














Rate of average 
days  
off work per 
weekly 
compensation 
















Rate of average 
days  
off work per 
weekly 
compensation 
claim per 1,000 
employees 
VARIABLES         
RF*post2011 0.0107 0.0128 0.00497 0.0121 0.0235 0.0280 0.0301 0.0560*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.0223) (0.0301) (0.0199) (0.0194) (0.0225) (0.0196) 
RF*Time trend -0.00176 -0.00219 -0.00672* -0.00613 0.00455 0.00436 -0.00559 -0.0125*** 
 (0.00363) (0.00351) (0.00407) (0.00539) (0.00398) (0.00387) (0.00403) (0.00353) 
Constant 2.975*** 3.108*** 1.282*** 7.088*** 5.807*** 5.750*** 1.209*** 6.941*** 
 (0.347) (0.345) (0.301) (0.700) (0.440) (0.445) (0.361) (0.436) 
Controls         
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
R-squared 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.015 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.018 
Observations 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 49,722 
Number of firms 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 7,824 
Mean log claim rate 4.7544 4.9495 1.8342 3.2923 5.7520 5.8948 2.3149 4.0666 
Note: Each column represents a separate regression. Controls include year and firm fixed effects, industry level 2 and firm characteristics.  
The first group of columns is based on work claims while the second group of columns is based on off-the-job claims for workers. 










Table D.5: Model comparison results for regressions predicting number of claims with costs of treatment greater than $500 to test for parallel 
trends in the pre-treatment period (2006-2011) 
Sample:  Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
 Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine Poisson QML Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine Poisson QML 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
   Dependent variable: Number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500    
RF*Time trend 0.00335 0.00154 0.00463** 0.00127 0.00509 0.00615*** 0.00438** 0.00751*** 0.00686*** -0.00286 
 (0.00271) (0.00277) (0.00232) (0.00217) (3.994) (0.00204) (0.00213) (0.00201) (0.00194) (2.403) 
RF 0.239***  0.316***  0.700*** 0.546***  0.729***  0.762*** 
 (0.0211)  (0.0193)  (0.0489) (0.0211)  (0.0205)  (0.0335) 
Constant -2.267*** -0.557 -1.683*** 0.0759 -5.707** -0.647*** 0.0728 -0.207 0.477*** -2.683*** 
 (0.501) (0.493) (0.266) (0.163) (2.337) (0.185) (0.287) (0.160) (0.175) (0.455) 
Controls           
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry level 2  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes   Yes  Yes  
           
R-squared 0.385 0.040 0.390 0.030 0.444 0.664 0.100 0.661 0.080 0.684 
Observations 16,086 16,086 31,755 31,755 31,755 22,305 22,305 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms  5,937  7,824   6,813  7,824  
Mean dependent variable 0.52841 0.52841 0.6834 0.6834 1.2061 1.0087 1.0087 1.2564 1.2564 3.5270 
Note: These regressions include controls for firm characteristics and year fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, 5, 6, 8 and 10 include detailed 
industry fixed effects (level 2). Columns 2, 4, 7 and 9 include firm fixed effects but exclude industry. Includes controls for number of 
employees and its quadratic.  










Table D.6: Model comparison results for regressions predicting the rate of claims with costs of treatment greater than $500 per 1,000 
employees to test for parallel trends in the pre-treatment period (2006-2011) 
Sample:  Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
 Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine 
VARIABLES (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Dependent variable: Rate of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 per 1,000 employees 
RF*Time trend 0.00722** 0.00389 0.00653 -0.00009 0.0115*** 0.00917*** -0.00490 -0.00357 
 (0.00305) (0.00282) (0.00495) (0.00490) (0.00220) (0.00189) (0.00502) (0.00488) 
RF -0.663***  0.648***  -0.368***  0.979***  
 (0.0196)  (0.0290)  (0.0159)  (0.0325)  
Constant 2.855*** 2.740*** -2.278*** 1.359** 4.484*** 3.585*** 1.187*** 2.346*** 
 (0.529) (0.438) (0.557) (0.597) (0.226) (0.347) (0.404) (0.648) 
Controls         
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared         
Industry level 2  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Firm fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
         
R-squared 0.566 0.013 0.121 0.003 0.266 0.048 0.175 0.017 
Observations 16,086 16,086 31,755 31,755 22,305 22,305 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms  5,937  7,824  6,813  7,824 
Mean dependent variable 3.1891 3.1891 1.9682 1.9682 3.7884 3.7884 3.1460 3.1460 
Note: These regressions include controls for firm characteristics and year fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 include detailed industry fixed 
effects (level 2). Columns 2. 4, 6 and 8 include firm fixed effects but exclude industry. Includes controls for the number of employees but not 
the quadratic. 












Table D.7: Model comparison results for placebo test: Regression predicting number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 in the 
pre-treatment period 
Sample: Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
 Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)    
  Dependent variable: Number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500  
RF*Post2007 0.017*   0.052***   0.035***   0.060***   
 (0.0093)   (0.0113)   (0.0074)   (0.0091)   
RF*Post2008  0.011   0.036***   0.027***   0.039***  
  (0.0087)   (0.0124)   (0.0067)   (0.0101)  
RF*Post2009   -0.012   -0.057***   -0.013**   -0.066*** 
   (0.0093)   (0.0116)   (0.0063)   (0.0092) 
Constant -0.629 -0.603 -0.408 0.0796 0.0731 0.0813 -0.0208 0.00301 0.283 0.481*** 0.474*** 0.474*** 
 (0.493) (0.494) (0.481) (0.162) (0.163) (0.162) (0.282) (0.285) (0.285) (0.174) (0.175) (0.175) 
Controls             
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employees squared Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
             
R-squared 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.101 0.100 0.100 0.081 0.080 0.080 
Observations 16,086 16,086 16,086 31,755 31,755 31,755 22,305 22,305 22,305 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms 5,937 5,937 5,937 7,824 7,824 7,824 6,813 6,813 6,813 7,824 7,824 7,824 
Mean dep var 0.5284 0.5284 0.5284 0.6834 0.6834 0.6834 1.0087 1.0087 1.0087 1.2564 1.2564 1.2564 
Note: These regressions include controls for firm characteristics, year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. Includes controls for number of 
employees and its quadratic.  












Table D.8: Model comparison results for placebo test: Regression predicting rate of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 in the pre-
treatment period 
Sample: Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
 Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine Log-Linear Inverse hyperbolic sine 
VARIABLES (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) (12) 
  Dependent variable: Rate of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 per 1,000 employees   
RF*Post2007 0.026***   0.065**   0.050***   -0.070**   
 (0.0094)   (0.0276)   (0.0066)   (0.0278)   
RF*Post2008  0.015*   0.026   0.035***   -0.010  
  (0.0087)   (0.0300)   (0.0059)   (0.0294)  
RF*Post2009   -0.0091   -0.083***   -0.0041   0.084*** 
   (0.0095)   (0.0284)   (0.0060)   (0.0277) 
Constant 2.69*** 2.74*** 2.95*** 1.36** 1.36** 1.37** 3.53*** 3.59*** 3.87*** 2.34*** 2.35*** 2.34*** 
 (0.435) (0.436) (0.439) (0.597) (0.597) (0.596) (0.340) (0.343) (0.350) (0.649) (0.648) (0.649) 
Controls             
Firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes    
             
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.050 0.049 0.047 0.017 0.017 0.017 
Observations 16,086 16,086 16,086 31,755 31,755 31,755 22,305 22,305 22,305 31,755 31,755 31,755 
Number of firms 5,937 5,937 5,937 7,824 7,824 7,824 6,813 6,813 6,813 7,824 7,824 7,824 
Mean dep variable 3.1891 3.1891 3.1891 1.9682 1.9682 1.9682 3.7884 3.7884 3.7884 3.1460 3.1460 3.1460 
Note: These regressions include controls for firm characteristics, year fixed effects and firm fixed effects. It includes controls for the number 
of employees but not the quadratic. 












Table D.9: Log-linear regression of firms predicting the number of injury claims with treatment costs over $500  
Sample: Work Claims Earners’ Claims 
VARIABLE (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dependent variable: Number of claims Number of claims with treatment costs greater than $500 (log)     
RF*Post2011 -0.0431*** -0.0231*** -0.0196*** -0.0194* -0.0254*** -0.0236*** -0.0117** -0.0239*** 
 (0.00844) (0.00849) (0.00730) (0.0117) (0.00745) (0.00716) (0.00568) (0.00810) 
RF 0.108*** 0.188***   0.511*** 0.486***   
 (0.0166) (0.0193)   (0.0194) (0.0223)   
RF*Time trend    -0.000034    0.00265 
    (0.00220)    (0.00168) 
Employees (hundreds) 0.169*** 0.163*** 0.264*** 0.264*** 0.203*** 0.191*** 0.382*** 0.382*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0221) (0.0231) (0.0235) (0.0235) 
Employees squared -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00007 -0.00007 
 (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) 
Multi-site firm  0.0843*** 0.0837*** 0.0837***  0.109*** 0.0881*** 0.0885*** 
  (0.0165) (0.0297) (0.0297)  (0.0143) (0.0249) (0.0249) 
Employee turnover  0.000859 -0.000182 -0.000183  -0.00154*** -0.00087* -0.00085* 
  (0.000612) (0.000621) (0.000621)  (0.00054) (0.00050) (0.00050) 
Monthly earning >$10,000+         
         
% earning $5-$10,000  0.0164*** 0.00473** 0.00473*  0.00332** -0.000294 -1.61e-05 
  (0.00404) (0.00240) (0.00244)  (0.00148) (0.00171) (0.00173) 
% earning $2-$5,000  0.0174*** 0.00285 0.00284  0.00212 -0.000994 -0.000703 
  (0.00362) (0.00230) (0.00234)  (0.00132) (0.00167) (0.00169) 
% earning $1-$2,000  0.0212*** 0.00305 0.00305  0.00305** 0.000478 0.000696 
  (0.00382) (0.00262) (0.00265)  (0.00152) (0.00201) (0.00201) 
% earning <$1,000  0.0160*** 0.00136 0.00136  0.00222 -0.00238 -0.00210 
  (0.00355) (0.00275) (0.00278)  (0.00151) (0.00208) (0.00209) 
% Male  0.00690*** 0.00476*** 0.00476***  0.000613* 0.00263*** 0.00264*** 
  (0.000563) (0.00113) (0.00113)  (0.000363) (0.000836) (0.000836) 
% Aged<=25  0.000399 0.000958 0.000958  0.00429*** 0.00205*** 0.00205*** 
  (0.000959) (0.000881) (0.000882)  (0.000600) (0.000759) (0.000759) 
% Aged>60  -0.00181** -0.000520 -0.000520  -0.00286*** -0.00213** -0.00211** 
  (0.000725) (0.00117) (0.00117)  (0.000669) (0.000984) (0.000984) 
Enterprise Age <=5 years         
         
5-10 years   0.0143 -0.0200 -0.0200  0.00614 -0.0190 -0.0192 
  (0.0312) (0.0343) (0.0343)  (0.0306) (0.0296) (0.0296) 
10-15 years   0.0198 -0.0449 -0.0449  0.0299 -0.0205 -0.0216 








>15 years   0.0165 -0.0940* -0.0940*  0.0216 -0.0411 -0.0435 
  (0.0469) (0.0553) (0.0555)  (0.0457) (0.0460) (0.0460) 
Enterprise size 
(firm=enterprise) 
        
         
Small  -0.0779*** -0.0624* -0.0624*  -0.106*** -0.0788** -0.0787** 
  (0.0172) (0.0319) (0.0319)  (0.0175) (0.0329) (0.0329) 
Medium low  0.0309* -0.0136 -0.0136  -0.0225 -0.00409 -0.00396 
  (0.0182) (0.0347) (0.0347)  (0.0167) (0.0275) (0.0275) 
Medium high  0.111*** 0.0160 0.0160  0.0759*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
  (0.0240) (0.0430) (0.0431)  (0.0194) (0.0325) (0.0326) 
Large  0.0826*** -0.0197 -0.0197  -0.0209 0.0795* 0.0800* 
  (0.0309) (0.0520) (0.0520)  (0.0219) (0.0458) (0.0459) 
Constant 0.245*** -2.001*** -0.449* -0.449* 0.476*** -0.0601 0.304 0.277 
 (0.0163) (0.343) (0.253) (0.257) (0.0187) (0.142) (0.187) (0.189) 
Controls         
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Level 2  Yes    Yes   
Firm fixed effects   Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
         
R-squared 0.292 0.378 0.052 0.052 0.631 0.653 0.099 0.099 
Observations 25,167 25,167 25,167 25,167 35,298 35,298 35,298 35,298 
Number of firms   6,366 6,366   7,074 7,074 
Mean log claims 0.5324 0.5324 0.5324 0.5324 1.0256 1.0256 1.0256 1.0256 
Note: This table displays the results of a log-linear regression looking at whether the degree of experience rating (RF) is associated with the 
number and rate of work injury claims following the introduction of experience rating (post2011). The coefficients for the interaction terms are 
displayed, along with that for RF. Additional controls are displayed in the bottom panel. 






 APPENDIX D: APPENDICES FOR CHAPTER 7 
170 
 
D.2 Calculations used in deriving variables 
D.2.1 The Rating Factor calculation 
The weighting for degree of experience rating (for firms with levies of over $10,000) 
is described in the experience rating Regulations as follows: 
a) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
$2,000,000 or less, the weighting is the result of— 
0.05 × √(LE ÷ $2,000,000) 
b) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $2,000,000 and equal to or under $5,000,000, the weighting is the 
result of— 
5% + {0.05 × √[(LE – $2,000,000) ÷ $3,000,000]} 
c) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $5,000,000 and equal to or under $10,000,000, the weighting is the 
result of— 
10% + {0.05 × √[(LE – $5,000,000) ÷ $5,000,000]} 
d) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $10,000,000 and equal to or under $20,000,000, the weighting is the 
result of— 
15% + {0.05 × √[(LE – $10,000,000) ÷ $10,000,000]} 
e) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $20,000,000 and equal to or under $50,000,000, the weighting is the 
result of— 
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20% + {0.1 × √[(LE – $20,000,000) ÷ $30,000,000]} 
f) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $50,000,000 and equal to or under $100,000,000, the weighting is the 
result of— 
30% + {0.1 × √[(LE – $50,000,000) ÷ $50,000,000]} 
g) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $100,000,000 and equal to or under $200,000,000, the weighting is the 
result of— 
40% + {0.1 × √[(LE – $100,000,000) ÷ $100,000,000]} 
h) if the liable earnings (LE) of the levy payer in the experience period are 
over $200,000,000 and equal to or under $1,350,000,000, the weighting is 
the result of— 
50% + {0.5 × √[(LE – $200,000,000) ÷ $1,150,000,000]} 
i) if the liable earnings of the levy payer in the experience period are over 
$1,350,000,000, the weighting is 100%. 
D.2.2 Liable earnings 
The calculation for liable earnings is: 
• Total gross earnings paid to employees (from IR348 PAYE schedules) 
• Less total earnings not liable for levies such as redundancy payments or pensions 
• Less other payments not liable, such as payments to contractors who meet their 
own ACC liabilities 
• Less total excess paid to employees over the maximum (for example, in 2008 the 
maximum individual employee earnings was $99,817.25). 
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Table E.1: Full regression results of lost-time injuries OLS estimates of the “Monday Effect” from linear probability models by type of injuries  
 Work  Off-the-Job Work  Off-the-Job Work  Off-the-Job 
VARIABLES Strain & Sprain Strain & Sprain Fractures Fractures Contusions Contusions 
Day of week (ref: Thursday)       
Sunday 0.00346 -0.0431*** 0.00400 0.0334*** 0.000897 0.00325*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00250) (0.00276) (0.00231) (0.00202) (0.00119) 
Monday 0.0188*** 0.0170*** -0.00467*** -0.0137*** -0.00259** 0.00217 
 (0.00261) (0.00290) (0.00173) (0.00257) (0.00126) (0.00137) 
Tuesday 0.00640** 0.0161*** -0.00203 -0.0133*** 0.000673 0.000594 
 (0.00261) (0.00297) (0.00174) (0.00264) (0.00128) (0.00139) 
Wednesday 0.00558** 0.0109*** 0.000523 -0.00684*** 0.00123 0.00161 
 (0.00263) (0.00293) (0.00176) (0.00262) (0.00129) (0.00138) 
Friday 0.00366 -0.0373*** 0.00149 0.0327*** -0.00326** 0.00181 
 (0.00270) (0.00280) (0.00182) (0.00261) (0.00130) (0.00134) 
Saturday 0.000574 -0.0178*** 0.00909*** 0.0326*** -0.000364 0.00156 
 (0.00355) (0.00239) (0.00245) (0.00219) (0.00175) (0.00113) 
Year (ref: 2001) 
      
2002 0.00426 -0.00446 -0.00965*** -0.00474 0.00412* 0.00536*** 
 (0.00426) (0.00393) (0.00299) (0.00379) (0.00210) (0.00194) 
2003 -0.00135 -0.0295*** -0.00453 0.000879 -0.00180 -0.00388** 
 (0.00421) (0.00383) (0.00298) (0.00375) (0.00203) (0.00184) 
2004 0.0126*** -0.0223*** -0.00288 0.00642* -0.00359* -0.00635*** 
 (0.00420) (0.00382) (0.00297) (0.00372) (0.00200) (0.00181) 
2005 0.0415*** 0.00194 -0.00800*** 0.00327 0.00663*** 0.00512*** 
 (0.00423) (0.00382) (0.00294) (0.00368) (0.00208) (0.00188) 
2006 0.0497*** 0.00814** -0.0160*** -0.0130*** 0.00799*** 0.00599*** 
 (0.00423) (0.00377) (0.00290) (0.00359) (0.00209) (0.00185) 
2007 0.0588*** 0.0178*** -0.0217*** -0.0301*** 0.00854*** 0.00716*** 
 (0.00425) (0.00371) (0.00288) (0.00350) (0.00211) (0.00182) 
2008 0.0739*** 0.0122*** -0.0170*** -0.0195*** 0.00465** 0.000501 
 (0.00432) (0.00370) (0.00295) (0.00351) (0.00210) (0.00178) 
2009 0.0774*** 0.00990*** -0.0138*** 0.00125 0.00309 -0.00658*** 
 (0.00449) (0.00380) (0.00308) (0.00363) (0.00217) (0.00178) 









 (0.00461) (0.00386) (0.00321) (0.00370) (0.00228) (0.00180) 
2011 0.0666*** -0.00250 -0.00504 0.00287 0.0115*** -0.00382** 
 (0.00467) (0.00391) (0.00327) (0.00374) (0.00235) (0.00185) 
2012 -0.0194*** 0.0123*** -0.0199*** -0.00884** -0.00615*** -0.00174 
 (0.00457) (0.00390) (0.00318) (0.00369) (0.00217) (0.00185) 
2013 -0.0368*** 0.0177*** -0.0285*** -0.0187*** -0.00603*** 0.00175 
 (0.00450) (0.00388) (0.00308) (0.00364) (0.00215) (0.00186) 
2014 -0.0165*** 0.0142*** -0.0339*** -0.0242*** -0.00767*** 0.00107 
 (0.00444) (0.00384) (0.00299) (0.00360) (0.00209) (0.00184) 
2015 0.000636 0.0281*** -0.0368*** -0.0184*** -0.00816*** 0.00266 
 (0.00441) (0.00492) (0.00294) (0.00445) (0.00206) (0.00237) 
2016 0.0211*** 0.0177*** -0.0390*** -0.0134*** -0.00249 0.0101*** 
 (0.00541) (0.00542) (0.00348) (0.00489) (0.00256) (0.00266) 
Observable characteristics 
      
Male -0.0585*** -0.0413*** 0.00341** -0.0103*** -0.0104*** -0.00839*** 
 (0.00215) (0.00165) (0.00138) (0.00150) (0.00108) (0.000791) 
Age (to nearest year) 0.000488*** 0.00102*** -0.000221*** -0.00165*** 0.000270*** 0.000374*** 
 (5.95e-05) (4.87e-05) (4.25e-05) (4.60e-05) (3.00e-05) (2.45e-05) 
Weekly benefits (hundreds) 0.00417*** 0.00907*** 0.00396*** -0.00998*** -0.000173 -0.000191 
 (0.000366) (0.000320) (0.000227) (0.000288) (0.000174) (0.000149) 
Industry (ref: Healthcare & Social Assistance) 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing -0.0540*** -0.0135 0.0611*** 0.0116 0.00918*** -0.0114** 
 (0.00526) (0.0106) (0.00350) (0.00939) (0.00258) (0.00524) 
Mining -0.0462*** 0.0234 0.0410*** -0.00155 0.0241*** -0.00956 
 (0.0133) (0.0354) (0.00946) (0.0281) (0.00730) (0.0167) 
Manufacturing -0.0726*** 0.0108 0.000196 -0.0132* -0.00259 -0.00421 
 (0.00450) (0.00888) (0.00269) (0.00755) (0.00215) (0.00448) 
Electricity, Gas, Water & Waste 
Supply 
0.00158 0.0207 0.0177*** -0.00399 0.00961** 0.00652 
 (0.00929) (0.0222) (0.00574) (0.0183) (0.00455) (0.0118) 
Construction -0.0101** 0.0157* 0.0347*** -0.0151** -0.00131 -0.0121*** 
 (0.00478) (0.00884) (0.00294) (0.00757) (0.00225) (0.00434) 
Wholesale Trade 0.00176 0.00734 0.0183*** 0.00910 0.00344 -0.00866 
 (0.00607) (0.0130) (0.00372) (0.0113) (0.00289) (0.00624) 









 (0.00488) (0.0102) (0.00287) (0.00891) (0.00233) (0.00502) 
Accommodation & Food Services -0.0749*** -0.0395*** 0.0343*** 0.0111 -0.000741 -0.00803 
 (0.00579) (0.0114) (0.00360) (0.0104) (0.00277) (0.00572) 
Transport, Postal & Warehousing 0.0129** 0.0232* 0.0417*** -0.0236** 0.0177*** -7.43e-05 
 (0.00520) (0.0124) (0.00322) (0.0101) (0.00257) (0.00637) 
Information Media & 
Telecommunications 
0.0676*** -0.0164 -4.16e-05 0.0537* 0.0233*** -0.0229* 
 (0.0111) (0.0301) (0.00626) (0.0280) (0.00592) (0.0121) 
Financial & Insurance Services -0.0759*** -0.0421** 0.0387*** 0.0122 0.00303 -0.0182** 
 (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0112) (0.0147) (0.00795) (0.00739) 
Rental, Hiring & Real Estate Services -0.0202*** -0.0309* 0.0403*** 0.0338** 0.0118*** -0.0154** 
 (0.00604) (0.0159) (0.00394) (0.0146) (0.00299) (0.00732) 
Professional, Scientific & Technical 
Services 
-0.0290*** -0.0341*** 0.0506*** 0.0276*** 0.00191 -0.0186*** 
 (0.00853) (0.0119) (0.00596) (0.0107) (0.00399) (0.00540) 
Administrative & Support Services -0.00737 -0.00705 0.0609*** 0.0185 -0.000246 -0.00286 
 (0.00735) (0.0159) (0.00502) (0.0142) (0.00348) (0.00814) 
Public Administration & Safety -0.0101 -0.00417 0.0314*** 0.0185*** 0.0151*** -0.00507 
 (0.00618) (0.00802) (0.00399) (0.00687) (0.00308) (0.00404) 
Education & Training 0.0334*** 0.0374*** -0.0145*** -0.0269** -0.000137 -0.00637 
 (0.00533) (0.0136) (0.00289) (0.0111) (0.00253) (0.00655) 
Arts & Recreation Services 0.00627 -0.0241* 0.0908*** 0.0223* 0.00707** -0.0145** 
 (0.00660) (0.0129) (0.00478) (0.0115) (0.00320) (0.00597) 
Other Services -0.00658 0.0375** 0.0707*** -0.0292** 0.00579 -0.00920 
 (0.00806) (0.0161) (0.00580) (0.0136) (0.00386) (0.00742) 
Industry Not Applicable -0.0105 -0.0169 0.0428*** -0.00443 0.00460 -0.0135** 
 (0.00809) (0.0129) (0.00538) (0.0112) (0.00377) (0.00613) 
Occupation (ref: Plant and machine operators & assemblers) 
Agriculture & fishery workers -0.0306*** -0.0138*** 0.0417*** 0.00959*** 0.00623*** -0.00382*** 
 (0.00365) (0.00294) (0.00267) (0.00278) (0.00183) (0.00148) 
Clerks 0.0484*** 0.00605* -0.00651** 0.0188*** -0.00246 -0.0103*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00323) (0.00307) (0.00300) (0.00245) (0.00157) 
Elementary occupations 0.0220*** -0.0103*** -2.63e-06 0.00499** 0.00125 0.00122 
 (0.00267) (0.00265) (0.00168) (0.00247) (0.00129) (0.00136) 
Legislators, administrators & manager 0.0143*** 0.000629 0.0254*** 0.0273*** -0.00417* -0.0195*** 









None & missing -0.0723*** -0.0577*** -0.00693** -0.0407*** -0.00514** -0.0101*** 
 (0.00425) (0.00287) (0.00280) (0.00267) (0.00207) (0.00142) 
Professionals -0.0157*** -0.00658** 0.0197*** 0.0255*** -0.00735*** -0.0183*** 
 (0.00446) (0.00287) (0.00305) (0.00263) (0.00211) (0.00135) 
Service & sales workers 0.0445*** 0.00458* -0.00862*** 0.0117*** -0.00198 -0.00617*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00259) (0.00235) (0.00240) (0.00184) (0.00128) 
Technicians & associate professionals 0.00469 0.0146*** 0.0125*** 0.0101*** -0.00245 -0.0148*** 
 (0.00427) (0.00287) (0.00290) (0.00261) (0.00208) (0.00136) 
Trades workers -0.0112*** 0.0109*** 0.00260 0.0127*** -0.00600*** -0.00503*** 
 (0.00267) (0.00240) (0.00174) (0.00221) (0.00122) (0.00117) 
Ethnicity (ref: European only) 
      
Māori only 0.00751*** 0.0302*** -0.0206*** -0.0425*** 0.0107*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00234) (0.00158) (0.00210) (0.00128) (0.00122) 
Pacific only -0.00750** 0.0262*** -0.0124*** -0.0436*** 0.00882*** 0.00934*** 
 (0.00373) (0.00321) (0.00233) (0.00289) (0.00187) (0.00162) 
Asian only 0.0112*** 0.0280*** -0.00235 -0.0372*** 0.0162*** 0.0189*** 
 (0.00377) (0.00364) (0.00246) (0.00322) (0.00196) (0.00191) 
Middle Eastern, Latin American or 
African (MELAA) only 
0.0319*** 0.0212** -0.00751 -0.0424*** 0.00533 0.000272 
 (0.00889) (0.00841) (0.00572) (0.00751) (0.00424) (0.00385) 
Other (single ethnicity) 0.0226*** 0.0232*** -0.0112*** -0.0267*** -0.00202 -0.000919 
 (0.00610) (0.00499) (0.00400) (0.00445) (0.00282) (0.00228) 
European & Māori 0.0164*** 0.0276*** -0.0153*** -0.0313*** 0.00581*** 0.00363*** 
 (0.00310) (0.00248) (0.00200) (0.00228) (0.00151) (0.00118) 
European & Pacific 0.0347*** 0.0461*** -0.0217*** -0.0441*** 0.00462 -0.00399 
 (0.00972) (0.00680) (0.00590) (0.00610) (0.00457) (0.00296) 
European & Asian 0.00782 -0.00820 -0.00816 -0.0307** 0.00556 0.00301 
 (0.0199) (0.0139) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.00963) (0.00660) 
European & MELAA 0.0121 -0.0111* -0.00918* -0.00504 -0.00239 0.00298 
 (0.00752) (0.00581) (0.00495) (0.00563) (0.00342) (0.00282) 
European & Other 0.00117 0.00815 -0.0132 -0.00883 0.0227** 0.00349 
 (0.0166) (0.0136) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.00922) (0.00661) 
Māori & Pacific -0.0146 0.0361*** -0.0141* -0.0426*** 0.000512 0.00586 
 (0.0120) (0.00932) (0.00754) (0.00850) (0.00561) (0.00454) 
Māori & Asian 0.0412 0.0689** -0.0385** -0.0322 -0.00414 -0.0198* 









Māori & MELAA -0.00617 0.0231 -0.00639 -0.0195 0.00435 -0.00371 
 (0.0227) (0.0208) (0.0152) (0.0194) (0.0113) (0.00952) 
Māori & Other -0.0259 0.0746 0.0235 0.0240 0.0244 0.00479 
 (0.0454) (0.0487) (0.0343) (0.0446) (0.0261) (0.0226) 
Pacific & Asian 0.0358** 0.0708*** -0.0231** -0.0663*** 0.0261*** 0.0229*** 
 (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0103) (0.0140) (0.00966) (0.00886) 
Pacific & MELAA 0.0756** 0.0462 -0.0228 -0.0529** 0.0143 0.00808 
 (0.0351) (0.0297) (0.0212) (0.0263) (0.0179) (0.0147) 
Pacific & Other -0.0995 -0.0337 0.0842 -0.0355 -0.0511*** -0.0277 
 (0.103) (0.0652) (0.0965) (0.0625) (0.00258) (0.0204) 
Asian & MELAA -0.0312 0.0125 -0.0368** -0.0230 0.0405** 0.00736 
 (0.0284) (0.0298) (0.0160) (0.0274) (0.0175) (0.0144) 
Asian & Other 0.133* 0.00666 -0.0978*** -0.0840* -0.00821 0.0406 
 (0.0744) (0.0541) (0.0235) (0.0458) (0.0318) (0.0329) 
MELAA & Other 0.151*** 0.0397 -0.0766*** 0.0865* -0.000200 -0.00396 
 (0.0535) (0.0514) (0.0234) (0.0520) (0.0235) (0.0220) 
European, Māori & Pacific 0.0454 0.0931** -0.0172 -0.0717** 0.0344 -0.0110 
 (0.0470) (0.0375) (0.0278) (0.0306) (0.0270) (0.0147) 
European, Māori & Asian 0.0213 0.0280*** -0.00870 -0.0427*** 0.0184*** 0.000140 
 (0.0134) (0.0100) (0.00868) (0.00918) (0.00706) (0.00461) 
European, Māori & MELAA 0.0327 0.0940*** -0.0290 -0.0394* 0.0152 0.00602 
 (0.0321) (0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0205) (0.0166) (0.0110) 
European, Māori & Other 0.0264 -0.0188 -0.0100 -0.0172 0.0181** 0.00970 
 (0.0165) (0.0134) (0.0107) (0.0131) (0.00879) (0.00703) 
European, Pacific & Asian 0.0725** 0.0148 -0.0167 -0.0704*** -0.00327 0.0221 
 (0.0364) (0.0298) (0.0229) (0.0256) (0.0159) (0.0166) 
European, Pacific & MELAA -0.0256 0.0507 -0.0173 -0.0873*** 0.0318 0.00623 
 (0.0432) (0.0355) (0.0274) (0.0295) (0.0252) (0.0168) 
European, Pacific & Other 0.0233 0.0529 -0.00351 -0.0813*** -0.00495 0.0165 
 (0.0437) (0.0333) (0.0284) (0.0278) (0.0191) (0.0171) 
European, MELAA & Other -0.000958 0.0789** 0.00225 -0.0797** 0.0289 0.0490** 
 (0.0492) (0.0379) (0.0331) (0.0311) (0.0277) (0.0231) 
Māori, Pacific & Asian -0.0295 -0.0568 -0.0201 0.0496 0.0570 -0.0149 
 (0.0774) (0.0614) (0.0510) (0.0651) (0.0522) (0.0259) 
Māori, Pacific & MELAA 0.121 -0.0426 0.00660 -0.0380 0.0422 -0.0489*** 
 (0.0867) (0.0562) (0.0556) (0.0553) (0.0501) (0.00120) 









 (0.0587) (0.0522) (0.0216) (0.0481) (0.0284) (0.0214) 
European, Māori, Pacific & Asian 0.141* -0.0183 0.0121 -0.0333 0.0197 -0.0108 
 (0.0767) (0.0692) (0.0493) (0.0632) (0.0408) (0.0311) 
European, Māori, Pacific & MELAA  -0.0383 0.00412 -0.0315 0.00219 0.0308 -0.00781 
 (0.0559) (0.0424) (0.0328) (0.0414) (0.0321) (0.0188) 
Other ethnic combinations -0.0454 0.0615 0.0223 -0.105*** -0.00315 0.0310 
 (0.0625) (0.0452) (0.0458) (0.0368) (0.0286) (0.0252) 
Constant 0.00751*** 0.0302*** -0.0206*** -0.0425*** 0.0107*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.00251) (0.00234) (0.00158) (0.00210) (0.00128) (0.00122) 
Observations 376,242 534,381 376,242 534,381 376,242 534,381 
R-squared 0.021 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.003 0.003 
Notes: The dependent variable in each regression is a dummy variable for the type of injury. The table reports coefficient estimates for the 
Monday/first Tuesday back from a public holiday dummy variable from several different linear probability regressions that estimate the 
incidence of each type of injury. Robust-cluster standard errors are in parentheses. Controls for observable characteristics include gender 
(male=1), age at time of accident, and gross weekly benefits. Industry dummies are level 1 ANZSIC. Occupation dummies are level 1 ANZSCO.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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